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Abstract
How can we understand the major contradiction that seems to exist between the unilateral 
global strategies of certain actors and a world which is now, for the first time, largely 
interdependent? This question has undoubtedly been among the key themes of the 
globalization debate in the post 9/11 world. While writers on globalization have tended to 
focus their attention on the incoherencies and eventual failures of the Bush 
Administration’s policies, the structural role that the 9/11 terrorist attacks played in the 
whole process has been largely overlooked by systematic scholarly research. This 
Master’s dissertation attempts to explore the mechanism of social change that is implicit 
in the latter perspective. Building on Anthony Giddens’ methodology of episodic 
characterization, global events are defined and studied as starting points of contingent, 
unpredictable and highly strategic sequences of structural transformation. The exploratory 
framework is applied to the study of the realization and aftermath of the- Madrid 2004 
terrorist bombings in order to give a flavour of how global event episodes can be 
individually characterized. The London 7/7 terrorist attacks episode is also explored, with 
the aim of outlining a program of comparative research towards a possible theory of the 
‘global event’.
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Preface
Towards a Theory o f the Global Event

This research aims at being a modest contribution to the globalzation literature, and more 
specifically, to the globalization debate in the post-9/11 world. I propose the idea that the 
development of the 9/11 episode (the event itself and its political responses) is interwoven 
in fundamental ways with a broader mechanism of power and institutional transformation 
that was neglected in previous analysis of globalization, and that can now be identified 
and studied systematically in this and other cases.
This perspective, I argue, could advance our understanding of the nature of power in the 
global age, which is undoubtedly at the core of the ongoing conversation about 
globalization. I also believe that the analytical model I will put forward in the following 
pages could contribute to the key arguments of the globalization debate in the post-9/11 
world. As the reassertion of geopolitics dominated the immediate international responses 
to 9/11, many realist authors took the opportunity to conclude that globalization, if ever 
existed, had reached its historical limits. Still in the aftermath of 9/11, such conclusion 
was contested by globalization scholars by studying how the very responses to the events 
were being increasingly constrained by globalization: the Bush Administration’s 
unilateral strategies were at odds with conditions of globalization, and this is what was 
creating the instability in world affairs.
However, few globalization scholars offered extended, systematic work dedicated to 
understand the ways in which the events and its responses were in fact a product of 
globalization - this approach, I will argue, is precisely the one that reveals the mechanism 
of power studied in this research, and the one that demands the full elaboration of the 
notion of global event.
My primary concern is then to build an analytical framework to fill this gap. To do it, I 
combine two prespectives that are apparently contradictory: the institutional analysis of 
the social disruptions generated by global events, and the analysis of the strategic conduct 
observed during global events episodes. The reasons for having to embark in such a 
complicated theorization are philosophilcal, but also plainly inductive: the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks were important because they created an acute sense of crisis both nationally and
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globally, but there is also a wide consensus among writers on globalization that the Bush 
Administration took strategic advantage of this situation in order to advance its agenda. In 
this research I offer a plausible version of a theoretical framework that helps combine 
these prespectives in a unique, coherent project, with the aim of a better understanding of 
this and other global event cases, and of the phenomenon as a whole.
The dissertation is organized in a sequence of chapters that concludes with the systematic 
exposition of this framework. All the previous work is aimed at justifying the plausibility, 
coherence and interest of the theoretical model. This explains a certain change to the 
normal ordering of chapters. In Chapter One I start with a discussion of the globalization 
debate and its trajectory in the post 9/11 world. This discussion provides clues for 
understanding the existing gap in the globalization literature with regard to the problems 
addressed in this research. In Chapter Two I build on Anthony Giddens’ work, and on the 
work of some international crisis and global risks analysts, in order to set up an 
exploratory framework which is sensitive to both the institutional and the strategic 
elements of global events, and which is useful in organizing the great quantity of data that 
each global event episode generates. Next, I mobilize this framework in a full 
characterization of the Madrid 2004 al Qaeda bombing episode, an exercise that is useful 
not only for the primary aim of this research, but also for providing specific knowledge 
about the strategic particularities of the Spanish case. In order to clarify some of the 
general implications emerged in the previous chapter, and to start exploring the 
comparative possibilities of a theory of a global event, I also investigate, in Chapter Four, 
the political aftermath of the London bombings of 7/7, 2005. This will finally lead me to 
propose what I hope will be a solid framework, and a research program, for the study of 
the political consequences of global events.
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Chapter 1
The G lobalization Debate in the Post 9/11 W orld

THE GLOBALIZATION DEBATE, POWER AND THE STATE
The exploratory analysis presented in the following pages presupposes a definition, and a 
theory, of globalization. It is necessary, then, to start with a brief discussion of the 
concept, the scholarly debate of which is vast, complex and heterogeneous. Consequently 
one can find in the literature many different ways of clustering the existing theses on the 
meaning and causes of the phenomena, none of which has acquired the status of 
orthodoxy. There are different reasons for this disagreement, but probably the most 
important one refers to the complex, overlapping relations that the theory of globalization 
has developed with distinctive academic disciplines such as Sociology, International 
Relations, Economics, International Political Economy, Cultural and Communication 
studies and Political Sciences. Each of these academic standpoints brings its own 
classification, definition and research agenda to bear in such a way that common 
agreement on a unique categorization of the debate is difficult to establish. This 
dissertation simply builds on the classification that Held and McGrew (2004) presented in 
the introduction to “The Global Transformations Reader”1. For the purposes of this short 
introduction, it will be useful to sketch the general explanatory outlines of this 
classification before entering into more analytical considerations concerning the trajectory 
that the debate has taken since 9/11.
According to the authors, two schools of thought can be identified in the globalization 
debate, the “globalists” and the “sceptics”. On the one hand, the “globalists” claim that 
globalization is indeed a distinctive and important development in contemporary world 
history (Giddens, 1990; Held, 1995). In contemporary societies, they argue, there is an 
increasingly blurring of the distinction between international and domestic, external and 
internal affairs, which denotes nothing more than a deep structural change in the scale of 
modern social organization (Rosenau, 1990, 2003; Dicken, 1998). A set of global 
interrelated processes bypassing traditional territorial boundaries are now operating across 
all the primary domains of social power, including the economic, military, political and 
cultural (Held et al., 1999). The global economy is now living historically unprecedented 
levels of integration and interconnection (Castells, 2001). The state has become a
1 Alternative ways o f ordering the globalization debate are Clark (1999: Chapter 3) from an International Relations 
standpoint, Sklair (1995: Chapter 1, 2002. Introduction) from a Sociological position, and Dicken (1998: Chapter 1) for 
an economic perspective.
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fragmented policy-making arena, permeated by transnational networks -such as terrorist 
networks- as well as by domestic agencies and forces (Sassen, 1996, Mann, 1997). 
Contemporary military globalization, defined by new global arms dynamic and a new 
military order, is now contributing to the reconstitution of national sovereignty (McGrew 
et al., 1992). Cultural flows are transforming the politics of national identity and the 
politics of identity more generally (Tomlinson, 2000; Sen, 2006). States are increasingly 
unable to control the migratory flows that characterized contemporary societies. In sum, 
all these processes define the changing scope of human organization linking distant 
communities and expanding the exercise of power across the world’s regions in a new, 
unprecedented way.
At the opposite extreme, the “sceptics” have strongly denied the existence of all these 
trajectories in particular, and of globalization more generally (Hirst and Thompson, 
1996). The globalization process is not only a great exaggeration, but also an articulated 
myth (Navarro, 2000). “Internationalization” or “regionalization” are much more valid 
terms to capture the contemporary trends under way that by no means prefigure the end of 
territoriality as a critical component for understanding social reality (Ruigrok and Tulder, 
1995; Payne, 2003). States maintain their full sovereignty and the capacity to choose 
appropriate forms of political, economic and social development (Gilpin, 1987, 2003). 
By comparison with the last part of the XIX century both the magnitude and geographical 
scale of flows of trade, capital and migrants are currently of a much lower order. 
Multinational companies are deeply embedded in their respective countries, and their 
logic is largely national (Garrett, 2003). The deeply rooted patterns of inequality we are 
currently confronting do not differ form those of previous epochs; many “Third World” 
countries are living a growing process of marginalization that reinforces preceding 
trajectories. There is not such thing as cultural globalization (Huntington, 1996). In fact, 
world politics is increasingly determined by a clash of civilizations, with the nation-state 
playing still a fundamental role in the cleavage. In sum, globalization is simply a myth 
which obscures social inquiry.
Although some reviews defend that they are complementary, it seems that globalists and 
sceptics have very distinctive accounts of the current reality of the world order. However,
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a different but related matter is what they actually tell us at the theoretical level. In most 
of the literature, the globalist and the sceptic perspectives indeed function as a descriptive 
measure of how far and in what ways certain historical processes had developed, so many 
authors participating in the globalization debate could be indeed speaking of different 
instants of the very same process. Other authors work at a more analytical level, and it is 
within their theories that one could identify a pattern of distinctive theoretical standpoints. 
The main characteristic of these authors is that they build on a different relation between 
the theory of power and the theory of the state. A brief analysis of the relationship 
between these two theoretical standpoints can perhaps shed some light on the underlying 
contentions in the globalization debate:
Tab le  1.1 T h e  G lobaliza tion  D eb a te : P o w e r  a n d  D om ination
Level o f T heoretica l P arad igm
a n a ly s is Globalists Sceptic
Nation-state:
Power
The Theory of Power overtakes the 
Theory of the S tate
Theory of S tate  overtakes the Theory of Power
Impacts of multidimensional global 
networks over the autonom y and 
sovereignty of the nation-state
The nation-state rules and maintains the sam e 
levels of sovereignty and autonomy
Significant g rades of autonomy of 
global networks over nation-state
Global Security State: security a s  a 
collective or multilateral affair. 
Unilateral behaviour a s  irrational 
strategy or contradictory with 
structural constrains.
State-supported, state-controlled global networks
National Security State: pursuing national interests 
unilaterally a s  a reasonable strategy
System:
Domination
Structural Domination diffused in 
multidimensional, global networks and 
flows, being the sta te  just one part of 
this structure.
Structural Domination determined by the 
prevalence of the nation-state, the distribution of 
material pow er and the current unipolarity of the 
international system .
Multilayered Global Governance: 
Different cen tres and resources of 
authority
New Imperialism: US rules.
Structure determ ined by complex 
interrelation of allocative and 
authoritative resources. Importance of 
Global Informational Capitalism
Structure determ ined by material m eans: 
Importance of military resources.
The globalist argument, which will constitute the main backdrop of this study, is usually 
understood as the antithesis of the sceptic’s statist, power-political understanding of
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international system structure, and it is often accused of underestimating the role that 
power plays within the system. Yet, the perspective outlined above suggests that this is an 
oversimplification that conditions and obscures the explanatory capacity of the globalists’ 
paradigm. The real difference between both schools seems to be precisely the opposite: in 
contrast to the sceptic position, the theory of power overtakes the theory of the state in the 
most sophisticated variants of the globalist perspective. This important difference between 
the two schools has not been yet elaborated in the literature, but it contributes to clarify 
many substantive as well as disciplinary difficulties in which the globalization theory is 
involved. The reason of this theoretical stratification is simple: the theory of globalization 
puts a lot of emphasis in stressing the interplay of flows, forces and networks that cross­
cut many realms of social power, not just the political. As many globalists argue, power is 
no longer fully concentrated in institutions, organizations or symbolic controllers, but 
diffused in multidimensional global networks with different levels of institutionalization. 
For these authors, the world order can no longer be conceived as purely state-centric or 
even primarily state governed, as authority has become increasingly diffused among 
public and private agencies at the local, national and regional level. Therefore, since states 
are units of a broader network of power, the theory of the state in the globalists’ 
perspective is a subunit, albeit a fundamental unit, of the theory of power.
The key importance of the theory of power can be easily identified in the works of some 
of the most prominent globalist authors. For Michel Mann (1986, 1997) the power of 
nation-states has always been exaggerated: human societies are constituted by networks of 
power of different type that, more often than not, cross-cut traditional nation-states. 
Among other expressions, this can be seen analyzing the different impacts that 
globalization has on different nation-states in different regions. Anthony Giddens (1984, 
1990) main theoretical project departs from the idea that no coherent theory can leave 
aside the knowledgeable nature of human agents, a perspective that situates the reflexive 
exercise of power at the core of any social scientific explanation. Prominent among 
Giddens own explanations is his study of the emergence of contemporary nation-states 
(1984), where knowledgeable agents play a key role in their constitution. In this sense, 
globalization is for Giddens both a constraining and enabling phenomena, which limits 
the nation-state’s intervention in some areas and increases it in others. David Held (2004)
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defines globalization as the exercise of power at distance. Contemporary globalization has 
historically unprecedented extensity, intensity, velocity and impact propensity of global 
flows, interactions and networks embracing different sites of power. Manuel Castells 
(2000, 2004) maintains at the core of his theories the traditional distinction between 
power and domination, and situates the core dynamics of contemporary societies in the 
conflictual relation between the domination exercised by global structural networks, both 
public and private, and the power mobilized by identity-based social movements. For 
James Rosenau (1990, 2003), there is a crisis of domination (or authority structures) of 
both nation-states and corporations due to the increase in the analytical capacities of 
citizens: what he calls ‘skills revolution’.
This broader, more complex theory of power of the globalist school allows the 
development of two levels or dimensions of the theory of globalization that cannot simply 
be thought within the sceptic framework. These dimensions can also be easily traced in 
the globalist literature, and they are important because they allow the generation of the 
key premises from which the theory of globalization can be further improved:
(a): The first dimension concerns the impacts of globalization over the nation-state: the 
instrumental capacity and autonomy of the individual nation-state is undermined by the 
globalization of core economic activities, by the globalization of media and culture, by the 
globalization of crime and terrorism, by military globalization, by the globalization of 
human migrations and by the globalization of legal and political decisions.
(b): The second dimension concerns the administrative and political responses as well as 
constrains of the nation-state to the previous impacts: what we can provisionally call, 
following Clark’s (1999) definition, the global state. Given a changing global order (or a 
globalist theory of power), the form and functions of the nation-state are having to adapt 
as governments seek coherent strategies of engaging with a globalizing world.
The interrelation of this new political formation and the globalization process takes the 
shape of a new global political structure, characterized by the plurality of sources and 
centres of authority, being the nation-state just one of these centres. Therefore, the agents
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at the heart of this political formation, be it nation-states, global, local and regional 
institutions, NGO's, multinational corporations or global banks are locked into a variety 
of overlapping communities, political relations and jurisdictions which constrain as well 
as amplify their individual political capacities. There are different conceptualizations in 
the globalist literature that try to capture this phenomenon: global governance, 
multilayered governance, structural multilateralism, network state, global state, 
disaggregated state, new medievalism, shared sovereignty etc. In all cases, they constitute, 
for the globalists authors, the relevant unit of analysis to understand and analyze the 
current political action under the conditions of globalization.
From the point of view of the investigations presented in this research, the theory of 
globalization emerged from the globalization debate, and seen under the analytical 
perspective proposed above, offers three important premises:
(1) Global, systemic coordination among states is a must under global conditions: any 
long term process that would show that states can go alone to defend their individual 
interests within the new global order would question the stability of significant patterns of 
globalization.
(2) Power does not disappear from this coordination: it is transformed in a more complex, 
systemic phenomenon. The globalist literature tends to focus on the complex, overlapping 
system of national and global interests which are strategically bargained between states 
and other actors. Yet, a more decisive element of the transformation of power seems to be 
the generation of new sources of power: a system of overlapping systems generates new, 
interrelated sources to which actors can draw upon to advance their global or national 
projects.
(3) The democratic nature of structural coordination is not only an open question; it is also 
a political field in itself that defines the transitional period form the nation-state to some 
sort of global state.
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9/11 AND GLOBALIZATION
9/11 and its aftermath has put a test to the explanatory power of both globalist and sceptic 
schools, and has animated the debate around the political nature of globalization2. The 
sceptic school has mobilized the empirical record of the events of 9/11 and its immediate 
aftermath to attack argument (1) of the previous section, that is, that structural 
multilateralism is the only available strategy to cope with globalization. Waltz (2002), 
Gray (2002), Kagan (2003) and Cox (2004) among others have focused on the USA as the 
main objective of the attack as well as the respondent to it. In response to the event, they 
argue, state power, in its new imperialistic incarnation, has come to dictate, without any 
further cosmetics, the new tendencies in international politics, even calling into question 
the international system of governance built in the aftermath of World War II (Rahman 
2002). Political globalization, if ever existed, comes to an end with the US unilateral 
foreign policy, which in fact was already well established before the attacks (Singh 2003). 
Most of the globalization theorists’ expectations about the worldwide pursuit of national 
security remain unfulfilled in the post 9/11 world: the frequency of interstate wars, the 
level of military spending and the challenge of state-sponsored terrorism are on the rise 
instead of declining (Paul and Ripsman, 2004). Other arguments had also been put 
forward in connection to the theory of globalization. For example, some argued that 9/11 
was largely a consequence of the unbalanced unipolarity that dominates international 
relations: the frustration at the periphery had its expression with the terrorist atrocity. The 
world, realist argued, is definitely moving towards a “clash of civilizations” in which 
fundamental political conflicts will emerge from the impossibility of dialogue among 
cultures. However, the resurgence of territorial politics, the realigning relationships 
amongst great powers and the increasing amount of border and security measures.
Globalist theorists have not been particularly interested in responding to these attacks, 
which, for the most part, underlie a rather deterministic conception of social and 
international structure that globalization theories simply do not share. Rather, the focus of 
analysis of the globalist school has been placed, for the most part, in the global nature of 
the attack (see for example Hoffmann, 2003) and the terrorist group that perpetrated it. al
2 The four best edited books about the globalization debate after 9/11 are Booth and Dunne (eds, 2002), Held and 
McGrew (eds. 2003), Buckley and Fawn (eds. 2003) and Held and Archibugi (eds. 2004)
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Qaeda, globalist argued, is in itself an example of the new modes of transnational social 
organization characteristic of contemporary globalization (Gunaratna, 2003; Kurth 2003; 
Benhke 2004). Among other things, it shows that the control of the means of force are no 
longer just in the hands of states, but also of many other types of non-state actors 
organized in a global scale; global terrorism and its causes are in fact another systemic 
layer of the complex globalization structure, and as such have to be analyzed and 
responded. Analyses and responses to global terrorism that only take into account the 
dynamics of power of nation-state system, such as the ones proposed and prescribed by 
the sceptic school, are either mistakes or pretexts for other purposes. The velocity with 
which terrorism became a global issue right after the events of 9/11 indicates not only the 
disconnection between physical settings and political issues, but also a clear example of 
the political consequences of the technological infrastructure sustaining the contemporary 
cultural globalization. The interdependencies of the world informational economy became 
evident after the attack (Granville, 2003). On 9/11, global financial markets went into 
panic, stock prices plummeted all over the world while the prices of oil and gold soared 
overwhelming the control capacity of any state or existing political system.
Obviously, the perspectives of 9/11 and its aftermath reflect the terms and positions of the 
previously existing debates on globalization. The post-9/11 world has been largely 
depicted according to the theoretical starting point and a particular conceptualization of 
power, and no theory seems to be neither clearly invalidated nor evidently tested after 
these events: the authors have simply concentrated in the key set of evidences that best 
fitted their particular theoretical schemes. The intersection of both schools, however, 
seems to be more loaded in theoretical implications when it’s focused on the Bush’ 
administration policies. And, as we have already said, more than in any other ground, the 
epistemological differences between both schools seem to dominate this intersection.
On this particular theoretical ground, globalist authors3 have tended to mobilize the 
following argument. Although the US unilateralism since 9/11 might be in contradiction 
with the multilateral nature of the new global order, and might have been a critical shift in 
the geopolitical situation of the world, the consequences of this policy can only be
3 Mann (2003Introduction); Held (2004Introduction); Castells (2004: Chapter 5)
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understood in the framework of an interconnected world perturbed by the unilateralist 
strategies of the Bush Administration. A unilateral political project is simply not feasible 
in the long run under the conditions of contemporary globalization, and the consequences 
of this major contradiction are becoming clearer now. Moreover, as 9/11 episode 
continues to unfold, is becoming clearer that, due to the dense networks of global 
interconnection, even an American administration with a highly unilateralist agenda has 
eventually come to depend on cooperation to achieve its aims. “The one thing that did 
most to give modem nation-states a focus and a purpose, that is, national security, can 
now be realized effectively only if nation-states come together and pool resources, 
technology, intelligence, power and authority”4 . Therefore, the real key question for the 
globalist authors would be how the nature, political forms and organizational modes of 
global cooperation have in effect suffered intended and unintended changes during and 
after the episode.
As interesting and revealing as this globalist perspective might be, however, it actually 
implies a problematic shift in the epistemological philosophy underlying the theory of 
globalization: agency prevails over structure in the first part of the explanation, and a 
constraining, deterministic conception of structure is immediately mobilized in the second 
part. This approach, that concentrates the analysis on the structural problems of Bush’s 
policies, might have obscured the wealth of information about the political nature of 
globalization that is buried in the specific and complex mechanism of power that was 
revealed by 9/11 and its political aftermath.
4 David Held (2004: 86)
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INCOHERENT EMPIRE
Michael Mann is to my knowledge one of the two globalist authors that has dedicated a 
whole volume to study the theoretical and empirical problems that the Bush’s strategy 
poses to the theory of globalization5. Moreover, his political sociology exemplifies some 
of the strengths and limitations of the globalist school that we have identified above, so 
the discussion of his latest book will also be useful to introduce our own epistemological 
position. Incoherent Empire (2003) builds on Mann’s seminal analytical framework, 
which is important to put forward before entering into the analysis of the results of this 
particular work.
Mann’s theoretical framework, which is based on Weber’s ideal types method, constitutes 
one of the most sophisticated theories of power. The author elaborates the framework in 
the first pages of his ambitious study of the history of the sources of power6. In this study 
Mann also provides a substantive sociological analysis of several historical episodes7 that 
shows the utility of his framework. Mann’s theory is deductive, and begins with two clear 
statements that, according to his own view, constitute the best way to summarize his 
approach. Firstly, Mann states that, “societies are constituted o f  multiple overlapping and 
intersecting sociospatial networks o f power” (Mann 1986:1). Using this conception of 
society, Mann wants to react against those sociological traditions of thought that conceive 
society as systems or structures with patterned proprieties. Functionalism, structuralism 
and their major sub-disciplines, he argues, tend to conceive societies as unproblematic 
units of analysis, thus assuming the false premise that individuals have a need to create 
society. What the “human nature” actually needs, according to Mann, is to enter into 
social power relations to struggle for certain human goals, being the institutionalization of
5 Joseph Nye Jr. (2002) also wrote, in the aftermath o f 9/11, an influential study about the theoretical consequences of 
unilateral policies in interconnected settings.
6 To date, two volumes have already been published (Mann 1986 and 1993) and, according to Mann’s official website 
(http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/soc/facultv/mann/CV2003.pdf: March, 2005), a third one, entitled Globalizations, seems to 
be underway. It seems that it will cover a new formalization of his theory of power as well as its application for the 
understanding of globalization. Since both the topic and the author are o f direct concern for my inquiry, I will 
immediately update the comments provided in these pages after the publication of this work. Yet, there is no clue in his 
most recent articles and chapters to assume that major changes in his analytical understanding of power, the main 
objective of criticism of these pages, will be introduced.
7 For example, the European “economic miracle” emerging from the ideological networks of Christianity Discussions of 
Mann’s historical sociology are already abundant in the literature. See for example Smith (1991) and Jacoby (2004). It 
is worth pointing out that Michael Mann’s, Incoherent Empire, the actual focus of this section, won the 2004 Friedrich 
Ebert Foundation award for political books.
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these power relations just a secondary explanatory element for the understanding of 
history (1986:14). Thus, in Mann’s individualistic approach, agents are active human 
beings who find themselves situated within complex, overlapping networks of conflictual 
power which are constantly negotiated and transformed according to their goals.
The second key statement that summarizes Mann’s approach follows from his interest in 
what is ultimately “determining” of society. Mann argues that “a general account of 
societies, their structure, and their history can best be given in terms of the interrelations 
of what I will call the four sources of social power: ideological, economic, military, and 
political relationships” (1986: 2).Implicit in this statement is a rejection of the sovereign 
state or any other social phenomenon as meaningful determinants of history. Rather, all 
institutions of society, including of course the state, but also the church and economic 
institutions are “functionally promiscuous”: they cannot be defined in terms of any single 
power source. In practice, they are fully penetrated and even constituted by complex 
networks of power sources that link one agent to the other. The most important networks 
are, in Mann’s conceptualization, those of ideological, economic, military and political 
power.
From these two statements follow a methodology for the study of the history of the 
transformations of these networks, which, in the end, will be the history of crucial 
elements that constitute the “ultimate primacy” in society (1986:3). Yet, for articulating 
this methodology, Mann explains that the selection of “major structural determinants”, 
“patterns”, “trends”, and “institutional proprieties” is unavoidable. And it is here when he 
shifts the emphasis of his theoretical model towards an structural account of domination. 
First, he finds several structural laws to draw on. The sources of social power become 
effective resources only when they are organized. In mobilizing resources, actors 
reorganize social life using alternative means of social control. What determines 
dominance in any specific system is the ability of people to “organizationally outflank” 
each other. Thus, the key to successful domination lies in the “organizational superiority” 
that certain networks obtain over other networks of power as well as over social masses.
For example, in the transition from classical feudalism to the predominance of centralized
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state, the dense masses of infantry pikemen, better sustained by centralized states, 
organizationally outflanked all the other social networks thanks to its overwhelming 
superiority against feudal armies. In practice, however, this superiority was not simply 
manifested by the victory of one particular source of power over the others in a purely 
competitive and deterministic game, but by the reorganization or regrouping of all 
networks of society (and social life, more generally speaking) around the social 
characteristics enhanced by the new dominant one, in this case the military. The history 
that Mann writes is the history of these outflanking episodes in wherever happens to be 
the cutting edge of power sources (starting in Mesopotamia).
However, Mann argues, these critical episodes do not depend ultimately on the superiority 
of one source of power over the other. They depend on the struggle between “ways of 
life” (for example, feudalist social networks vs. towns and free peasants communities), 
which are able or not to generate key innovations (in our case the pick phalanx) that 
finally enable this “moments” of outflanking.
Thus, Mann’s theoretical model tries to undertake the arduous job to overcome the 
dualism between the structural conceptions of large-scale social change and the empirics 
of individual action. Yet, the key connecting element that Mann’s framework offers to 
transcend the dualism is a rather problematic “unavoidability”, which he does not 
elaborate much further. Among other analytical consequences, these problems impact on 
Mann’s characterization of the concept of network, a central theoretical element of the 
globalist school. Mann does not provide a formal definition of what he primarily 
understands by “network”, but it seems plausible, taking his first definition of society or 
summarizing statement, to say that he uses the term network precisely as an antidote 
against a unitary conceptualization of societal orders. Thus, social networks are, in 
Mann’s interpretation, alternative instrument of analysis for the general study of social 
sciences. In other words, tools at the service of methodological individualism. This is 
clear enough in this statement; “social life is always more complex than its dominant 
institutions because, as I have emphasized, the dynamic of society comes from the myriad 
social networks that humans set up to pursue their goals” (1986:19). Thus, from these 
words we have to assume that individuals form networks in Mann’s terminology. A
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further logic assumption is that those networks do not have constraining or enabling 
structural proprieties beyond the simple adherence of the proprieties of the individuals 
that set them up.
The globalist school in general, an Michel Mann in particular, have tended to mobilized 
this agency-based characterization of social networks in the analysis of the post 9/11 Bush 
Administration’s policies. The first key question is then whether or not Mann’s general 
account of this networks of power follows the rules of its implicitly methodological
o
individualism :
The first and most important premise is problematic in Mann’s analyses. Aims, goals or 
ends at the individual level, or at least at the level of the networked collective agency, 
would need at least a general explanation.9 If we do not know what leads individuals to 
act, we simply do not know why they want the power for10. Sometimes, Mann sees these 
goals as “too complex to be theorized”. Others, Mann presupposes objectives which are 
very difficult to prove.
The second element is the necessity of a certain delimitation of the social network. There 
is an inherent difficulty of drawing clear boundaries to social networks. But Mann’s 
definition of human societies as “formed by multiple, overlapping and intersecting 
networks of interaction” (Mann 1997: 495) poses clear difficulties in testing clear 
hypotheses of power relationships.
A third element is that there must be justified reasons for sustaining that the analytical 
importance of the individually determined goals of social networks are ultimately more 
relevant than the external social factors which influence these goals. Mann is not 
interested in providing an argument in this direction.
8 Mann’s “methodological individualism” is analyzed by Jacoby (2004: 407)
9 See for example Elster (2003). Underlying this condition there is an assumption which I consider useful to put forward 
here: admitting that human agency can be defined in more ways than just relaying on its intentions, as many sociologists 
and philosophers have pointed out, does not necessarily mean that such intentions are to remain fully opaque in a useful 
explanatory analysis. There is a simple methodological reason for remaining suspicious about alternative definitions o f 
agency; if the presumed causal explanation of change, that is, the agents’ intentions, is out o f the scope of the analyst, 
what’s the point o f the analysis?
10 Mann confuses me here accepting as a key scaffold of his inquiiy the complicated notion of “human nature” and 
attaching to it the predatory characteristic o f the eternal pursuing o f power.
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The fourth premise is that all the critical elements involved in the power relationships, 
such as the resources of power, can also be explained exclusively in terms of simple 
aggregation of human interests. Steve Lukes correctly advise us that purely individualist 
explanations tend to “build crucial social factors or features of society into the allegedly 
explanatory individuals”, and he goes on concluding that “the social phenomena have not 
really been eliminated; they have been swept under the carpet” (Lukes, 1968: 18).
And fifth, and probably the most important in terms of the objectives of this study, the 
dynamics of these social networks of power must provide causal explanations for social 
change11. Mann’s analyses do provide us with interesting explanations of social change. 
But I would argue that these explanations are achieved only at the cost of certain 
epistemological problems: although Mann departs from a radical individualistic 
conception of society, all the premises raised above are addressed using structural/societal 
arguments. This is clear for example in his first empirical example on the rise of the 
European pike phalanx (above) to see that, ultimately, what triggers social change are not 
social networks themselves, but the build-inn structural elements of the distinctive “ways 
of life” present in feudalism. These structural explanations are the only available 
arguments, in Mann’s analysis, to understand the innovation process of the pike phalanx, 
which in turn is the critical element leading to the reorganization of social networks. 
Eventually, the lack of interest in acknowledging the constraining and empowering 
solidity of social structures produces, rather paradoxically, a rather deterministic 
explanation of the deep complexities embedded in the causal elements conducting to 
social change.
“Has globalization ended the rise and rise of the nation-state” (1997) is one of Mann’s 
first articles on globalization, which provides and insightful reflection about the nature of 
nation-state. However, it also exemplifies some of the limitations of his approach. Mann 
first affirms that global networks “do not contain any singular, relatively systemic 
principle or integration”. That is, they are instruments for the study of individual agencies. 
Yet, immediately after this definition, he describes these global networks as “segmented”
111 would extend these elements to general conceptions of networks as tools for methodological individualism; 
especially the modeling o f social networks and policy networks analysis.
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by “the particularities of nation-states, especially the more powerful ones of the North”. 
So these global social networks are actually separated by authoritative, nationally- 
bounded, structural network that transmits “social particularities” to nation-states.
One can now address Mann’s work on the post 9/11 world, which illustrates the key 
theoretical and empirical dilemma that this research tries to deal with. Mann’s preface is 
clear enough about his analytical intention. The empirical problem that he sets out to 
study is how the uneven configuration of resources (economic, military, ideological and 
political) of the United States of America actually restrains (or will restrain in a near 
future) the manifested intentions of its ruling elite to transform the country into an 
effective Empire. His general argument is that, because of this unevenness, the American 
imperialism is in fact a new and ineffective militarism, for the only real source that the US 
actually controls is the military one. Mann follows his theoretical scheme mobilizing two 
distinctive conceptions of social networks. The first one, social networks as virtual 
substitutes of society, is used to offer a documented analysis of the interests, intentions 
and objectives of the US administration. The individuals (namely George W. Bush, 
Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Perle and co.) who collectively make up the imperialistic strategy, 
according to Mann, are concerned mainly with a “unilateralist and militarist vision of how 
to overcome world disorder” (2003:2). A profound neo-conservative agenda, backed by 
the media and several academics and think tanks, is actually behind them. Thanks to two 
“accidental or near-accidental” triggers (Bush 99 election and his political inexperience) 
and one unqualified further trigger (9/11), Mann argues, these views were put into action. 
Among other policies, Bush Administration used four “wars” that Mann investigates, 
following his scheme, in four different chapters: the war in Afghanistan, the war against 
(Muslim) terrorism, the war against rogue states and North Korea and the Iraq attack.
Mann’s second understanding of social networks, the structural one, is mobilized in order 
to show the structural position that the US has in his four major sources of power. In 
terms of military power, the US is “gigantic”, by which we have to understand that the US 
enjoys an “authoritative” power within the network. However, this assertion is 
immediately qualified in three substantive epigraphs: new threats such as weapons of 
mass destruction in the hands of Rogue states, guerrillas and terrorists groups are
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contradicting this hegemonic power of the US (2003: 29-45). In the other structural 
networks (the political, the ideological and the economic), Mann finds important 
structural constrains to the US unilateralism. For instance, the US is only a “back seat 
economic driver”, Mann argues, because it cannot directly control either foreign investors 
or foreign economies (2003: 74).
In conclusion, according to Mann’s account, the social networks or collective agencies of 
the beginning (Bush and company) of his narration will not be able to further advance 
their imperialistic interests because they are part of four broader structural networks three 
of which constrain their intentions. Mann’s book finishes with a number of predictions 
about what can happen if this contradictory dynamic is moved beyond the current 
situation: the new militarism will bring more resistance, will increase terrorism, and will 
be incapable of consolidating his domination because of the lack of economic, political 
and ideological resources.
Mann’s theoretical approach to 9/11 political aftermath illustrates some of the strengths as 
well as defects of his ideal typical academic method based on networks of power. Three 
theoretical problems can be identified.
First, Mann’s style of theorizing network of power is highly visible in this book. Mann 
approaches to the problem of structure/agency mobilizing conflicting notions of network 
in a manner that the explanations generated can only be understood in terms of the 
irrationality of the actors or tortuous theorizations on “contradiction”. The social networks 
in the Bush Administration, making use of their effective agency, decide to advance an 
imperialistic agenda. Yet, at the same time, they do not to realize that are severally 
constrained because they are part, or they use to be part of four (political, economic, 
military and ideological) structural networks that virtually determine their future failure. 
Mann’s main difficulty is precisely not recognizing the paradoxical character of this 
interesting albeit contradictory explanation. Secondly, Mann’s use of the terms “military 
giant” is an example of the inherent problems in mixing hierarchical connotations with 
network structures. The explanatory capacity of both concepts is mixed in the first 
chapter of the book, but the analytical consequences are clearer in the conclusion; despite
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being only hierarchically dominant in the military networks, the main conflicts that the 
US will have to confront in a near future are of a violent nature, such as more terrorism 
and resistance. And thirdly, Mann’s account of the structural power of the networks is 
empirically and theoretically insufficient to consistently argue both how the US is actually 
constrained and enabled by it and how the overall domination that this global networks 
exercise constrains or enables the peoples and communities which are virtually excluded 
from them.
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Acknowledging from the beginning that globalization and its global networks are 
structural phenomena which impose both enabling and constraining forces on the agents 
has important consequences for the ways that one can approach the analysis of the post 
9/11 world from a globalist perspective. Figure 1.1 indicates the type t of view developed 
by Mann: a given political project (Empire) is interpreted as purposeful action. This 
reveals the first problems of such an analysis, both empirically and theoretically, since by 
its very nature this approach generates a tendency to develop some kind of conspiracy 
theory around political situations of global magnitude, such as global events realizations. 
The structural properties of globalization are then mobilized in order to show the limits of 
such action, and we encounter here the opposite problem: the second part of the analysis 
falls into a rather deterministic analysis of the feasibility of certain projects. Finally, the 
predictability of the analytical model has necessarily to be tested against the rationality of 
the agents involved, and it is simply problematic to assume absolute conditions of 
bounded or erroneous knowledgeability of powerful subjects (although George W. Bush 
could, in effect, be a dramatic exception).
An alternative to this approach is the one represented in Figure 1.2, which defines a rather 
different set of research problems. Seeing globalization as a structural phenomena (or an 
structuration process) from the beginning allows the definition of the institutional settings 
within which actors are interwoven in complex ways. There are two main structural 
conditions: (1) structural coordination and multilateralism is a must under globalization 
conditions, and (2) some actors have more power than others within the system, an
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analysis that could be perfectly based on Mann’s characterization of sources of power. 
The key research problem then becomes that of studying the modes by which certain 
actors mobilize certain sources of power, thus overcoming, intentionally or 
unintentionally, temporally or permanently, certain structural conditions of 
globalization. Political projects become a secondary element of the analysis in relation to 
the modes by which these political projects are mobilized, and to the identification of 
new sources of power intimately connected to the global system. The question becomes 
the following: how can we understand the major contradiction that seems to exist between 
the unilateral policies of certain actors, especially the US, and this first truly 
interdependent world? Globalist theorists coincide in identifying 9/11 as the key sources 
of power that the Bush’s Administration mobilizes in order to advance its policies. Mann 
defines it as a “trigger”, but does not attend to the possibilities of theorizing it as a source 
of power. The approach that could be developed in (2) would place its focus precisely 
within this theorization, and would presume that the immediate policies are a direct 
consequence of this process. Initial specification of the structural conditions of 
globalization (structural coordination) also allows the analyst to identify the key political 
arenas in which the agents’ activities impact in relation to globalization. The problem is 
no longer to study the restrictions of certain projects, but the intended or unintended 
impact that such projects have on the nature of the structural coordination of states. 
Therefore, approach (2) allows the identification of the key mechanisms of power that the 
9/11 episode revealed, thus allowing the extension of the analysis to other cases. But it 
also allows us to account for what the most recent empirical record of the 9/11 world 
seems to have revealed: that the “War on Terror” seems to be shifting from a unilateralist 
military policy to a project of informal coordination among states that bypasses 
international organizations, having in fact a more durable and profound impact on 
International Law structures than its first phase.
In sum, the approach represented in Figure 1.2 concentrates attention upon attributing 
power ramifications to 9/11 in relation to globalization structure. It is then plausible to 
find an analytical category for the event, and see if this can be extended to other cases. 
From the point of view of the globalist school, a theory of global events can potentially 
advance our understanding of power within the globalist framework because: (a) It 
directly addresses the crucial conceptual point which is common to many globalist
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authors: power is an expandable quantity in relation to divergent forms of systems. In 
other worlds, power is not given, but generated. The theory of the global event is in part a 
theory of power generation that can potentially explain why and how the globalization 
system is not a zero-sum power system, (b) The political process triggered by global 
events has a dual spatial nature, both national and global, that generates abundant data 
that can help us understand how actors that operate at the interface of these two spatial 
dimensions exercise power. Implicit in this position is the classic globalist claim that the 
structuring of opportunities for political action is no longer defined by 
national/international dualism but is now located in the “glocal” area, (c) The theory of 
the global event, like the theory of the global risk society, combines in a single analytical 
framework different dimensions or sites of power such as the violent, the economic or the 
ecological. This property is especially relevant to understanding such a complex concept. 
In this respect, both the previous discussion and the following framework provide the 
intellectual foundation for addressing the exploratory questions that animate this 
dissertation:
• What is a global event? How should it be conceptualized and studied?
• What is the relationship between the global event and power?
• Who are the key actors who play a significant role in the political process
generated by the global event? What strategies do they utilize?
• Can global events be associated with patterns of domestic and international
conditions? Can the identification of these conditions help to explain the different 
intensity and the different scope of the immediate political action borne out of global 
events?
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Chapter 2
G lobalization, Power and the Global Event:
An Exploratory Fram ework

GLOBAL EVENTS AND SOCIAL CHANGE: LITERATURE
In this chapter I shall seek to develop the alternative approach to the political sociology of 
the post 9/11 world that I have identified in the previous discussion, an approach that 
turns upon questions of how actors mobilize what we will try to characterize as global 
events. However, it would be obviously misleading not to recognize the multiple types of 
literature and arguments that relate one way or another to the concept of global event. 
First of all, I shall discuss some basic conceptual and epistemological problems posed by 
this approach. I shall then move to relate these problems with the relevant literature. This 
will lead directly through to an elaboration of a systematic research strategy (or an 
exploratory framework) that will help us organize the empirical material of our cases, and 
explore the political relevance that global events have for the global system, thus 
contributing to move their study beyond the 9/11 case.
The first and most important starting consideration is the premise that global events, or at 
least the most important ones, must have some kind of connection with social change and 
power. This, we think, is a very plausible link supported by the available evidence. Many 
phenomena that we can intuitively label as global events have been followed, almost 
immediately, by new policies, organizational changes, alternations in the dynamics of 
reputation, economic disruptions, waves of global solidarity, wars, etc. that have 
significantly altered a given state of affairs. There is no need to develop a full 
conceptualization of global events - a task that we will undertake in the concluding part of 
this study - in order to argue this. However, as this research will try to show, the 
connection of global events with some sort of institutional change is more complex that a 
mere superficial or intuitive outlook on the phenomena reveals.
Any useful framework for the study of global events must be able to trace the mechanisms 
and agencies that operate between the systemic realization of the event and the occurrence 
of minor or major (but in any case significant) institutional changes in the global system. 
Before developing this framework, it must be specified what do we mean by social 
change and what types of accounts have room in this project. We also have to briefly 
account for that literature that has analyzed phenomena that have some sort of
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connections with the preliminary notion of global event that has been exposed in the 
previous chapter.
A purely structuralist, funcionalist or evolutionist approach to social change can be 
dismissed on the same empirical grounds that give rise to the study of global events. 
Reducing their study to the analysis of systemic contradictions, institutional crisis and the 
subsequent mechanisms of adaptation would imply a rather outdated project of 'law 
discovery' that would go against the very empirical record that we have observed on the 
previous section. 9/11 and its political aftermath, specially the war in Iraq, show that 
global events are intrinsically connected to the agency of certain actors, and to the 
intrinsic openness of the global system, at least to the global system as analysed by the 
authors of the globalist school. The analysis of the political aspects of global events has 
thus more to do with human agency than with the structural parameters of their 
realization, and we will have to bear this in mind thought the whole investigation.
This imperative, however, does not mean that the study of global events has to be
undertaken under a constructivists or postmodernist perspective. It could be that certain
practical versions of postmodern theories have been incorporated into the strategic
conduct of certain actors - but this is a different matter than the general approach to the
study of global events episodes. There’s no need to go over the epistemological and
empirical problems of postmodernism to be suspicious about their utility in the specific
terms of our analytical aims; postmodern standpoints have already been tested mainly
against the backdrop of 9/11, and they don’t seem to provide a coherent corpus of
knowledge of the phenomena, if such is their objective. For example, a set of papers
applying the notion of “sublime” to the study of global events has been recently 
10published. The definition that the editors give of the sublime is “phenomena of 
stupendous size or overwhelming beauty [...] that relates to [...] the experience of this 
things as well as their external characteristics” (Editors 2006: p. i). As interesting as this 
definition can be, it is then barely maintained in the individual papers, that tend to focus 
only on developing the psychological aspects of “sublime events” and leave totally 
unattended those “external characteristics” of it, which refer to relevant elements of
12 Among them, the most relevant papers for this study are: Bousquet (2006), Bleiker and Leet (2006), Weber (2006), 
Debrix (2006)
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structural causation involved in the process. Both parts deserve not only a detalied 
analysis, but also an account of their complex relation. Furthermore, in most of the papers 
events are said to trigger a “range of powerful emotions”. Yet the definition and the 
political consequences of these emotions are then vaguely defined. On a similar vein, but 
more explicitly inclined towards a postmodernist standpoint, Der Derian (2001) outlined 
what he calls a “Virtual Theory of the Global Event”, a project which is, to our 
knowledge, the only in the social sciences that has developed the concept of global event 
as such. He defines it as “a state of affairs in which the interaction of multiple state actors, 
complex military systems, and networked information technologies produce the image of 
a security crisis” (p. 669). It is worth noticing that although he uses the word “global” to 
describe his concept, he defines it in almost exclusive statist terms. Der Derian follows his 
definition with a postmodern elaboration of the concept, in which he argues that global 
events are challenging war as the main rationale behind the national security state. Yet 
little or no indication is given about how and why this has come to be the case.
The very notion of global event must necessarily presume stability, structure or order, 
either national, international or individual, with the global event being understood in 
terms of the conditions which give rise to serious disruption or instability, and that can be 
related to eventual social change. If not, the mobilization of the concept is in fact rather 
gratuitous. Again, this consideration does not mean that we can generalize about 
hypothetic mechanisms of social change operating throughout human history. But it does 
imply that a meaningful notion of global event must be developed in relation to the 
particular social systems that they disrupt. This opens up not only more sophisticated 
notions of events applicable to more concrete aspects of social change. It also justifies the 
exploration of the relation between significant events and the new global order, a central 
element for the globalist theory.
Two sets of literature have explored phenomena that are closely related to global events, 
and that tend to follow a modernist perspective which is similar that the one outlined 
above. The concept of “international crisis” is perhaps the most closely connected to
1 'Ipurposes of this study . Most definitions of crisis stress the relative perception of threat
13 The concept o f international crisis has been widely applied to the analysis o f empirical phenomena that has at least the 
potential o f being characterized as global events. For example, Crotty (2003) compares the decision-making approaches 
o f John F. Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis o f 1963 and George W. Bush in 9/11. This approach, I believe, is
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by public and policy-makers and the expectation of possible violence and war14. Richard 
N. Lebow (1981) developed a classic study of a large number of cases in which he 
demonstrates that, in opposition to those theories that exclusively focus on the underlying, 
structural causes of war, crisis and their patterns of conditions play a crucial autonomous 
role in the course of conflicts, and that the perceptions, interests and anxieties of policy­
makers during the crisis have a decisive influence in its outcome. Lebow’s studies of 
international crisis always build on an explicit account of the international system of 
states, and it seems obvious that, although there is literature which tries to use the concept 
for the analysis of different phenomena, the author is right in anchoring the notion of 
international crisis to study of conflicts between states. The key issue is then to recognize 
that states are just one part of the global system as understood by the globalist theory, 
although the identification of types and patterns of international crisis, especially in those 
studies emerged under Lebow’s approach, provide an important background that must be 
taken into account15.
The other type of literature that is relevant for this study is the one on risk management16,
1 7social construction and sociological analysis of risk and most especially the literature on
1 fithe world risk society, with Ulrich Beck at the forefront of this perspective . These 
approaches depart from an ambitious theoretical project: the explanation of the 
contemporary transformations of modernity in terms of the current incapacity of the 
nation-state system to manage the de-bounding, uncontrollable risks that are intrinsic to 
the globalization process. In this project, risk-related events play an alleged subordinate 
role, either as a unit for collecting certain evidences or as an undemanding factor that 
simply reinforces widespread consciousness of global risks. This perspective, we think, 
covers the potential of the area of sociological inquiry around the notion of global event: 
while world risk society studies might help to understand a hypothetical dominant 
mechanism of social change in contemporary societies, its very ambitious approach 
contribute to overlook the manifold contributions that a more restricted theory of the
highly questionable because it does not acknowledge the fundamental differences between the two crises.
14 For discussions o f the concept o f crisis see Stam (1971), Hermann (1972), Snyder and Diesing (1977), Lebow (1981), 
Alexander (1991).
15 Lebow (2006).
16 Cvetkovich (1999); Blaikie (2003); World Economic Forum (2006)
17 Luhmann (1993); LOfstedt (1998); Perrow (1999); Adam (2000).
18 Beck (1992,2002)
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global event can bring to our understanding of the particularities of the phenomena* and 
the transformation of power in contemporary societies. There’s no simpler argument to 
support this claim than the one already explored: there are solid evidences that show that 
many significant global policies and other transparent realizations of global power are 
borne out of global events rather than global risks. This is at least how the political 
dynamics triggered by the 9/11 terrorist attacks are understood in the globalist literature, 
as we have seen in the previous chapter. Moreover, this perspective is also consistent with 
the hypothesis, widely supported by psychological experiments, that people tend to 
increase their estimates of the probability of an outcome once it has occurred. Yet a 
theory of the global event and the theory of the global risk society are, by definition, 
complementary. Ulrich Beck is the key theorist of the world risk society, and it has to be 
pointed out that his book Power in the Global Age (2006) he addresses some of the issues 
investigated in this dissertation, and succeeds in creating a framework for the study of the 
contemporary reconfiguration of power that bears multiple connections with the 
objectives of this work. There’s no need to agree with all the themes covered by Beck’s 
analysis to realize that it achieves an important milestone not only for the risk society 
approach but also for the general understanding of power within the globalist framework. 
He does so by stressing not only the political strategies observed in the context of the 
global risk society, but also conceptualizing some of the manifold ways in which the 
generation of power takes place within global interconnected spheres, a process that, as 
we will try to argue, is closely connected to the realization of global events. Although we 
will take a different position regarding the role of national actors, his book will be a 
constant reference for this work, so there’s not need to explain its central theorems at this 
point. Suffice is to say that its principal aim is not the study of global events, and its 
analytical ambitions are far beyond our purposes, so we think that the theoretical part of 
this research does not incur on unnecessary repetitions.
In sum, both international crisis studies and the world risk society studies provide many 
elements to inform an exploratory framework for the study of global events. These 
perspectives will be used as both an agenda-setting device and as a field for collecting 
already elaborated variables and premises to better frame and facilitate the analysis that 
will follow in other chapters. But given the previous considerations, it is reasonable to
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seek to ascertain if an approach that gives analytical priority to global events rather than 
global risks and international crisis yields further theoretical and empirical results for our 
understanding of the political dimension of the phenomena. There is not such an approach 
in the literature, and the subsequent pages offer a way of thinking about how this absence 
might be addressed.
THE EPISODIC CHARACTERIZATION OF GLOBAL EVENTS
Global events are intrinsically connected to power and human agency. Yet, an attempt to 
construct an exploratory framework for the study of the political aspects of global events 
has to include both a coherent conception of social change and theoretical room for the 
globalist account of the global system. Anthony Giddens proposed methodology for the 
study of social change19 satisfies these two conditions and will be the main theoretical 
backdrop of this study.
Giddens’ approach to the analysis of social change is closely connected to structuration 
theory. This theory has already been analyzed in many works20, so there’s no need to fully 
explain its general epistemological and ontological position again. Giddens’ theoretical 
standpoint explicitly rejects the idea that some sort of general mechanism that can be 
found and applied across history governs social change. There cannot be such mechanism 
not only because the “unit of evolution” is unclear in social sciences, but also because the 
reflexive nature of human social life is far more important than the unconscious 
motivational impulses which would be necessary to support such theories. As a reaction 
to these problems, Giddens develops an analysis of social change which is in many ways 
particular according to variation of context in which this change takes place. Within the 
framework, social or individual change is treated as a process that can be circumscribed 
within a particular span of time. In these particular sequences, a number of acts and events 
with specifiable beginnings and ends take place, thus generating optimal circumstances 
for reflexive human agencies to bring on intended or unintended institutional 
transformation. Giddens calls this strategy “episodic characterization”, an approach that
19 Giddens (1984: 244-262). An recent attempt to build and mobilize an analytical theory of social change based on 
Gidden’s framework is Liu (2006)
20 Giddens (1984:1998). See for example Held and Thompson (eds. 1990); Haugaard (1992); Stewart (2001).
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consists, first of all, in the identification and analysis of certain elements as marking the 
opening of a sequence of change and then in tracing through that sequence the factors and 
political agencies that lead to a process of institutional transmutation. He applies it to 
large-scale episodes of social change, such as the nation-state formation characterization. 
But Giddens also acknowledges that his framework can be mobilized to study smaller, 
less critical transitions that do not imply the break up of societal totalities.
A study of global events drawing on this model could focus on the cumulative analysis of 
the following issues. First of all, it should establish the structural relevance of global 
events as power generators within the global system, thus identifying them (or not) as an 
specifiable beginning of a sequence of institutional change. The second characterization 
problem becomes one of identifying the conjunctions of structural factors that arguably 
affect the process and the amount of power generated. These factors can in principle be 
compared with the factors occurring in other cases. Thirdly, it analyses the strategic ways 
in which the relevant agents draw upon the power sources generated by global events in 
order to affect the political direction of the sequence of social change. This denotes the 
strategic nature of every relevant event. And fourthly, it establishes clear criteria for the 
identification of the type of institutional transformation eventually involved in the 
episode, an analysis that can also be approached in a comparative fashion. We’ll elaborate 
on these fourth stages to get a clearer understanding of the exploratory framework they 
provide.
1) Global events as origins o f  a sequence o f change 
Global events are only politically relevant as long as they open a sequence of institutional 
transmutation, be it national or global. From this it follows that the study of particular 
global events must proceed leaving a substantial amount of time between the event 
realization and the empirical research, although this requirement is not as temporally 
constraining for the researcher as historians normally assume. Seeing events as starting 
points of a sequence of change also has certain theoretical advantages in relation to other 
perspectives. For instance, in defining global events exclusively as the product of 
systemic contradictions within the global order, one could easily fall into deterministic 
approaches, although it would be a mistake to ignore the multiple connections between 
global events and globalization. Therefore, the first question is to establish the relation
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between global events and the globalization structure. The second primary concern, which 
is in fact more analytically relevant than the former, is to address why a certain 
phenomenon acquires or does not acquire the status of "origin" in a particular episode, a 
problem to which Giddens’ framework does not attend.
What is then the relation between the global event and globalization? “Globalization 
concerns the intersection of presence and absence, the interlacing of social events and 
social relations ‘at distance’ with local contextualities”21. Global events are constitutive, 
both cause and effect, of the globalizing tendencies of modernity, although pursuing the 
implications of this view would lead us into serious methodological problems. For 
analytical purposes, then, we shall adopt a different perspective which works out this 
definition assuming the subordination of the “social event” to the “social relation”. We 
will understand globalization as the “shift or transformation in the scale of human
organization that links distant communities and expands the reach of power relations
00across the world’s regions” . Global events are then understood as a sub product of this 
relational processes, which, taken together, represent the structural aspects of the new 
global order. It might be useful to outline some of the multiple connections that this 
perspective reveals.
(a) According to the theory of globalization, the world order today is characterized by 
both the persistence of the sovereign state system and the development of plural authority 
structures which involve several global, non-state actors. Global events are symptomatic 
of this complex new global order not only because they are the systemic product of 
parallel authority structures, but also because they manifest the structural incapacity of the 
nation-state system to deal with their causal dynamics. In this sense, a broader theory of a 
global state formation can be injected with an explanatory theory of the global event in a 
manner that will be explored in the concluding part of this thesis.
(b) Global events are the product of global processes, although the extend and the 
relevance of this has to be addressed as a critical political arena in itself. However, it is 
quite clear that the symbolic/perceived character of global events is product of the 
worldwide communication infrastructure that has radically facilitated globalization across
21 Giddens (1991:21)
22 Held (2004: 1)
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every domain of social activity (Manuel Castells). There would not be global events 
without global networked media.
(c) Global events are in fact glocal events: both global and local. Although their physical 
occurrence is either local (terrorist attacks) or global (global financial markets crisis), they 
always acquire almost instantaneous global consequences. In this respect, they represent a 
sudden realization of globalization understood as an spatial phenomena, and a sudden 
realization of the principle of “globality” (Albrow, 1996), understood as the growing 
consciousness of global interconnections.
But why can global events contribute to engender a sequence of institutional change in the 
global system? While the theoretical connections of global events with globalization is to 
a great extend a simple conceptual adaptation of the globalist framework, the 
conceptualization of the specific nature of global events as origins of change requires 
further effort.
Lakoff is a fashionable researcher in the United States, both in academia and political 
circles, because he has provided an interesting (but not verified) theory explaining this 
phenomenon. In Moral Politics (2002), this author outlines a theory of cognitive framing 
that explains both, the generation of power after an event and the strategic behaviour that 
accompanies it. During exogenous crisis, Lakoff argues, citizens instinctively draw upon 
the narrative of heroes and villains to explain the situation: they fear the villain, and 
search for the protecting hero. Under these circumstances, political speech is most 
effective when it evokes metaphors that activate certain mental frames in the audience, 
encouraging the subscription to one policy choice over another. Father’s mental 
framework -  strict and protecting, in Lakoff s description- is immediately activated after a 
global event situation, and the manipulation of the sentiment of fear by political leaders 
explain the increasing opportunities for their reflexive exercise of power. As relevant as 
Lakoff s hypotheses are, they not only lack sophistication in social theoretical terms, but 
also overestimate the emotion of ‘fear’ by implying a functional connection between it 
and the components of his theory. Fear, one could argue, is only one among the 
constellation of emotions that a global event can generate, and that political leaders can 
mobilize -  this, at least, seems much more consistent with the empirical record (see
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Chapter Three and Chapter Four).
Our working hypotheses would start with the contention that global events generate 
power with implicit transformative capacity. There are two interrelated dimensions that 
need to be analytically separated: the first one is the inherent property that global events 
have of breaking the circular stability of zero-sum power systems. The second refers to 
the political reflexivity that they invariably generate.
The globalists authors mantain that power needs to be understood as an expandable 
quality of social systems: “The national zero-sum game of sovereignty that exists in many 
people’s heads is proving to be historically false: interdependence can and must be 
created and understood as a plus-sum game in which all the parties involved make power 
gains” Beck (2005: xv). However, what is the logical system sustaining these claims? The 
zero-sum perception of power is premised upon the tacit assumption that power is simply 
given. But power, some globalist authors argue, is created by society, a theoretical claim 
that would be easily justified if taken through the lenses of contemporary constructivist 
social theorists.
Yet the globalist scholars do not take a constructivist tack. On the contrary, the intuitive 
idea underlying most of the globalist authors claims is that power works in a similar 
evolutionary logic that the one attributed by modem economic orthodoxy to market 
relations: if economic gains by some are not necessarily at the expenses of others, so work 
power gains. This parallel with the economic system, however, is problematic in a 
number of ways23, so we need to depart from other views and work out an operative 
strategy to mobilize the transformative aspect of power. Therefore, how power is created 
in society? Modernist social theorists such as Talcott Parsons (1963), Anthony Giddens 
(1984) and Barry Barnes (1991) have explored this problematic from different 
perspectives and having very different theoretical projects in mind. We shall adjust and 
combine their ideas for the exploratory purpose of this project in a way that here we only 
announce:
23 Talcott Parsons (1963) adopted a similar position, and received a considerable number o f attacks which are also valid 
for this perspective.
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Power must be indeed an expandable quantity of social systems - a different view is 
simply not consistent with historical evidence. The problem is then how is it created 
within the system reproduction process. What we will argue is that the crucial need is to 
draw a distinction around the circumstances that create different temporal dispositions o f  
the consensual/conflictual character o f  power. Rather paradoxically, conflictual periods 
in the system, when power is at its most visible point, tend to be dominated by the 
generation of power in a slowly incremental way, in the manner that is generally assumed 
by the globalist theorists. However, to understand the theoretical significance of this pace, 
conflictual periods have to be grasped in connection with consensual phases within the 
system, when the tempo of power generation is accelerated in an almost revolutionary 
way. The crucial connecting point between the micro and the macro is the contention that 
the creation of power can only happen if a significant part of the collectivity and its 
members become ready to assume new binding obligations over and above those 
previously in force. In consensual periods, this takes place in a very circumscribed period 
of time, and this is what makes them highly relevant periods. What’s the relation of this 
with global events?
Global events induce a sudden discontinuity of norms that shape national practices by 
exposing the nation-state system incapacity of managing global processes. The global 
event transforms the widespread rational expectation that something needs to be done in 
relation to globalization into a commitment to implement this rational demand by positive 
action, including coercive sanctions if necessary. Thus, global events break through the 
relative circular stability of power in conflictual periods, which, if considered in 
connection with consensual periods, tend to represent a zero-sum power system. How this 
mechanism is exactly articulated?
Global events are constituted by physical, observable facts that are fundamental to 
understand the generation of power within a common transnational context. However, it 
can be argued that global events’ consensual effect is mainly based on their perceptual 
dimension, or what Giddens calls “the intrusion of distant events into everyday 
consciousness”24. Both cultural and biological elements intervene in this perception, but
24 Giddens (1991: 27)
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global events can only be considered global to the extent that they affect universal 
parameters of human existence. Broadly speaking, these parameters are the cognitive 
(Barry Barnes) and the emotional (Antonio Damasio) framework that any human being 
has. Global events always generate a widespread rational demand for action (a 
consensus), but rationality, as recent investigations have revealed , is always assisted by 
some sort of emotion. Our working hypothesis, adapted from an Ulrich Beck’s and 
Lakoff s idea, is that during global events episodes, emotions take a highly visible role in 
the rationalization process, being empathy and fear the two main, mutually exclusive 
emotions that could assist the rational consensual phenomena. If either political 
reflexivity (empathy) or risk perception (fear) triggered by global events are made to 
endure a significant span of time, they can generate a tendency for the rational consensus 
to strengthen as time passes by virtue of its very persistence. This is the process where 
political agents mainly act. However, the transition of consensual periods to conflictual 
ones is the very normal process, and we think that the causes and the political 
consequences of this transition are of great importance to understand social change. The 
specific workings of this mechanism have to be specified in relation to specific episodes, 
such as the one that we will analyze in the next chapter.
2) Conjunctures o f Factors 
Giddens considers “conjunctures” to mean the interaction of factors which, in a particular 
time and place, have relevance to a given episode, and we will follow this position for our 
characterization of global events episodes. However we shall not adopt all the 
implications that Giddens injects to this definition: the themes discussed in the previous 
section, we think, allow us to elaborate a position which is more consistent with the aim 
of achieving some kind of generalization about social change. Seeing events as power 
generators offers the possibility of considering such “conjunctures” of factors as 
influences that decisively affect the “amount” of power generated, an idea which is also 
relevant not only for establishing the “type” of event under study, but also for addressing 
the study of global events in a comparative fashion. This, however, does not necessarily 
mean that the power is effectively translated into change, a process which will be 
explained in the following section. Thus, the conjunctures of our exploratory model are
25 Damasio (2003, 2007)
52
those factors that might or might not be present and that might have different levels of 
intensity both in the event itself and in the political process triggered by it. Adopting 
central elements of the international crisis and risk studies schools, we will list in the 
following paragraphs certain factors that are relevant to explain the political power 
generated by the event. Two important considerations: (a) It has to be stressed again that 
the aims of this dissertation are exploratory; this implies that the identification and the 
systematic questioning of the relevant variables is in fact one of the aims of our work. The 
relevance of the listed factors, then, will be evaluated in the light of the evidences 
obtained in the two case studies, (b) Nevertheless, the proposed factors are the product of 
a careful consideration of the relevant literature. Some of these factors have admitted 
connections with each other, but this is not a major problem given the epistemological 
position implicit in Giddens’ framework: all these elements should provide a robust 
starting point for organizing a systematic collection of the evidences of the Spanish and 
the UK cases.
(a)Firstly, we can consider the scale of the event, which might be high, medium or low. 
All structural models explaining risk perception deal with a variable that measures the 
scale of particular risks (Bums, 1998). They refer to purely objective information 
connected to the event rather than perceptions or predictions of its scale. We can define 
the scale of an event exploring the following parameters: Casualties: The number of 
people injured, killed or materially affected by a hazard; Economic impact: Degree to 
which a hazard generates economic impacts (damage to property, loss of sales, increased 
costs due to regulation); Chronological position’. Order of occurrence of the event in the 
proper chronological list. All this factors can be analyzed with official statistics.
(b) Secondly, we can consider the power location o f  the nation-state or nation-states 
mainly affected by the event. They can be weak powers, middle power, great powers or 
hyper powers (only in the case of the US). Events occur, or at least have physical 
consequences, within the boundaries of particular nation-states that have distinctive 
political systems and distinctive locations in the global power hierarchy. This factor is 
important not only because it directly affects the quantity of new power that enters into 
the system. It is also relevant in terms of the structural location of the agents that can 
eventually mobilized the power of the event (see below).
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(c)Thirdly, we can consider the national and global mass media attention generated by 
the event, which again can be measured through a simple scale of high / medium / low 
attention. The importance of the media in risks and events representation has obviously 
generated several hypothesis and conceptual angles in academic research. For instance 
the “social amplification of risk” theory is based on the thesis that events pertain to 
hazards interact with psychological, social, institutional and cultural processes in ways 
that can heighten or attenuate individual and social perceptions of risk and shape risk 
behaviour (Kasperson et al, 1988). The social amplification process itself is made possible 
by the occurrence of a risk-related event (an event of physical nature) which is selected by 
the mass-media and subsequently further transmitted by institutions within society, 
generating a number of systemic effects (such as anti-technology feeling or decline in 
tourist activity). Another relevant perspective for this variable is the theory of “agenda 
setting”, whose main finding in terms of the relationship between media and events is the 
claim that negative public reactions are not the result of critical reporting or negative bias 
in news coverage, but rather of the sheer amount of coverage of the media (Mazur and 
Lee, 1993). In order to define and measure this variable, one can refer to: Stories: The 
number of follow-up news stories reporting on the event; Duration: The number of days 
between the first and last news stories. Half-life: The number of days until half the news 
stories appeared. In order to measure these elements, one can refer to the data obtained 
from automatic search of national and global media (CNN, New York Times, Al Jazeera, 
etc.) indexes for coverage of the event.
(d) Fourthly we can consider the global and national causality debate, which can take 
values of agreement / uncertainty / disagreement. Global events have multiple causes and 
developing an accurate understanding of what these are and how the may interact to cause 
or exacerbate the events is not a concern of this study. In what we are interested is in the 
political dimension of the debate around causality, which will constitute a critical variable 
for the model. The collective reflexivity of modem social life consist in the fact that social 
and natural events are constantly examined and tackled in the light of incoming 
information about those very events, thus constitutively altering their character. The 
political dimension of this epistemological position are multiple and complex, but we will 
be especially interested in studying the ways in which a particular value of the causality 
debate constrains the power generation process of global events, which, as we have
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already discussed, is partly based in emotional or psychological issues. In the case of 
terrorism, for example, the extend to which al Qaeda has or has not significant 
connections with nation-state actors is not only a critical source for justifying particular 
policies, but it also could reveal particular ideological understandings of globalization. 
The global agreement or the global disagreement around this clearly constrains the 
opportunities for power. A qualitative assessment of this factor can proceed through the 
study of the debate generated at IGOs, academic circles and global public opinion polls.
(e) Fifthly we can consider the occurrence and political direction of popular mobilizations 
explicitly linked to the event. There is also a social scientific background for the study of 
this factor. Some structural models on risk studies use a variable measuring the political 
response to risk. For example, they measure the political involvement by means of the 
degree to which the public is willing to become actively involved to reduce future risks 
posed by a hazard. Here, we are more interest in spontaneous or quasi-spontaneous 
mobilizations that take or not take place after the event, their social composition, and their 
political overtone in terms of the nationalist/cosmopolitan axe. All these can be 
qualitatively evaluated using secondary materials.
Table 2 .1: P re lim inary  V aria b les
S ca le N ation-S tate
L ocation
M edia
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C ausa lity  D ebate P o p u la r M obilization
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Pow er location 
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availability in 
time and 
sp ace
Collective 
reflexivity on the  
c au ses  of the 
event
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reactions to the event
A s s e s sm e n t Quantitative
data:
Casualties,
econom ic
impact,
chronological
position
Middle, great 
and
hyperpowers
Stories, 
Duration, Half 
life.
Agreem ent,
Uncertainty,
D isagreem ent
Qualitative: 
occurrence, social 
composition, 
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3) Political Agencies
Agency refers not to the intentions people have in doing things but to their capability of 
doing those things reflexively and in the first place, which is why agency implies power. 
In the previous sections we have listed some variable factors connected to the systemic 
realization of global events, and have constructed the working hypothesis that they mainly 
have an effect on the quantity of transformative power generated by the event. Under this 
specific framework, to study the agency of crucial actors means to analyze who they are 
and why and how this transformative power is mobilized. In other words, we aim at 
studying both the effective capabilities that certain structurally located actors have of 
advancing their interests and values in the political process generated after the occurrence 
of a global event, and the unintended consequences that this actions have for the system. 
Accordingly, the identification of the key actors must proceed in terms of their structural 
position during the episode, and must take for granted that the key power mobilizers are 
aware of the factors and elements of the power generation process. The interests and 
values of the identified actors must then be studied in detail .
Implicit in this perspective is the decision of holding in relative suspension the theoretical 
causes of the global event as the main motivation for actor’s subsequent action. Rather, as 
we have discussed in the previous section, our exploratory model focuses on the debate 
around the causes of the event as an independent factor affecting the episode -in doing so, 
the theoretical causality is considered to be more a constrain to the actor’s reflexive action 
than a motivation of it.
This position is only sustainable for analytic purposes. However, we consider it to be the 
key element of our exploratory framework because it defines the specific analytical area 
that this study will hopefully contribute to identify. The theoretical causes of a particular 
event are the terrain of the traditional academic debate around the phenomena, and they 
obviously have to be the core of the scientific preoccupation. However, where these 
causes are specified with some degree of precision by competing schools, the study of the 
political consequences of events immediately derive into either absurd conspiracy theories
26 This position is aligned with the work of Friedman and Starr (1997), which also contains a summary o f the agency- 
structure debate in International Relations
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(usually adopted by those whose theories are implicitly dismissed by the implemented 
policies) or inadequate evolutionary notions of social change. This situation is obvious in 
many episodes - each time a global event has occurred, innumerable political fantasies 
and dramatic discourses arise. And they do so within a span of time when opportunities 
for global transformative power are generated. A research on the political consequences 
of global events can also be considered a reaction to this dangerous combination. The 
systematic study of global events pursued in this research aims at identifying, for purely 
analytical purposes, something of a middle space that avoids the common extremes of the 
debate: those that assume full responsibility and those that assume full indulgence of the 
actors involved in the process. The analysis of such space should shed some light on the 
political process and the political strategies which are invariably connected to global 
events while taking very seriously all the structural elements that surround their 
occurrence.
This does not imply, however, that the logic of causality that leads to the occurrence of 
particular events does not have room in the model. It has room indeed, but it is 
subordinated to the debate around causality, and it is relevant in connection with the 
modes and forms that actors draw upon it. Certain ‘styles’ of power mobilization might 
focus public attention on the evidences generated by the debate than others, and this is 
precisely what the agency part of the study will try to investigate. Fundamental for this 
aim is the distinction between the opportunity that global events generate, and the modes 
into which it is mobilized. Global events, we have argued, are intrinsically connected 
with the generation of opportunities for reflexive transformation of given institutional 
alignments. These opportunities can be mobilized in different directions and to very 
different ends, and are always connected with social ‘consensus’. The agency in global 
events episodes, we shall argue, is played around the emotional basis of this consensus. 
In this project we will explore two mobilization modes:
Political opportunism is a particular style of opportunity mobilization where actors seek to 
make political capital out of fear as a mean for expanding the consensual period. The 
rational debate around global events is assisted by fear, and the solidity of evidences 
become less important that its emotional impact -  in order to articulate this strategy,
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actors tend to abandon the coherency of certain political principles. Opportunism is 
closely connected to Machiavelli’s theorems, and from the International Relations point 
of view is inherently linked to unilateralism and state-centric policies27. For all this we 
will call this particular style ‘postmodern Machiavellianism’. Consensual republicanism 
or Empathic Realism (see below) is another style of opportunity mobilization where 
actors seek to make political capital out of ‘empathy’ as a mean for expanding the 
consensual period. Rationality is assisted by dialogue, and a modem, inductive standpoint 
is mobilized in the debate around the event causality.
4) Modes o f  Institutional Change
In referring to the modes of institutional change connected to a global event episode we 
mean to indicate both how intensive and how extensive this change is -that is to say, how 
profoundly the impacts of the political action disrupts or reshapes an existing alignment of 
institutions and how wide-ranging such changes are. Once again, it needs to be repeated 
that the political actions studied in this dissertation are not a product or a mere 
determination of independent factors. The factors determine the intensity of the 
opportunity (the new “stock” of power which enters into the system reproduction), which 
is then mediated by the reflexive intervention of the relevant collective agencies and 
transformed into action directed towards particular directions. However, opportunities can 
be analyzed much more clearly when they are effectively transformed into effective 
changes, and that’s why we can momentary hold in suspension the agency part of the 
model in order to study the transformative dynamics of global events.
Power and social change are very contested concepts the analysis of which presents 
serious empirical difficulties. We will confront this practical issue in the concluding part 
of the dissertation, where we will put forward a proposed analytical model for the 
development of a theory of the global event that will include a proposal of this 
assessment. Strictly taken, the assessment strategy should be rather expansive, and many 
variables could and should be analyzed in order to capture the complexities of social 
structures’ disruption. However, it seems plausible to simplify this study taking as
27 Kane (2006)
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empirical references the specific policies which are arguably connected to the particular 
global events. While this simplification might imply the lost of some information, it 
should help to provide a clearer framework for the identification and assessment of certain 
elements, like for example the relation between the objectives of the policy and their 
actual realization. Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that the studied policies can 
ultimately have intended and unintended consequences over the social structure, although 
the intensity of both modes of impact must have some sort of connection with the power 
generation process of the given episode. The planed qualitative analysis of the policy 
making process, implementation and impacts of the “Alliance of Civilizations” policy, as 
well as the exploration of the Terrorism Act impacts (see below), should help us explore 
the variables upon which these policies have had a clear impact.
FRAMEWORK SUMMARY
G lobaliza tion A g en t’sM obilization
G lobal E v en t
In order to mobilize this framework for the empirical section of this Master’s dissertation, 
it is necessary to condense its analytical implications in relation to the theory of 
globalization:
1- Global events have to be analyzed as starting points of certain small-scale episodes of 
social change. The central hypothesis, informed from a political sociological point of 
view, would be that, in global event episodes, agencies take precedence over the global 
structural forces of this transformation, thus amplifying both the intended and the 
unintended consequences of their strategic activities. The first analytical section of a 
global event analysis should provide plausible explanations of why this is so. In terms of 
our framework, this means studying the systemic alternation of the consensual/conflictual 
character of societal totalities, both national and global, that ‘naturally’ occurs after an
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event realization.
2- Conjunctures of circumstances are empirically and theoretically relevant: they help to 
organize the episode’s data and explain, at least in theoretical terms, the strength of the 
episode’s political consequences. However, what is more relevant from the point of view 
of episodic characterization is that these circumstances converge and interact to form a 
unique process: the generation of transformative power, that is, the generation of a new 
source of power. Consequently the key, and simplified, question becomes how certain 
agents strategically mobilize this new source of power. The focus has then to be placed 
upon the modes whereby these agents draw upon the generative power of the event, and 
eventually lead to the design and implementation of certain policies, and their strategic 
activities focused upon the emotional basis of the episode’s consensus. These modes or 
‘styles’ can be broadly simplified into two categories, both expressing a package of 
principles and theoretical standpoints underlying the actor’s strategies: postmodern 
Machiavellianism and empathic realism.
3- The third and last section of the framework demands an analysis of the impact of the 
key policies of the episode. As we have discussed in the previous section, and will address 
again in the conclusion, this strategy necessarily involves a certain loss of information in 
relation to the objective of analyzing social change, but at the same time becomes a much 
more feasible research strategy for the exploratory aim of this dissertation.
METHODOLOGY
In the following paragraphs we will outline some basic methodological considerations of 
the thesis. The general, most important point is our intention to take very seriously all the 
theoretical and empirical implications of Giddens’ epistemological position, which is 
neither individualistic nor deterministic. Since the main aim of this thesis is in fact the 
development of a coherent analytical framework, and a research program, for studying 
global events, the question of the duality of structure will be further elaborated in the 
concluding part of the thesis.
However, it is necessary to advance here some methodological implications of this
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approach. According to Giddens’ structuration theory, and by extension according to our 
epistemological and methodological position, two types of methodological perspectives 
are possible in global events research. In the institutional analysis of global events the 
focus is placed upon the ways in which global event episodes disrupt a given social 
system. Some characteristics of these disruptions, what we have previously referred as the 
“quantity” of power, and their impact trajectories over the global system, are in principle 
generalizable: they can be reduced to a general, testable statement that applies to different 
cases. The development of this perspective needs to be eminently comparative, involving 
the analyses of a relatively high number of cases. This perspective will be addressed 
mainly at the end of the thesis.
The other type of perspective is the analysis of strategic conduct during global event’s 
episodes. In this analysis the focus is placed upon modes in which actors draw upon the 
power generated by global events. It gives primacy to discursive and practical 
consciousness of the structural disruptions generated by particular events, and to the 
creative, self-generated strategies that relevant actors deploy during the episode. These 
strategies are particular to each episode, and can only be generalized in an ideal typical 
fashion. In this second perspective, then, the characterization of particular global events 
becomes an exercise that has an interest in itself, and which is in principle capable of 
generating particular knowledge of each episode.
The selection of the 2004 Madrid bombings (“11-M28”) as the central qualitative unit of 
the thesis responds to criteria mainly connected to the agency part of our exploratory 
framework. The event was mainly mobilized by two different collective agencies, the 
Spanish Socialist Party and the People’s Party. As we will see below, both actors applied 
different styles of mobilization, and these styles coincide with the ideal characterization 
that we have proposed earlier. The significant presence of both modes of mobilization in 
a single episode makes 11-M a highly relevant case. Moreover, the main policy that came 
out of the episode, the “Alliance of Civilizations”, provides a marked contrast with the
28 In this research we will use “ 11-M” to refer to the 11 March 2004 Madrid’s terrorist bombings, which is how the 
event is known in Spain. For similar reasons, we will use 7/7 to refer to the London’s case. Les Back (2007: 124) has 
detected the seriousness of global events nomenclature: “this kind of naming is more than merely a line through time; it 
is the temporal alignment o f geopolitics. It results in a kind o f political longitude that designates a historical moment, 
yet at the same time comes to occlude historical perspective [...]. It is impossible to speak o f the events in London 
without first situating them relative to the primer meridian of US geopolitical time” . This will be reflected in chapter 4.
61
political consequences of the 9/11 episode, which is the global event that inspires this 
research. This is useful because it contributes to show the highly contingent nature of 
global events’ episodes.
Since an example of episodic characterization is already provided by 11-M case, the study 
of 7/7 is only intended to provide a comparative reference to the previous case. This 
should help our progress towards the global event theory’s comparative research program, 
which will be outlined in the conclusion of the dissertation. 7/7 and 11-M represent a 
good comparative pair for exploring the institutional analysis of global events, as they are 
similar in terms of the type and scope of the event and the position that the involved 
nation-state occupies in the global power hierarchy. At the same time, the political actions 
that can be associated to the cases show very different levels of intensity and extensity, 
and different political trajectories. This also raises comparative questions about the 
strategies and modes of political mobilization. As we will study in Chapter Four, while 
the 7/7 style of mobilization is intimately connected to the 9/11 case, 11-M constitutes a 
very interesting and relevant object to study the richness of alternatives of strategic 
conduct in the post 9/11 world.
The 2004 Madrid train bombings were a series of coordinated bombings against the 
commuter train system of Madrid on the morning of 11 March 2004, which killed 192 
people and wounded 2,050. The well know political controversy regarding the 
responsibility of the attack was accompanied by a number of highly relevant social, 
political, judicial, media and international responses that culminated, among other power 
expressions, with the “Alliance of Civilizations” policy. The “Alliance of Civilizations” 
is, officially speaking, a United Nations Secretary-General initiative intended to galvanize 
collective action across diverse societies in order to combat extremism, and overcome 
cultural and social barriers between mainly the Western and predominantly Muslim 
world. It was officially introduced by Spanish Prime Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez 
Zapatero at the 59th General Assembly of the United Nations and co-sponsored by 
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
To research the case we will use all the available quantitative and qualitative materials
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about the political process circumscribed between the terrorist attack and the 
implementation of the “Alliance of Civilizations” policy. This exercise should bring our 
understanding of the case beyond the mere assessment of the variables described in the 
previous section, and should help us design a better analytical framework for an eventual 
theory of the global event. At the same time, according to our approach, the case study 
has an independent interest. It can help, for example, to understand the effect that 11-M 
terrorist attack had in the peace negotiations with ETA, an important topic within the 
Spanish political debate.
The focus will be placed upon studying the mechanisms in which the key actor of the case 
draw upon the structural opportunities generated by the global event in the constitution of 
significant political actions observed in the 11-M political process. The Spanish president 
Jose LuisRodriguez Zapatero is the key agency of the case, the leader of the relevant 
collective agency and the crucial symbol mobilizer, so he will be the main focus of the 
qualitative study. All his speech acts, academic and journalistic books about his 
personality and political philosophy and other relevant documentation will be analyzed to 
study his agency during the episode. Besides Zapatero, other national actors, such as 
political parties, civil society organizations and media groups, will also be explored 
through relevant documented sources. We will put an especial emphasis in studying the 
strategic conduct deployed by People Party actors during the episode. The ‘Alliance of 
Civilizations’ policy will also be analyzed using books, reports and other documentation. 
In the methodological appendix we provide a list of all the consulted documents.
The 7 July 2005 London bombings were a series of coordinated suicide bombings that 
struck London's public transport system during the morning rush hour. Fifty-six people 
were killed in the attacks and about 700 injured. The incident was the deadliest single act 
of terrorism in the United Kingdom since Lockerbie and the deadliest bombing in London 
since the Second World War. It can be argued that the “Terrorism Act 2006”, which was 
drafted in the aftermath of the bombings, condenses the main political action emerged 
from this event. It is a UK Act made law on March 30, 2006, after being introduced on 
October 12, 2005. The Act creates new offences related to terrorism, and amends existing 
ones. In spite of the difficult progress of the Bill through the parliament, the government
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considers the Act a necessary state-based response to an unparalleled terrorist threat; 
Tony Blair personally argued for the Bill, in its full form, in the strongest terms. In 
particular, he refused offers to compromise on a shorter period of detention, arguing that 
the 90 day figure was a direct recommendation of the police and that no lesser period 
would provide adequate protection. The Bill was finally given a Second Reading, and that 
16 Labour MPs opposed to the first version (a relevant issue for our characterization of 
the relevant collective agency). The law encounters opposition from many sectors of the 
British society who feel that it is an undue imposition on civil liberties, and could 
convince members of Britain’s Muslim community to turn to violence.
The British Primer Minister, Tony Blair, is the key agency of the case and will be the 
main focus of the qualitative study. Moreover, Tony Blair’s strategic conduct is especially 
interesting in the context of the post 9/11 world. He played a crucial role in the political 
process triggered by 9/11 and aligned with the Bush Administration policies after the 
attack, a situation that we will also have to take into account in the study of the episode. 
Speech acts, books and other relevant documentation will be analyzed. Similar to the 
Spanish case, we will also analyze other agencies around Blair’s power mobilization, but 
this time the analysis will be much more concise. The research will focus on the policy­
making process and implementation of the Terrorism Act, and its comparison with the 
Alliance of Civilizations. All the documents and data sources utilized to research the case 
will be detailed in Chapter Four
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Chapter 3
11 March 2004 Episode Characterization: 
From the Madrid bombings to the Alliance of Civilizations

The political process triggered by the global event, as experienced in the aftermath of the 
Madrid bombings on 11 March 2004, offers an interesting case for exploring the 
implications of the previous framework. After the March 11 bombs, the worst terrorist 
attack in Europe since Lockerbie, two coalitions of interest, mobilized around the two 
main Spanish political parties, draw upon the transformative power of the event in a 
diversity of ways. Intensively and formally different political actions, all of them having 
direct but distinctive connections with the attack, were implemented. Many details of the 
event and its immediate consequences have already been described in some academic 
books and articles, so we can skip the descriptive details and focus on the elements that 
are relevant to our framework, especially those concerned with the strategies followed by 
the main actors, but also those structural forces that contribute to explaining the 
transformative character of the 11-M episode.
MARCH 11 AND THE GENERATION OF SOCIAL CONSENSUS
Globalization Agent'sMobilization
Global Event
Global events are starting points of a sequence of reflexive social change in so far as they 
generate a consensual period within the social system, and the first task of the case 
analysis must be to trace the empirical evidence that reveals the factors and mechanisms 
that could make this claim plausible for particular episodes. Given the intensity of the 
Spanish episode, it might seem strange for some analysts of the Spanish political system 
to characterize the situation generated after 11-M as consensual, but the key analytical 
element is to distinguish the structural phenomena generated after the event (the ‘natural’ 
reaction of society) and the strategic activities of certain actors, which according to our 
working hypothesis are in fact played out around the consensual phenomena. Precisely 
because of the highly strategic tone of the episode, the elements of consensus formation
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are more clearly visible in 11-M. I will first advance the general arguments of this section 
and then describe the empirical material from the Spanish case which makes the 
consensual hypothesis plausible.
Consensus is always generated around a particular objective that frames all the new 
binding obligations and commitments over and above those previously in force, although 
consensus is generally extended and mobilized to aims that have different levels of 
relation with the central goal: it is then a social phenomenon that must involve a complex 
combination between emotion and rational cognition. In this research we will follow this 
definition, which tends to characterize consensus as an individual emotional-rational state 
which is shared by a significant part of the community.
The 11-M episode is characterized by the presence of two consecutive phases where 
consensus was generated around two interrelated objectives. (1) ETA terrorist group was 
the first national objective, and the global ramifications of the first consensual phase were 
concentrated around the notion of ‘terrorism’ as a general phenomenon of global 
connotations in the post 9/11 world. This was a short phase, very particular to the Spanish 
case, and very relevant from the point of view of the analysis of strategic behaviour. 
However, these contingencies also help to clarify the powerful ‘natural’ consensual effect 
of the global event, for even when certain evidences of the case were deliberately hidden 
to public opinion, the reaction was consensual in character during a significant span of 
time around the ‘official’ version of what occurred in the attack.
(2) The second phase is much more relevant in terms of the power ramifications of the 
episode -  the national level kept a consensual character in the first stage, but in certain 
key themes, specially ETA’s implication in the attack, the consensus fluctuated towards 
conflict as a consequence of the penetration of the ramifications of the strategic behaviour 
of the first phase. At the global level, the consensus of the first phase was immediately 
transported to the second, and reinforced by the generation of new evidences of the 
mechanisms and consequences of the post 9/11 world, specially the dramatic failure of the 
Iraq war, therefore creating new additions to the total supply of power of the global 
system. This new supply of power together with the power generated by the global event 
allowed the key agent of our case, who was the president of only a middle-power state, to
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design and implement the highly ambitious cosmopolitan policy of the Alliance of 
Civilizations.
Rational consensus around a particular topic inevitably has an emotional substratum, and 
this can also be empirically analyzed in the Spanish case. This substratum, I shall argue in 
the following sections, is where the key strategic conduct can be observed, but the very 
realization of an event also reveals information about the societal predispositions to 
sanction or engage with certain strategies. The 11-M episode is consensual, as all global 
events are if the theory is correct, but it is also ‘empathic’ at least in its national character, 
and this is significantly different than other episodes where ‘fear’ has been the main 
emotion assisting the rationalization process.
Societal Consensus
In this section I will discuss the evidence that suggest the existence of a consensual period 
in the social system emerged from 11-M terrorist attack. Evidences will be presented in 
three interrelated sections: the media, political actors and institutions and society in 
general.
1 Media: The media transmits events, globally and nationally, and makes them 
experienced in a cognitive unitary framework which is increasingly unitary in other 
respects. Therefore, the media, printed and electronic, has to play a central role in the very 
definition of what constitutes a global event. It is, with no doubt, one of the key strategic 
fields and a source of power for certain actors (see below) but it is also structurally tied to 
‘credibility’ and ‘immediacy’, and it maintains a relative autonomy from political power. 
This makes it both a social institution highly susceptible to be impacted by the consensual 
force of the global event and a structural vehicle for broader consensus generation after a 
global event realization, although its role can change as the episode advances. March 11 
event had indeed two successive kinds of coverage, both of them characterized by the 
centrality of the message instead of the medium, but with different mediums leading each 
period, and with dramatic differences in the homogeneity of the message. The following 
evidence is from the first period, which is the most revealing of the effect we are looking
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to test in this section.
• Visual/Linguistic Consensus. Shocking, contradictory and repetitive images of the 
trains and the victims and emotive, strong language dominate the first coverage, 
which was essentially Television-centred, and had a strong level of similarities 
within all media corporations29. The dominion of TV over other kind of media was 
strongly determined by the type of available information rather than any strategic 
decision: TV is best suited to transmit casual events30, thus amplifying the 
emotional impact in the viewer. The dominium of the message over the medium, 
however, set the stage for the majority of communicative processes of other 
traditional media -  newspapers and radio.
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S o u rc e : C a s ta n o s  a n d  M unoz (2005)
According to one study, on the main newspapers headlines on March 12 there 
were more emotive than informative expressions, with terms like ‘massacre’, 
‘carnage’ and ‘hell’ highlighted in both Spain and the US. The victims of the 
attack were the protagonists in most of the front pages, which included much 
bigger pictures than usual - most of the paper’s editors agreed to show the real
29 Castanos and Mufioz (2005) have studied March 11 coverage, both local and global.
30 This is a very common research result in media studies.
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aspect of the attacked area, although they also agreed, it seems that through a 
closed debate, that they would not show the worst images.31 Rather than 
transmitting new information, these images tended to recall and reinforce the 
psychological impact of the type of audiovisual material previously absorbed in 
the viewing of the TV images. Similar phenomena were also observed in the 
global media, from Al-Jazeera to the CNN, which focused their lenses on Spain 
with significant intensity. For example, on March 12, 80% of the US newspapers 
dedicated their front page to the attack.
• Message Consensus. Another significant evidence of this first stage of event 
coverage was that many of headlines of the Spanish and some international papers 
called for the ‘unity’ of people against the attack: the right-wing paper La Razon 
and the financial paper Expansion, for example, coincide in the headline “Todos 
unidos contra el terror” .
• Authorship Consensus. As it has been shown later on, ETA was initially blamed 
for strategic purposes, and, obviously, with very little evidence pointing towards 
its guilt. But this is precisely what makes the initial media agreement towards the 
ETA’s authorship hypothesis one of the most significant evidence of the 
consensus generative capacity of global events: albeit with different levels of 
intensity, ETA’s authorship hypothesis was not contested, and in general terms 
spread by the main Spanish media.
As the timeline of the episode went on, media played a much more strategic role, but the 
important fact for the generative character of the event is that, according to the available 
studies, at the very beginning of the episode the event ‘impacted’ the media, both global 
and national, in a rather homogenous way: there was consensus in the media agents 
around the ways and the information to be transmitted, which in turn contributed to start a 
broader systemic alternation of the otherwise regularized dynamic of consensus and 
conflict to other institutions of society.
31 Casafia (2004)
32 “All united against Terror".
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2 Political Actors and Institutions: they are certainly impacted by events, forcing
immediate public declarations that, in many respects, have a binding character because 
they create future expectations of certain institutional change. Global events force a 
consciously emotive account of the event by national and global leaders which, 
analytically speaking, supply the moral and normative grounds whereby further action is 
justified in relation to the particular event. In other words, they invariably create a 
consensual normative obligation to action, which is then internalized in various degrees 
by broader social actors, and tends to be global in its character, but they also tend to 
supply the emotional and moral background that justifies this action. The second part is to 
a great extend an indicator of strategic behaviour, and will be addressed below.
• National and Global Leaders Unanimous Condemnation. All the most relevant 
political leaders around the world immediately and unanimously condemned 
the attack in a very similar tone.
UN un2 NATO US US2 A IS PH IN EC EP IRL F UK D P VA PL R SY
C ondem nation Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
U njustification 
of th e  a ttac k Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Em pathy o ver 
A ction X X X X X X X X X
A ction o v e r 
E m pathy X X X X X X X X X X
Table 3.2: Content Analysis of the S peach es of National and Global L eaders at Madrid blasts (all sp each es w ere 
m ade on March 11 2004. UN, United Nations Secretary General; UN2, United Nations High C om issioner for Human 
Rights; NATO, Secretary General; US, United S ta tes  President; US2, US E m bassador to the EU; A, Australian 
Foreign Minister; IS, Israeli Prime Minister; PH, Philippine President; In, Indonesian Foreign Minister; EC, European 
Com issionPresident; EP, European Parliam ent President; IRL, Irish Prime Minister; F, French President; UK, United 
Kingdom Prime Minister; D, G erm an Foreign Minister; P, Portuguese Prime Minister; VA, The Vatican Spokesm an; 
PL, Palestinian Minister; R, R ussian President; SY, Syrian President)
Source: BBC, El P a ls and Official Institutional W ebsites. Elaborated by the author (se e  Methodological Appendix)
• International Organizations Resolutions. They express in formal terms the 
consensus achieved by the global governance system of institutions. The most
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illuminating of these resolutions was again advanced is spite of the lack of 
solid evidence about the attack: it was the Security Council Resolution 1530, 
that unequivocally attributed responsibility for the bombings to ETA. The 
consensual force of global events was exemplified by a senior French official 
reported as saying: ‘Under the circumstances, nobody wanted to say no’33
• Symbolic Consensus. TheEuropean Parliament declared March 11 as the day 
“of the victims of terrorism”. In France, Portugal, Romania among others as 
well as in the official buildings of the European Union, all flags were down at 
the middle. Poland and Portugal declared March 12 as day of luto. Romano 
Prodi, Silvio Berlusconi, Jean-Pierre Raffarin and Joschka Fischer among 
others assisted to the demonstrations to condemn the attack.
• National Political Opposition. During the days that went from the attack to the 
March 14 national elections, the Socialist Party remained significantly silent, 
although they had evidence that Popular Party was deliberately manipulating 
the episode. Only
3 Society: the study of systematic distortions in social life is what ultimately matters in 
global events episodes characterization, although the majority of indicators in this respect 
are relatively superficial in relation to the importance of the phenomena. The systemic 
alteration of its consensual/conflictual character of society in connection to global events 
can be studied through opinion polls, but they must be specifically designed to capture 
this specific alteration. In absence of this, we can partially relay in other observable 
evidence:
• Public demonstrations. The day after the attacks, 11’4 million people -a  
quarter of the Spanish people- came onto the streets to demonstrate. It was the 
second largest demonstration ever organized in Spain, and the first time that 
members of the monarchy and the Spanish Catholic hierarchy, one of the most
33 Quoted in O’Donell (2007)
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reactionary institutions in Europe, demonstrated. Before that, silent, massive 
concentrations of students took place in all Spanish Universities. The majority 
of shops and business closed at 18:30. Several demonstrations took place in 
other European and American cities, being
• Condemnation o f  the Spanish Muslim Community. The Muslim community in 
Madrid and elsewhere joined with all other social actors in condemning the 
attacks.
In sum, there are evidences that 11-M actually impacted the media, the political and the 
social systems: taken together, this impacts suggest the plausibility of the hypothesis that 
global events disrupt the consensual/conflictual character of social systems, both globally 
and nationally: ‘power over situations’ are outflanked by ‘power to situations’, thus 
increasing the system effectiveness at realizing certain goals. Parson’s analogy between 
money and power has been widely and correctly criticized, but, since global events also 
tend to impact the economic system, which is much more easily quantifiable, the analogy 
still provides a good way of visualizing the systemic impact that global events might have 
on the political system: On March 11, for example, European financial markets dropped 
between 2 and 3% as a direct consequence of the attacks; Down Jones felt 1.6%.
However, what are the goals that are necessary to explain the alternation of the global and 
national power system? The particularities of the Spanish case, and the disparities of the 
evidences analyzed above, precisely suggest the hypothesis that ‘the sentiment that 
something needs to be done’ is in fact more important than the rationalization of these 
very goals: during the pick of the consensual period in 11-M episode, ETA was 
strategically blamed without any significant evidence, and the majority of the political 
actors unite around this hypothesis, even when it was contradictory to their particular 
interests. Emotions seem to take a very firm role during global events episode, and this 
will be analyzed below. However, as the timeline of the episode went on, the ETA’s 
authorship hypothesis was eventually dismissed by the social system, a fact that suggest 
that, in spite of the centrality of emotions, these goals cannot be programmed at will and 
irrationally, as certain versions of postmodern theories would defend.
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The generation of power in 11-M episode eventually converged around the Al-Qaida’s 
authorship hypothesis through a very ‘modem’ and rational process, what in turn 
reinforced the global character of the event. Long, tedious and expensive judicial, police, 
journalistic and academic investigations took place, and all of them confirmed without a 
shadow of a doubt that March 11 was perpetrated by an Islamist group connected to Al- 
Qaida34, and that no domestic terrorist group had any kind of involvement with it. March 
11 was then seen as product of the contradictions and complexities of the global system. 
It’s important to take a closer look to the terms of this contradiction in relation to the 
evidences generated during the episode.
Al-Qaida is widely analyzed by the academic community as a global violent network that 
has demonstrated to be significant for the global system March 11 was a product of their 
operational capacity at the global level. For example, it seems that 11-M was prepared in 
different states. Some of the suspects in the Madrid bombing had been of interest to the 
French and Spanish police in 2001 for movements in both countries. Two of the formally 
accused individuals were on a list of suspects issued by the Moroccan police for a series 
of cafe bombings in Casablanca, and retrospective information has turned up further 
information on their connections in Germany and Norway. Judge Juan del Olmo’s 
indictment identified the criminals: a group of fourteen (five of whom died in a suicide- 
blast in the Madrid suburb of Leganes on 3 April 2004 when the police surrounded their 
hideout) politically affiliated to the Islamic Combatant Moroccan Group (GICM) that has 
links in France, Belgium, Iraq and Italy. In sum, al-Qaida is a global network, and 11-M 
was perpetrated by a significant section of it.
From the point of view of the political institutions, the very occurrence of March 11 
provided evidence that the instrumental capacity and autonomy of the individual nation­
state to assure their security was decisively undermined by the globalization of terrorism. 
It also signalled the crisis of instrumental and political legitimacy of the current 
configuration of international institutions, which by mere geometrical principle are the 
best institutions to cope with the actual causes of global events. Some analysts situated the
34 The indicators are now overwhelming, and all point towards Al-Qaida linkage with the attack. From the academic 
perspective, see Brynjar and Thomas (2004)
75
*5 c
failure to stop 3/11 at the European level , and in fact the management of crisis moved to 
the centre of the European Union’s political agenda after the attack. For example, 
European political leaders revoked the EU solidarity clause and called for strong anti­
terrorist measures right after the event. Also, an EU terrorism ‘Czar’ was appointed to 
coordinate such measures. Other analysts situated the failure at the global institutional 
level. This position is usually accompanied by the expansion of the conception of security 
(see below). But some researchers also stay at the national security state framework to 
argue that “the traumatic events of 11 March 2004 in Madrid underlined the opportunities 
offered to terrorists and criminals by hesitant or partial intelligence exchange” . For these 
analysts, there’s a growing tensions between a global networked world, which is ideal 
terrain for the operation of criminal and violent groups, and the current bureaucratization 
of public, national and international, institutions.
But regardless of what analysis bears more explanatory power, what is relevant is that the 
connections of the attack with the global system, made of both the global state system and 
other, more flexible authority structures, became clearer as the timeline of the episode 
went on, thus exposing the systemic contradictions of globalization and framing the 
rational terms of the consensual period.
Emotional Basis of Rational Consensus
Global events, especially those of violent nature, tend to be analyzed in terms of the ‘fear’ 
they awake. Scientist have shown that in many circumstances of our life as social beings, 
our emotions are triggered only after an evaluative, voluntary mental process, and for 
many political scientists, sociologists and risk theorists, the evaluation of global events 
trigger ‘fear’, an emotion which is normally attached to survival and to the quality of that 
survival. The previous sections has tried to show that, at least in the Spanish case, the 
relevant phenomena from a political point of view which is ‘naturally’ triggered by global 
events is a ‘rational consensus’ in connection to the event and the agent or element that 
produced it, that is, in connection to globalization. Emotions, however, play a crucial role 
both as strategic fields of action and, indeed as semi-automatic emotional responses to the
35 Ekengren and Groenleer (2006)
36 Aldrich (2004;732)
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event. The Spanish case suggest the hypothesis that “fear” is not necessarily the emotion 
that underlies the political reaction and strategies of particular global events episodes. 
First of all we’ll detail some evidence that seriously question the ‘fear’ hypothesis in the 
Spanish case. Then, we’ll discuss the hypothesis that ‘empathy’ was the predominant 
emotion of the episode.
• Street mobilizations. The massive demonstrations that took place the day after 
the attack are testimony of the lack of sentiment of fear in Spanish society: a 
rational process assisted by the emotion of fear would have immediately build 
the hypothesis that the terrorists would take advantage of the situation and 
attack such large, planned and announced concentration of people. Although 
not so revealing, other spontaneous public demonstrations of the episode 
provide also evidence against the fear hypothesis.
• Train traffic. The day after the attack, there were four times as many train 
travellers as usual in Spain. This increase in train passengers is explained by 
the massive attendance to the demonstrations against terrorism, but it also 
reinforces the questioning of the fear hypothesis, as Spaniards choose the 
transport which was the object of the attack. Lopez-Rousseau (2005) has 
studied the data on train travel for the months immediately following 11-M. 
He observes that Spaniards briefly reduced their train riding the immediate 
weeks following the attack (approximately 5% less train travellers), but they 
also reduced their car drive, hence preventing the dramatic extra highway 
fatalities that were observed after the airplane attacks of September 11.
These evidences question the fear hypothesis. What is then the key emotional state that 
assisted the rationalization process of the episode? A qualitative assessment of the 11-M 
demonstrations suggests that empathy, rather than fear, was the central emotion of the 
episode, at least in the first part of it. Three elements must be differentiated to document 
the political character of these demonstrations. The first one was obviously their internal 
diversity: there’s no point in trying to characterize the internal cacophony of the origin of
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the demonstrators, which came from all ideologies, genders and ages. The second element 
is strategic, and will be further discussed below: People’s Party tried to deliberately unify 
the demonstration message towards the ETA’s authorship hypothesis forcing the motto 
“With the victims, with the constitution and for the defeat of terrorism”. The third and 
most important element was the relative unity of the spontaneous messages of the 
demonstrators, which showed a marked empathic tone with the victims: in Madrid, for 
example, the key spontaneous motto was ‘Not everyone is here, 191 are missing, we will 
never forget you’; in Barcelona, it was ‘Today I’m also from Madrid’. There are, 
however, other evidences sustaining the empathy hypothesis. People across Spain flocked 
to hospitals and mobile blood donations units in such numbers that the need for blood for 
transfusions was totally satisfied by 10:30 am on March 11. Furthermore, there were no 
significant reported racist incidents directly connected to the terrorist attack in Spain.
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JO SE LUIS RODRIGUEZ ZAPATERO AND PEO PL E’S PARTY
Globalization Agent’sMobilization
Global Event
According to the proposed methodology, the analysis of strategic conduct must be carried 
out by focusing attention on the modes by which structurally relevant actors draw upon 
the transformative power of the event, that is, the rational consensus and its emotional 
basis, for the design and implementation of certain policies. In the context of global event 
episodes, an analysis of the strategic conduct of key actors requires giving primacy to the 
discursive modes and activities by which they draw upon the distinctive elements and 
factors that intervene in the generation of a consensual period. Taken together, these 
factors constitute an institutionalized property of the global system: a source of power 
within the institutions of globalization.
We will focus our analysis on two significantly distinct types of agents in the mobilization
Zapatero
‘There’s life beyond orthodoxy;
What’s more, the great majority of life is outside all forms of orthodoxy’
Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero
Before addressing the arguments presented above, it will be useful to introduce very 
briefly the intellectual origins and the stated political philosophy of the key actor of the 
case37. This should provide a sophisticated account of motivation, an analysis that 
Giddens considers to be crucial for any study of strategic conduct (1983: 289). Zapatero’s 
political philosophy seems to be rather inductive in its nature and origins: he does not 
show any type of uncritical adherence to theoretical postulates, ideological schemes or 
‘great men’ fore-fathers, and declares to have construct a great deal of his political 
practice and theoretical standpoints on the basis of his personal experience and certain key 
contemporary theoretical works. He grew up intellectually under Franco’s dictatorship, 
when, as he has described, participated in long night conversations with his father and 
brother about politics, law and literature. Moreover, he entered politics in a time when 
the Socialist Party was fully addressing the debate on renouncing Marxism as its 
ideological base: ‘Marx,’ Zapatero has declared ‘is an extraordinary thinker and excellent 
analyst of capitalism. But he lacks reflection about democracy’. Zapatero’s marks at the 
university weren’t especially brilliant, but he was very active in youth organizations of 
divers origin, both cultural and political. He left unfinished his PhD studies in Law at the 
University of Leon, where he nonetheless had the opportunity to learn from a number of 
very strong political personalities within the Spanish academia, and get in touch with 
some political theories that would be then crucial for his political doctrine. The theory of 
Republicanism as presented by Phillip Pettit (1999) and a particular adaptation of the
37 There is not much academic literature on Zapatero. There are however two books addressing his biography and 
political figure: Campillo (2004) and Calami (2006). I found them particularly useful, but given the obvious bias o f both 
books, they cannot be considered an academic, balanced analysis of his figure, a task that is still to be done. All the 
major newspaper’s websites contain descriptive profiles o f the Spain’s socialist leader. The BBC News website also has 
a shorter but interesting profile. Some good international articles on Zapatero’s philosophy and personality are Graff 
(2004) , Millas (2005), The Economist (2006). In chapter one I detail all the speech acts which I consulted for this 
section. There’s also a plethora of media reports on the Zapatero’s role during 11-M, which I will not cite unless I find it 
necessary to refer to specific information. Since most o f this is in public domain, and this Master’s thesis do not pretend 
to add new information on this topic, I have constructed the analysis o f Zapatero’s agency during the episode by 
combining different sources, without specifically referring to the source used for each particular point.
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Third Way political programme (what Zapatero calls the ‘New Way’) are the two 
theoretical references that he often quotes. Both Republicanism and the Third Way have 
intimate connection in Zapatero’s practice. The New Way political programme, which is 
indeed a very important reference for understanding his agency on global events episodes, 
will be addressed in the following chapter in relation to Tony Blair’s strategic conduct 
during 7/7, so we can focus this section on the Zapatero’s adaptation of Pettit’s political 
philosophy.
‘Pettit’, Zapatero has declared, ‘was for us the ordered expression of many intuitions, of 
many values.’38 At the centre of Pettit’s theory is a conception of political liberty as ‘non­
domination’, an expression that Zapatero often uses in his political speeches. According 
to this conception, we are free to the extent that we do not find ourselves under the 
domination of others, subject to their will and exposed to their arbitrary use of power: the 
role of political power and public law must be to actively intervene in the conditions, the 
rules of the game, which are though to diminish our possibilities of action and free 
expression. Only universal suffrage and the widespread participation of citizens in 
political life can ensure that the laws will be just, instead of serving particular interests 
and private or bureaucratic concentrations of power. Freedom from domination by others 
is not equivalent to being one’s own master, since in itself it is a condition which people 
may enjoy in a variety of ways, as much by letting themselves be influenced by particular 
emotions and creative behaviour as by bringing themselves under the stable rule of just 
social institutions.
Although with certain reservations and libertarian overtones, Zapatero’s political 
philosophy and practice clearly endorses the concept of ‘non-domination’ in Pettit’s 
theory, which, on the other hand, does not seem to offer a much deeper inside into the 
nature of freedom than the one that Max Weber already advanced few decades ago. Much 
of Zapatero’s work in domestic policy has been on social issues which clearly involve 
situations of arbitrary domination, including gender-violence and discrimination, divorce, 
same-sex marriage and children rights. One of the policies that better expresses the non­
domination philosophy is the Dependency Law, a plan to regulate help and resources for
38 In Z8bis Zapatero reflects about the connections between his political philosophy and Pettit’s theory.
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people in dire need of them, and who cannot provide for themselves and must rely on 
others on a daily basis.
Ambitious economic and educational ‘non-domination projects’ are yet to come on 
Zapatero’s domestic policy, but one can easily think about policy projections on these 
fields of action that could depart rather directly from Pettit’s theoretical root. And yet 
Pettit’s postulates do not seem enough to capture all Zapatero’s philosophical ‘intuitions’. 
Especially in his more theoretical speeches and interviews, Zapatero expands and injects a 
substantial epistemological connotation to the rather limited role that democracy plays in 
Pettit’s theory (ensure the justice of laws). This injection wouldn’t probably pass a 
rigorous test for its consistency, but it is ultimately fundamental to understand Zapatero’s 
consensual style of event mobilization. Institutions live in the past: they are memory 
traces, and can be studied scientifically, thus providing important knowledge about the 
conditions that impose situations of domination. But politics, Zapatero argues, addresses 
all those things to which we don’t have a technical or scientific response because they are 
projected into the future: 'That’s why politics has to be democratic, because nobody can 
have the true response. However, all of us, together, can and have to achieve the highest 
level of possible support for the solution we believe in.’ Therefore, real, effective 
democracy isn’t an institution to which ‘one arrives with established positions’. Political 
decisions about the future of social institutions are only improved when they come from 
true and substantial dialogue. To do this, citizens have to be strong: they have to have 
rights, economic resources, education and cultural knowledge that allow them to 
overcome ‘systemic forces’ and thus participate in the process of building a strong 
democracy. ‘From this emerges our deep democratic faith and our rejection to the 
abdication of responsibilities implicit in leaving politics in the hands of technocrats or 
populists. For all these reasons the left cannot be mainly scientific, it has to be 
democratic. We don’t have an orthodoxy to offer’.
Zapatero’s political philosophy has been qualified as ‘weak’ by some academics (Santos 
Julia and Fernando Savater among others) and innovative and desirable by others 
(Salvador Giner being one of the key intellectuals supporting Zapatero's republicanism). 
In analytical terms, it seems that the key element is the ontological and epistemological
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role reserved to democracy and dialogue: true, informed dialogue provides, within the 
very same simultaneous processes, the best possible transparent (rational) knowledge 
about the institutions of the past, and the strongest possible (emotional) implication about 
the avenues of the future. The pragmatic articulation of a coherent discourse and practice 
between both elements (what we call empathic realism) is what penetrates Zapatero’s 
global events mobilization, and his strategic conduct when Machiavellianism is 
confronted.
Globalization and the Third Way (see next chapter) politics seem to provide the empirical 
basis from which Zapatero’s own institutional analysis depart: ‘It is not that globalization 
is inevitable. It has already taken place. And the answer to globalization cannot be the 
reconstruction of walls and boundaries’. Zapatero not only accepts without hesitation the 
existence of globalization, he also understands its multidimensional nature: ‘Not even the 
Adrian wall, nor China’s Great Wall is going to protect us from global terrorism’. 
‘Politics’ Zapatero argued, ‘is the only response to the contradictions of globalization. 
Politics is the only thing that can force us to overcome our local identities and liberate 
ourselves from all the harm that afflict us’. Zapatero’s political practice, especially his 
very positive relation with the Catalan and Basque nationalisms, shows that he’s in a 
political plane, not cultural, when he speaks of local identities: he’s thinking about the 
nation-state. To my knowledge, there is not a single president or prime minister in power 
that has stated something similar, that has reflexively and clearly renounced to draw upon 
what has been the key emotional source of power since the rise of the nation-state. ‘The 
united Europe is a good political response, a response which is close to the size of the 
systemic forces of globalization that we all have to face’.
Having briefly introduced Zapatero’s political philosophy, it is necessary to separate these 
theories from his reflections about ‘power’ and his way to it, two elements that are 
intrinsically connected in Zapatero’s evolution as a political leader. Zapatero’s political 
speeches are replete of theoretical reflections about power that would seem naive to some, 
and that tend to pass totally unattended by the media and political analysts because they 
seem to lack substance. However, both the intensity and the moment when he intensified 
his discourse about power, which was, precisely, the immediate moment when he took
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office, seem to be two extraordinary relevant elements of Zapatero’s strategy. ‘I promise 
this especially to the young: power won’t change me’ was his key statement on the day of 
his election; ‘Democratic power is the only voice most citizens have. The corporations 
and the media don’t need power; they already have it. I don’t want to be a great leader. I 
want to be a good democrat’ was one of his statements in the first interview as Spanish 
president for the international press, following many others with a very similar message: 
‘The greatest satisfaction to me does not come from public or media praises, but from 
seeing others happy. A man in power isn’t a man facing his destiny. What’s important is 
the destiny of the country he serves’; ‘My passion is politics, not power. Citizens rule’; 
‘My intention is to take power away from the powerful and give it to the citizens’; ‘Power 
is a tireless hunter for excuses to delay the solutions to difficult tasks. I will not fall into 
this vice’; ‘It consists in the exercise of power with transparency, constantly opened and 
accountable to the citizens’; ‘The people that better exercise power are those who don’t 
love it, those who don’t feel anxiety to have it, those who don’t feel an unhealthy 
attachment for it, those who want to use it in order to change things’
Anxiety, dynamics of trust and betrayal, and everyday routines of social interactions in 
the cabinet office seem to be the elements that operate in the transformation of rulers’ 
attitudes and emotions once in power: we can readily understand Zapatero’s unusual 
interest to publicly state his distance from power as a personal, initiatic ritual to cope with 
the transformative mechanisms of the exercise of power, and to dissuade, by means of a 
deep commitment with radical transparency, the application of professional, rationalistic 
strategies by his immediate collaborators. But we can also read these statements as a 
powerful emotional strategy to construct a direct, non-mediated link with the citizens -  to 
stimulate deep, empathic social awareness about the mechanisms of power, including the 
media ones, and construct an intimated and honest connection with the constituency based 
not on seduction or acting performances, but on basic trust: on the inherent connections 
which exist between learning the institutional and strategic circumstances that the ruler 
has the face, and the major axes of ontological security described by Anthony Giddens 
(1991). Zapatero had to face a ‘Machiavellic Moment’ during the legislature when ETA 
broke the cess fire: this test to Zapatero’s relation with power will be briefly addressed in 
the following chapter.
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Zapatero rise to the Socialist Party power is also highly relevant to understand the 
opportunity to effectively deploy his strategic conduct during the global event. This is so 
mainly because the episode, as described by academic39 and journalistic reports, seems to 
be more a product of chance, of an instinctive and brilliant reading of political timing, of 
the existence of a generational gap in the Spanish society, and of the last resorts of 
internal party democracy, than to the bureaucratic manoeuvres and the subscription of 
long term, capturing deals which are so important to understand the reproduction of the 
institutional constrains of all political systems. The electoral defeat of the Socialist Party 
in 1996, after 14 years in power, confronted the party with the challenge to replace the 
charismatic leadership of Felipe Gonzalez. The process was extraordinary complex and 
turbulent: the PSOE had four different leaders until July 2000, when Zapatero was 
elected. All these leaders came from mainstream currents of the party apparatus and 
defended a programmatic and formalistic continuity to defeat the Peoples Party 
government. The bad results for the Socialist Party in the 2000 general elections opened 
up a critical threshold in the evolution of the party that was admitted and institutionalized 
in the Party Congress that took place in July 2000, which was mainly organized to elect a 
new leader. The candidate best placed to win the election to become Secretary-General, 
and the one that had the support of most of the party elite, was Jose Bono, a strong 
Spanish nationalist with a confrontational political style and authoritarian personality who 
was very respected by the Church and even certain sections of the Spanish political right. 
Zapatero was only the fourth contender in line, who was unknown to the public and even 
to the party. Zapatero made a speech based almost exclusively on the question of 
generational change, what in rationalistic terms seemed more a political suicide than a 
clever move: as most Spanish organizations, the Socialist Party was highly hierarchical 
and gerontocratic, and most of the elites of the regional delegations supported Bono. But 
many of the lower-rank party members were much younger, and the block vote by 
regional delegations had been removed in a previous Congress and replaced by a secret 
individual ballot. Zapatero won 41.7 per cent of the vote to Bono’s 40.8. Zapatero found 
the critical support to rise as the Party’s leader not in internal political pacts or a solid 
bureaucratic career, but within the relatively powerless younger generation of the
39 M6ndez-Lago (2005) offers a good analysis, in English, o f the Socialist Party recent period of changes.
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Socialists, who, through a new electoral mechanism that the party machinery hadn’t had 
time to process strategically, found the way to express their differences in values and 
attitudes. As we will see below, the existing generational gap within the Spanish society is 
also crucial to understand Zapatero’s mobilization of the power of the global event.
86
Structural Factors and Strategic Conduct
It is a basic premise of our theoretical framework that the reality and intensity of a 
particular consensual period observable during a global event episode is a direct 
consequence of a complex interaction of factors. These factors, we have argued, are 
empirically discernible and in fact comparable to other cases (see Chapter One and 
Conclusion). However, the generation of transformative power does not mean that this 
power is automatically translated into change: agents have to discursively mobilize this 
power. The purpose of this section is to analyze the mobilization of the power of the 
global event by means of the study of the strategic conduct of the key actors of our case in 
relation to each generative factor. For each factor, we will study: (1) What mechanisms 
would explain how each one of these affects the generation of power, that is, how they 
contribute to generating a consensual period; (2) How they are discursively mobilized by 
the key agent in our case (Zapatero), and (3) How Zapatero’s strategic conduct interacts 
with People’s Party strategies.
Scale
11-M was a big terrorist attack. The number of people killed were 191, and 2.057 people 
were injured -  the attack was the second most lethal in terms of deaths and the first in 
terms of injuries suffered in Europe to date (only before the Lockerbie attack in 1988). It 
wasn’t as deadly as 9/11, which had 10 times more deaths, but it was the first al Qaeda’s 
(or al Qaeda’s inspired) attack perpetrated in European soil. 11-M revealed the 
vulnerability of Europe, and reinforced the perception that Western societies were 
confronting a new style of terrorism which was much more ruthless in the violent means 
that is prepared to use. The scale of 11-M revealed emotional indiscrimination and 
vulnerability: an absolute lack of empathy in the rationalization process of those who 
perpetrate it, and this, I argue, was the main mechanism that generated transformative 
power at the European and global level.
At the national level, another more specific mechanism activated the generation of 
transformative power in relation to national terrorism. Diego Muro, an Spanish analyst of
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Basque nationalism and ETA’s terrorism, wrote five days after the attack an article 
entitled “ETA after Madrid: the beginning of the end?” (2004). In it, Muro argued that 
ETA’s “activities and character will remain associated in people’s minds with the 
irruption of international, mass terrorism in Spanish soil”. In a similar argument, Moreno 
(2004) wrote that “the deep shock produced by the Madrid bombings and the change in 
the Spanish government may have produced the least propitious political and societal 
circumstances for the maintenance of political violence and terrorism in the Basque 
Country”. Similar arguments were abundant in the journalistic and academic 
investigations on the attack, but the mechanisms underlying the hypothetical cause-effect 
relationship between March 11 and the generation of a negative political climate for the 
continuation of ETA’s terrorism were much less investigated. A working hypothesis on 
this issue would suggest that the competence for media attention and for space in the 
political agenda and the activation of empathic mechanisms among ETA’s social 
supporters, and perhaps certain sections of ETA’s activists, could be two plausible 
connecting mechanisms. In any case, the link between March 11 and the transformation of 
the political climate around ETA was later supported by the beginning of a peace process 
which, nonetheless, was interrupted later on (see below).
Zapatero’s strategic conduct in relation to the political mobilization of the scale of the 
event employed a combined use of quantitative and qualitative data: qualitative 
information infused an empathic overtone to the quantitative information of the scale of 
the event. And this was so in both national and global interventions. In his speech acts 
(Zl, Z2 for example) numbers were used always in direct connection with certain 
personal details of the victims. These details included names and nationalities, and were 
mixed with an emotive discourse that sometimes incurred in cliches, but that also showed 
an innovative approach to the combination of rational and emotional information in one 
single narrative: neither the quantitative nor the qualitative dominated the discursive 
mobilization of the scale of the event -  they interacted and reinforced each other. 
Emotional ideas were never detached from its quantitative counterpart, nor used in a 
demagogic way to connect two unrelated elements. However, although the coherency of 
the rational discourse was always maintained, emotional ideas seemed sometimes aimed 
at increasing the salience of certain premises and, in so doing, incline the conclusion of
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the information transmitted in favour of certain interpretations of the event. This was 
especially clear when Zapatero made reference to the nationality of the victims in both 
global and national discourses (there were 51 foreigners killed in the attack). The core of 
the Zapatero’s treatment of the episode scale was in fact expressed in the commemorative 
statue that was later situated next to the Atocha’s train station: all the victim’s names were 
inscribed in a solid, arid monument, painted in blue.
The event’s scale and its analysis did not take a substantial place in the People’s Party 
strategy, an element which is significant because it seems to suggest that the scale factor 
is only beneficial to those that hold the best structural position during the episode. 
However, a circumstantial element might also be intervening here: the scale of 11-M was 
in fact an indicator that the attack was perpetrated by an Islamist terrorist group, a fact 
that was systematically questioned by People Party’s agents during all the episode. When 
the scale of the event is directly mentioned, such as in PP2 (p.l), it is immediately 
attached to a theoretical statement that is not necessarily connected to it, but has important 
implications for the general strategy (in the referenced speech act, the dimension of the 
event was directly connected to the theory that the blasts had a direct effect on the 
elections). Thus, the strategic interaction concerning the scale of the event seems to offer 
no points of direct confrontation, but it is significant to the extend that the actors that hold 
power during the episode seem to have a clear structural advantage in relation to the 
mobilization of this specific factor. Under these circumstances, the application of 
Machiavellic Postmodernism in relation to the scale is in fact forced to the extreme of 
evident demagogy.
Nation-State
11-M physical occurrence took place within the boundaries of Spain, a middle power that 
has never been part of the European core despite its size as the second-largest country in 
the EU-15. At the same time, Spain has a close proximity to North Africa, with the 
cultural and economic ties that have build over the history, and an intimate connection 
with Latin American countries. Under these structural elements, the generation of 
episodic power throughout the ‘nation-state factor’ was rather limited in terms of the
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opportunities opened to lead a military/realist policy out of the attack (like in the 9/11 
episode for example), but the level of consensus generation within the cultural realm seem 
much more relevant. However, we have to place these elements within the context of the 
political situation of Spain before and after the attack to understand the strategic conduct 
that derives from it.
Aznar’s support for the United States in the post 9/11 ‘War on Terror’ placed the country 
in opposition to the rest of the European Union and the vast majority of states across the 
Arab world and Latin America, as well as the United Nations and its Security Council. 
His decision had consequences for relations with traditional allies within the European 
Union, and in particular with France and Germany. By fixing upon the American global 
strategy, and distancing himself from ‘old Europe’, People’s Party actors broke both the 
internal and the global consensus that had been established in the immediate aftermath of 
9/11 attacks. As Aznar himself admitted, the Spain’s alignment with the US responded to 
a strategy to raise the international influence of nation-state and its particular interests. 11- 
M was first mobilized by the People’s Party’s actors, and other nation-state actors (see 
Table 3.2) to try to reconstruct this consensus along the lines of the American strategy 
against terrorism: along the lines of a rational policy assisted by the emotion of fear. This 
was clear, for example, in the ‘sorry tale’ of Security Council Resolution 1530 (2004) 
analyzed by O’Donnell (2007). We don’t have elements to doubt that had People’s Party 
won the elections, the mobilization of the global event transformative power would have 
followed this strategic path, thus reinforcing the US preventive, statist strategy.
But the electorate cast its vote in disapproval of the way that the Aznar administration had 
responded to the attacks. Zapatero’s strategic conduct switched from a pro-US stance to 
several actions and styles aimed at transferring the consensus generate by the global event 
to the core of European Union, and to mobilize the structural impact of the event towards 
a sustained improvement of the relations with Arab countries.
Relations with the European Union took a dramatic turn, as the Zapatero government 
announced a change of strategy and declared its support for finding an agreement on the 
draft EU constitution. The first visit of Zapatero as the new Spanish president was in
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Germany. In the following press conference (Z4), Zapatero showed a conspicuous 
thankful attitude towards the condemnation of the attack and the solidarity expressed by 
the German government and its people. This discourse was mixed with a strong 
commitment with the European project. It is significant that he chose to use the new 
American narrative about the European Union to express this position: “there’s not an old 
Europe, there is only a big, united Europe”. Zapatero also expressed a commitment with 
to the multilateralist tradition in international relations: both leaders articulate the 
argument that any further action in Iraq should be conducted within the framework of 
international law and with the approval of the United Nations Security Council. Similar 
ideas were put forward in Z5.
However, Zapatero’s first official visits and joint interventions after the attack were 
connected to Arab countries (Z6 -  Morocco; Z7- Palestinian National Authority; Z8 -  
Algeria). It is very significant that in none of this speeches Madrid’s blasts were 
mentioned, although the very chronological position of the visits constructed an implicit 
association with them that, in principle, did not have any specific content. Within this 
ambiguous epistemological context, Zapatero concentrated in deploying a very 
consensual discourse, revealing himself as a dextrous non-zero sum power theorist when 
he commented, in his Morocco’s visit, that he wished a “dialogue sustained in reciprocal 
loyalty, in permanent understanding and in constant communication. A positive relation 
between Spain and Morocco makes Spain grow, and makes Morocco grow”. In his 
immediate visits to Arab countries, Zapatero did make explicit mention to the most 
predominant conflicts on the regions, such as the Sahara conflict, and always expressed 
the position that they had to be solved building a progressive consensus through the 
United Nations institutions. Moreover, he always portrayed the Spanish nation-state as an 
historical place of cultural confluence, especially between the Western and the Arab 
countries. To counterattack this argument, Peoples Party’s actors had to go as far and 
absurdly as putting forward the theory that to understand the causes of 11-M it was 
necessary to revisit the theories of the
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Media Attention
From the national point of view, the events of March 11 still occupy, more than three 
years after their occurrence, a primary position in the Spanish media. A superficial 
analysis of the quantity of media information about the Madrid blasts is enough to 
measure this variable as high. At the global level, we have already discussed some studies 
that suggest that the initial media attention was also high. However, there are no studies 
that measure the evolution or the temporal consistency of this attention. We have 
performed an automatic search of three prominent global media Internet databases: CNN, 
New York Times and Al-Jazeera. The results obtained suggest that 11-M still has a 
significant presence on the global media. If we look closely to this data, however, we see 
that, more often that not, 11-M is only mentioned in connection with al Qaeda terrorism 
or other terrorist attacks, and that new information about the attack and its political and 
judiciary consequences is scarcely present.
We have already commented that the role that media plays during a global event episode 
seem to vary in relation to its timeline: the first phase seems more tide to the structural 
elements of the medium and the second seems to be more suitable as an strategic field of 
action. The second, consecutive stage of the 11-M coverage was led by radio and 
newspaper information, more than TV images. This shift in the media seems to be a 
consequence of both the type of message (content) generated by the very development of 
the episode and the societal demands naturally emerged from the circumstances of the 
episode. After the first impact, simple analytical questions arise in society: the who, the 
how, and the why took precedence over other elements in the episode’s mediation 
process, and it is an established fact in media studies that print and radio favours a more 
systematic and analytical type of message. Many distinctive institutional settings, both 
global and national, reframed the questions in relation to their context. Global networked 
media participated in this debate, interacting with national media and the Spanish 
population, and a sub-episode of popular mobilization, involving new media such as 
mobile phones and the Internet, took place the day before the elections. But despite the 
relevancy of these facts, it was in Spain, and it was through the national radio and 
newspapers, where the strategic conduct around 11-M media coverage took a more
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relevant path.
Peoples Party’s actors used the natural media attention around the event to provide 
coherent strategy that would have been much more successful had not intervene the 
globalization of media40, and the social diffusion of the instruments of the Information 
Society. The changing institutional rules are more visible in the first part of the episode. 
President Aznar personally telephoned the editors of all major Spanish newspapers and 
TV channels putting his personal credibility on the line in affirming ETA’s guilt. All 
media followed his view because they believed that he actually had privileged 
information on the attack pointing to that direction. Also, the state-run TVE-1 made an 
unannounced change to its Saturday night schedule and broadcasted the film ‘ Asesinato 
en Febrero’ about the murder of a politician by ETA. However, ETA’s guilt hypothesis 
was questioned from the beginning by the global media (CNN, New York Times, etc.), 
which was obviously beyond any institutional and strategic national influences. Many 
people in Spain had access to these sources through the Internet, and transmitted the 
information to other parts of the population, giving rise to public anger against the People 
Party’s management of information during the episode.
After the elections, a second stage of this strategy emerged. Rather than assuming the 
previous strategic mistake, journalists from the radio network Cadena Cope (belonging to 
the Episcopal conference of the Catholic church), the newspaper El Mundo, some talk- 
show commentators, and members of the Popular’s Party insists that 11 March was the 
result of a plot between ETA, members of the Moroccan and Spanish intelligence services 
and al Qaeda. There were, and still are, multidimensional newspaper investigations, but 
the agenda of the debate was mainly set around this theory, a theme that occupied the 
political headlines until very recently, when the judiciary investigations have completely 
cleared any doubt about the issue. Different data and political files were leaked, 
discovered, manipulated or invented and published in the press. Most of the pro-ETA 
hypothesis elements were first published in El Mundo, a conservative newspaper that 
became notorious during the 90s for revealing several corruption scandals of the PSOE, 
eventually leading to their defeat in the 96 national election. El Mundo lead the
40 See Held at al. (2001: Chap. 7)
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‘investigations’, but weekly tabloids and radio talk shows, especially in the Cadena Cope 
spread a simpler and more direct message among the audience that reinforced the 
emotional component of the more analytical information presented by El Mundo. This 
was an strategic victory for the Popular Party’s actors: it caused huge uncertainty and 
doubt among the population, and more than 50% of the Spaniards believed that ETA 
could have had some kind of involvement in the attack. The PostmodemMachiavellic 
strategy was the responsible for draining the consensual power of the event at the national 
level.
At the global level, another type of narrative was also spread with the help of People 
Party’s actors and conservative media outlets, although its force and character was much 
less powerful and successful than the national one. There were two ways of presenting the 
argument depending on the perspective: (a) Zapatero’s party had rise to power on Al- 
Qaida’s help, and returned the favour by withdrawing Spanish troops from Iraq or (b) 
Spanish people’s vote was decided out of fear, knowing that the Socialists would 
withdraw the Spanish troops from Iraq thus reducing the risk for more attacks. The 
arguments were propounded, with singular vehemence, by military analysis and political 
commentators in conservative media outlets, from the Wall Street Journal and the Daily 
Telegraph to Fox News. Off-the-record remarks by leaders of People Party were widely 
employed.
Both strategies, the national and the global, were obvious forms of Machiavellic 
Postmodernism, where narratives targeting certain emotions where imposed over any kind 
of serious institutional analysis of the situation. Globalization conditions contributed to 
dismiss the first ETA narrative, thus showing the structural limits of postmodern 
strategies when they are exclusively based on media control. However, in the second 
strategy, the combination of media games and the concentration on exploiting the 
limitations of institutional analysis converged in a conspiratorial narrative that impacted 
on significant sections of the Spanish society. The national strategy was especially 
successful in draining the consensual power of the global event and this, I shall argue 
below, had an important effect on the evolution of the peace process with ETA initiated 
after 11-M. Yet to understand the evolution of this strategy we have to place it in relation
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to its tactic counterpart.
Instead of engaging in a combat of competing media narrations (a strategy which is in fact 
the one advised by Lakoff to the US Democrat Party), Zapatero and the Socialist Party 
deployed a defensive, realist tactic aimed at counterattack People Party’s conduct. 
Zapatero entered power with the electoral commitment to introduce measures to guarantee 
the impartiality of public sector’s media, and both radio and TV public broadcasters 
indeed kept a rather distant position on this particular debate. However, Grupo Prisa, a 
private media group close to the Socialist party, engaged in the debate through the 
newspaper El Pals, the radio station Cadena Ser and the TV channel Cuatro. The 
investigations were focused on providing evidences to falsify the ETA hypothesis 
narrative. It is interesting to note that every minute of 11-M trial, where most of the 
evidences were systematically presented, and where the ETA narrative was definitely 
dismissed, were broadcasted over the Internet by the digital edition of El Pals, which also 
kept a detailed analysis of the judicial process. Thus, the ETA hypothesis marked the 
agenda in the media terrain, and as we have already argued, it contributed decisively to 
drain the initial national power generated by the global event. However, Zapatero’s 
strategic perseverance in deploying a realist, modem approach to media tactics seems to 
be currently paying its benefits, as the Socialist Party has regained a comfortable distance 
in the pre-electoral polls.
Debate on Evidences
Madrid’s blasts were perpetrated by an Islamic terrorist group close to al Qaeda. As we 
have seen above, however, the strategic use of the media attention generated by the event, 
specially in the national front, was mainly marked by the PP strategy of constructing a 
narrative around the ETA’s hypothesis. But Zapatero’s empathic realism in the sphere of 
evidence also took a more constructive tack, which was especially significant at the global 
level, where the postmodern strategies deployed by the PP actors were simply ignored. 
11-M generated power in terms of evidences at the global level because it provided new 
incoming information about the nature of the new global terrorism and about the 
effectiveness of the ‘War on Terror’. The debate around both issues remained uncertain,
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but 11-M contribute to move this uncertainty towards a consensus (agreement), explicit 
and implicit, on the hypothesis that the ‘War on Terror’ was a political failure and that al 
Qaeda had a new, global structural configuration that didn’t need significant connections 
with particular nation-states to be fully operative.
Zapatero’s strategic conduct around the debate on evidences simply consisted in financing 
and empowering the autonomous academic research and political dialogue around the 
nature of the new global terrorism. In March 2005 the association of former heads of state 
and government known as the Club of Madrid organised, supported by the Spanish 
government, a distinctive meeting where the nature of new global terrorism was widely 
discussed. The purpose of the International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and 
Security was to commemorate the victims of the attack (empathy) and to formulate 
practical strategies to counter the threat from terrorism. It was the largest gathering of 
terrorism and security experts ever held. Among the participants were twenty-three 
current and thirty-four former heads of state and government; the heads of the United 
Nations, NATO, the European Union, Interpol, and the league of Arab states, and 500 
representatives form NGOs and civil society. Moreover, in the approach to the summit, 
more than 200 scholars engaged in a four-month-long process of debate and reflection in 
which the key dilemmas of democracy, terrorism and security were discussed through a 
system of password-protected weblogs. In the opinion of its content director, the summit 
produced ‘a high degree of consensus in relation to the way in which terrorism should be 
fought’41 According to the director, there are certain areas where the widespread 
agreement at Madrid is notable. For example, the working group on intelligence, in which 
prominent intelligence practitioners from the United States and Britain participated, 
emphasised that methods such as extra-legal detention were of no practical value to the 
secret services. It was also agreed that the imperative of improving international 
cooperation was fundamental because the rise of international terrorist networks like al 
Qaeda means terrorism has become a global challenge. International police, intelligence 
agencies and the judicial authorities need to collaborate more closely. Also, the Madrid 
conference recognized the need to strengthen and deepen democracy as the only viable 
long-term response to terrorism. The assembled experts were clear that while open
41 Neumann (2005)
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societies make it easier for terrorist to operate, they are also less likely to see terrorist 
achieve their political objectives in the long run. People Party actors refuse to participate 
in the summit.
Popular Mobilization
11-M events were contingent in many ways, but the elections and the intensity of the 
immediate popular mobilizations were the two most relevant circumstances that affected 
the episode process of development, and the conduct of its key actors. Their structural 
impact in terms of their relevance for the episode is probably one of the highest that can 
be found in any other global event episode. The mechanism connecting the event to the 
generation of societal power is simple and important: the mobilizations expressed and 
reinforced the political sentiment that the Spanish public was willing to become actively 
involved to reduce future risks posed by the global terrorist threat.
Both the demonstrations and the elections were, in essence, respected by Zapatero as 
autonomous expressions of the public will. The strategic conduct of People Party’s actors 
was much more interventionist. For example, in the massive demonstrations that took 
place in the aftermath of the attacks, they tried to unify the front message towards the 
ETA’s authorship hypothesis forcing the motto "With the victims, with the constitution 
and for the defeat of terrorism”. Postmodern Machiavellianism was also deployed by 
People Party actors in order to drain legitimacy from the 14 of March elections, which 
provided a formalized mechanism of popular mobilization after the event. The chosen 
narrative was that the attack, and not the politics involved in the management of its 
information, had a direct effect on the electoral results. This time, it was academic 
sections close to the Socialist Party that mobilized a modem counterstrategy, writing 
specific papers analyzing the electoral results as a test to People Party arguments42. 
Turnout at the election rise to 77 percent, the highest in a democratic election in Spain, 
but the question was if this increase in participation was due to ‘fear’ or to a social 
reaction to PP strategies. According to official statistics, 16% of the voters declared that
42 See for example Lago Peflas and Montero (2005)
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that their electoral decision was mainly driven by the mismanagement of the information 
that the Peoples Party government did about the authors of the attack. Many Spaniards 
attributed a logic of causality between the People Party foreign policy and al Qaeda 
attacks, and that was a decisive electoral mechanism that influenced the vote, too (some 
studies say that around 19%). Only 6% of the voters recognized that they decided to vote 
for their party after the attacks -  otherwise they would have stayed home. Most of these 
new voters were young people, and the majority of them voted for the Socialist Party, thus 
rewarding the emphatic realistic strategy deployed by Zapatero during the whole episode, 
and throughout all the generative structural factors. PP received about the same number as 
in the previous election: but 2.5 million more people had voted, most of them young 
people.
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Drawing Together the Threads: From 11-M to Political Action
In the preceding section we have discussed the strategic, circumstantial mobilization of a 
variety of structural factors by the key agents of the episode. Research has been 
undertaken in order to attempt to clarify the strategic implications of different issues that 
would otherwise appear to be simple, ‘natural’ reactions to an event. However, we have 
also studied how each and every one of these factors is indeed a structural contribution to 
the generation of a consensual phase in the social system, the existence of which has been 
explored in the first part of this chapter.
Zapatero’s empathic realism mobilized the power implicit in this consensual phase by 
invoking, in a precise style, the different alterations to the institutional order produced by 
the event. He combined a commitment to institutional analysis, even when the structural 
and strategic circumstances for this were not optimal (such as in the mobilization of 
media attention), and a language and discourse aimed at stimulating empathy as the 
emotion leading future institutional orientations. However, the existence of a generative 
phase of power and the deployment of certain styles is only relevant (analytically and 
politically) to the extent that a relevant realization of this power obtains some sort of 
visibility.
It is perhaps still too soon to analyze the final impact of this strategic conduct at the 
national level. But I will introduce into the argument the results of my observation as in 
October 2007. First, the national level: Under globalization conditions, there aren’t many 
political issues that maintain an essentially national character, but one of this could be 
precisely the conflicts connected with the ‘old’ national terrorism such as ETA. As we 
have seen in the previous section, 11-M contributed, it seems that quite decisively, to 
open up a sequence of change on this particular issue: global event’s consensual phase 
was reflexively extended by the key episode’s actors towards the design of a consensual 
resolution. To a great extend, Zapatero risked an important part of his political capital, 
and the power gained by the global event occurrence, in the peace process opened up with 
the terrorists, which for a long time seemed to be going towards a successful resolution. 
People Party was against a negotiated peace process from the beginning, and different 
strategies, always under the stylist mark of postmodern Machiavellianism, were deployed
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to stop it. And they did it. However, it is plausible to sustain, in the light of the theory 
explored in this research, that the key strategic factor that eventually drained the 
possibility of a successful resolution of the peace process was the conspiratorial narrative 
around 11-M, which was only one among the many pressures strategically designed by 
PP’s actors to achieve this particular aim.
However, Zapatero chose to keep a modem approach to his strategic conduct, keeping the 
facts up front of the political analysis of the situation, and of his communication strategy, 
and giving his unconditional support to the judicial process. This escalated PP’s actors’ 
strategy. They were forced to design, in order to maintain the coherency of their approach, 
and to drain the consensual phase generated at the national level, a postmodern narrative 
that was so absurd, so remotely obscure and detached from reality, and so connected to 
negative emotions, that although it had a successful impact in the short term, probably at 
the cost of the mental wellbeing of many old generation Spaniards, it might have execute, 
at least among the younger generation of the Spanish society, the social credibility and 
tacit acceptance of those strategies borne out of the Florentine author’s theorems. Chief 
among the causes of this effect were the final results of the 11-M trial. After 21 months of 
investigation, Judge Del Olmo ruled Moroccan national Jama Zougam guilty of 
physically carrying out the attack, ruling out any ETA intervention. The trial of 29 
accused began on 15 February 2007. According to many analysts, the Court dismantled 
one by one all conspiracy theories, and demonstrated that any link or implication of the 
bombings with ETA was either misleading or without any foundation.
The global sphere did not have the institutional and cultural requirements to be impacted 
by such conspiratorial narrative, and it is precisely within this sphere that the key policies 
of the episode emerged. The relevancy of these policies can be measured precisely against 
the structural constrains imposed by globalization conditions. Globalization, as studied by 
the globalist school, obliges structural coordination among political actors to achieve 
objectives in at least eight spheres of power (see Global Transformations), and it is 
precisely this rule that was subverted by the Bush Administration in the 9/11 episode, 
when it managed to effectively ignore the position of the majority of global political 
actors to advance its strategy. But Globalization also implies asymmetrical relationships
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within the conditions marked by structural coordination: globalization does not preclude 
the existence of political inequalities among nation-states and their governments. Spain is 
what international theorists might call a middle-power in many important dimensions 
such as the economic and the military, and by its very situation in the power hierarchy 
there are some policies that would appear structurally unattainable under the stable rule of 
the traditional sources of power. However, the reflexive, global mobilization of 11-M 
allowed Zapatero’s government to overcome thes{Payne, 2004 #404}e structural 
constrains. It did so with the withdraw of the Spanish troops in Iraq, a complex policy that 
will be addressed in the following chapter, since it connects precisely with the parameter 
framing the strategies of the 7/7 case: the kind of power of the US under globalization 
conditions, and the erroneous perception of it by other actors. But more importantly, the 
structural constrains of the global system were also overcome by the design and 
implementation of the Alliance of Civilizations policy - a political project of such 
magnitude, so ambitious, and so beyond the realistic capacity of a country like Spain, that 
can only be understood through the mechanism of power that we are trying to explore and 
illuminate in these pages.
However, the plausible connections between 11-M and the Alliance of Civilizations 
design an impact could only be possible as a result of the rise of an specific political 
culture in civil societies around the world, but especially in the Spanish society. In other 
words, the mobilization of global events for political purposes which are beyond mere 
national interests both signal and require that people experience a ‘transformation of 
consciousness’ (to put it in a Habermasian way) and reward the policies in electoral terms, 
even before its reasonable results are delivered. We have already observed in a previous 
section that the ‘natural’ emotional basis of the 11-M episode was empathic, and this sole 
element makes more feasible that the utilization of the global event’s energy could be 
directed towards cosmopolitan policies. But there’s another structural element that to my 
view is more relevant and interesting to analyze, although here we will only be able to 
approach it rather superficially.
This element is the generational gap that we can observe in the Spanish society, and in 
societies all over the world. The post-materialist theory developed by Ronald Inglehart
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(1997) presents the argument that pervasive structural trends are transforming the basic 
values of the younger generation: with the new result that intergenerational population 
replacement is producing cultural change. The identity component of this change is 
empirically explored in Norris (2003) using the World Values Survey data. The results of 
this study confirm the generational gap thesis at the global level: the youngest cohort 
(1965-78) displays by far the strongest sense of global identification. The study also 
shows that the world’s youngest generation gives a stronger support to the UN and is 
more pro-migrants and more pro-free trade.
Similar trends can be observed in the Spanish society. For example, the data of the last 
survey of Fundacion Santa Maria (4,000 interviews) about the Spanish youth confirm 
that there’s a sustained declining of the Spanish identity among the 18 to 25 year olds. 
Between 1981 and 2005, this sentiment went down seven points in favour of both local 
and cosmopolitan identities, but kept similar numbers among the older generations. These 
differences in identification are also accompanied by changes in the level of trust in 
national and global institutions, and both trends are also observable in public opinion 
official surveys43. But there are also other elements, much less analyzed in the studies 
about the question, that seem to contribute to define decisively the generational gap, and 
that are relevant in relation to the type of political styles observed in our episode. The 
younger cohorts of the Spanish population seem more sceptic and reluctant to accept 
traditional strategies of political practice. This is reflected for example in the attitudes 
towards political leaders. In the last CIS’ survey (2007), over two thirds of the younger 
Spanish citizens (18-34) believed that anyone holding national political power is always 
looking for his personal interests (this was six points above the total) and 32 percent 
expressed ‘mistrust’ as the main feeling inspired by politics (three points above the total 
of citizens). However at the same time the youngsters expressed a deeper level of trust in 
people in general, a much more marked optimism about the economic and political future 
of Spain and a stronger confidence about alternative ways of political participation 
beyond the democratic vote.
The Spanish data, as well as the data at the global level, suggest that it would be greatly
43 For example, see the survey Globalization y  Relaciones Internationales elaborated by the CIS (Sociological 
Investigation Center) -  May 2005.
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exaggerated to depict an scenario where support for nationalism • and Machiavellic 
Postmodernism has been displaced in favour of other stylistic and substantive political 
projects. Prudence is also needed in analyzing the apparent future direction in public 
opinion. However, what 11-M episode shows is that the very evolution of certain political 
situations, and global events are positively one of them, can create mechanisms where 
cosmopolitan and ‘empathic’ attitudes take a more relevant strength than their opposites, 
thus empowering the political projects that show a direct affinity to them. The 
demonstrations that took place hours after the event, and hours before the elections, were 
basically spontaneous, but they were structured by SMS messages over mobile phones 
sent by many young Spaniards44. The most popular motto in these demonstrations was 
very simple: ‘we want the truth’. It was an explicit sanction, globally broadcasted, of 
those tactics based on the assumption that power is always prior to reality. Young 
Spaniards were the ones that went to vote massively for Zapatero in the March 14 
elections, thus inclining decisively the final result. And the youngest members of the 
Socialist Party were the ones that, unexpectedly, gave Zapatero the General Secretary of 
their bureaucratic organization.
While the generational gap seem to be the key of Zapatero’s success, there are other 
reasons that could explain the growing support of the Spanish society for cosmopolitan 
policies, and that also could have been influenced by the specific circumstances of the 
episode. For example, according to two recent CIS surveys45, there is already a 
widespread awareness of globalization as a multidimensional phenomenon. 62.5% of the 
Spaniards have heard about globalization, and 38.1% think that in 10 years time 
globalization will have contribute to build a better world (25.7% hold the opposite 
perception). The Spaniards also believed that International Institutions, multinational 
companies and national governments (in this order) are the institutions that contribute 
more decisively to the growing interconnection between world regions, and that the main 
advantage of this will be the growth of cultural interchanges (which, by the way, is the 
second most cited definition of globalization). Events that take place in other parts of the 
world have a lot, or quite a lot influence in their everyday lives according to 72% of 
Spanish people. When asked about what institutions should decide about certain
44 Ugarte (2005: Chapter 6)
45 Centro de Investigaciones Socioldgicas (2004,2005)
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problems, the majority of the Spanish people declared that international institutions 
should address questions such as environmental problems, human rights violations, 
epidemics, and terrorism (56.7% hold this view). These studies also found that 67 per cent 
of the Spanish people believe that globalization has positive effects in the fight against 
terrorism (only 12.4% thought that these effects were negative).
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THE ALLIANCE OF CIVILIZATIO NS46
Globalization Agent’sMobilization
Global Event
From the mobilization of the empathic-based consensus of 11-M rose the national and 
global political support for the Alliance of Civilizations policy. Dialogue became the 
paramount concern in Spanish foreign policy and the overarching principle for Zapatero’s 
government, also in domestic affairs - the richness of communication with others and its 
capacity for expression and resolution of conflict was put at the service of addressing 
world imbalances and the existence of extremisms. Within this strategic context, the key 
objective of the current conception of the Alliance of Civilization policy is to build a 
powerful communicative matrix between all cultures in the world, developed on the basis 
of a common belief in equal respect and in the value of cultural exchanges and critical 
discussion. The Alliance is an institutional innovation, highly flexible, and traditional 
policy analysis models, especially the linear ones, might not provide enough theoretical 
room to understand the complexity of its very nature. To begin, however, we can indeed 
detect an agenda and decision phase as the initial step of the Alliance, the very developing 
of which shows how the realization of a new global event contributed to blurring the 
distinction between the design and implementation processes of the policy.
The Alliance’s Formal Beginnings
The design phase of the Alliance of Civilizations policy was clearly penetrated by 11-M 
attack and its strategic mobilization. It was finally co-sponsored by the Turkish Prime
46 The analysis o f  the A lliance o f  C ivilizations is mainly based on the docum entation detailed in the m ethodological 
appendix.
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Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoga, and was officially proposed at the 59th General Assembly 
of the United Nations in 2005. The initial aim was to identify the principles and the aims 
of the policy, and to produce actionable, time-bound recommendations by the end of 2006 
for UN member states to adopt, two tasks that were undertaken by a tightly knit group of 
elite experts. It seems that this method was the optimal to legitimate the policy among the 
UN system of institutions, the relation with which was considered crucial from the 
beginning. The UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan assembled a ‘High-level Group’ 
consisting of an epistemic community of 20 eminent persons drawn from policy making, 
academia, civil society, religious leadership, and the media. As we will see below, the 
Alliance developed into something more complex and open. But despite that it was a 
relatively closed and small number of people, the diversity of the group provided a 
mechanism of openness and inclusion of the policy network to a full range of actors from 
different religions and civilizations backgrounds. For example, among the members were 
former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami, who proposed the Dialogue Among 
Civilizations initiative, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, South African Nobel laureate, Prof. 
Pan Guang, who obtained the Saint Petersburg-300 Medal for Contribution to China- 
Russia Relations, and Arthur Schneier, who is the founder and president of the “Appeal of 
Conscience Foundation” and who gained the "Presidential Citizens Medal”. The epistemic 
community met personally 5 times between November 2005 and November 2006, and 
produce a report that provided some of the key principles of the Alliance.
The first meeting of to design the principles and projects of the Alliance occurred in Spain 
in November 2005. The second meeting was in Doha, Qatar from 25 to 27 February 2006. 
This meeting took place precisely in the context of another global event episode: the 
cartoon crisis between West and Islamic world. The very development of the meeting 
shows that even in the very first design phases of the Alliance, the actors were able to 
activate the policy in order to achieve particular objectives. Kofi Annan used this meeting 
to push a consensual statement between relevant international actors about the crisis. 
Spain and Turkey as the official promoters of the Alliance, the United Nations General 
Secretary, the Arab League, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference signed this 
statement, which affirmed the necessity to protect freedom of expression, but also mutual 
respect and understanding. The European Union was first expected to attend the meeting,
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but it finally refused to sign the statement due to its internal divergences, specially the 
opposition of the Netherlands. But despite this setback, the Alliance of Civilizations, with 
its internal fluidity, became the only International institution to officially address the 
cartoon crisis, and contribute to calm it, a fact that reinforced its firmness and the interest 
of other countries and actors. Moreover, the episode forced the compromise of the 
European Union to write a declaration of support to the Alliance and, probably more 
important, it also contribute to the letter that Condoleezza Rice wrote, on behalf of the 
US, to the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressing the American support to the 
initiative.
The third meeting took place in Dakar, Senegal from 28 to 30 May 2006 and at the fourth 
meeting in November 2006 in Istanbul, the members presented their final report outlining 
the agreed strategic principles of the Alliance. The organizational structure and leadership 
were also decided. The Secretariat of the Alliance of Civilizations office are based at the 
United Nations headquarters in New York, and it is relatively small in terms of personnel 
but very intense in technology (from what we can assume that its organizational structure 
is quite horizontal). The office provides support to the “High Representative for the 
Alliance of Civilizations", which is the title of the primary leadership position of the 
Alliance. The representative functions as political facilitator and lead spokesman, and 
consults directly with the United Nations Secretary General. In April 2007, the UN 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appointed the position of High Representative to Jorge 
Sampaio, former president of Portugal. The strategic implications of this appointment will 
be discussed below.
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The Alliance Strategy
The components of the Alliance strategy, as stated in the key documents of the institution, 
can be summarized as follows. First, to promote a consensual and holistic educational 
system around the world, with emphasis on knowledge of other cultures and human 
rights, mobility and the active, autonomous use of the Internet for educational purposes. 
Second, to expand opportunities for youth independent mobilization and the overcoming 
of social-economic and cultural alienation in their respective societies. The policy also 
proposes the establishment of a “Global Youth Alliance” as a mechanism of policy 
implementation. Third, to establish proactive strategies for addressing migration in a 
coordinated way among states, stressing the positive opportunities open up by 
contemporary human flows. And fourth, to encourage traditional media actors to serve as 
a bridge between cultures and societies, and to promote the use the Internet as a network 
for social interactions to exchange ideas and information.
There is a long-running debate about multiculturalism in the academic world that, among 
other things, shows the complexity of the issue. The Alliance political project inherits 
some of the contradictions that are intimately connected with the complexity of all 
cultural concepts and policies. Some intellectuals for example have strongly attacked that 
the concept of ‘Civilization’ was chosen as the unit for organizing the policy objective 
and principles. Some political groups, such as PP’s actors, have qualified the policy as 
simply naive and unfeasible47. But given the complexity and ambition of the task, the 
political project seem to have a strong internal coherence, especially because it appeals to 
the value which is unquestionably shared by all cultures in the world: the value of open 
communication, which not only gives consistency to the overall strategy, but also 
minimizes the grey areas where different principles can collide. To some analysts this is a 
sign that the policy lacks accurate content, a perception that is reinforced by the fact that 
its contents are only outlined it the different documents and statements made by the 
Spanish government and the UN secretary general. However, this seems to outlook the 
complex nature of the policy, that for the moment has received the support of public
47 For example, the former Spanish president, Jos6 Maria Aznar, said in a conference in the Hudson Institute in 
Washington (September 2006) that “for me, the Alliance of Civilizations is an stupidity. It is absolutely impossible. Our 
Alliance must be the Atlantic Alliance, and we need it to be stronger. Because if they attack, we will be able to defend 
ourselves”. For another conservative critique o f the Alliance see Schaefer (2006).
108
opinion around the world and of the governments of more than 60 countries, with more 
countries expected to joint the policy in the short term. However, how can be asses the 
observable consequences of the policy? To assert this we must first confront an analysis 
of the coherency of its principles, especially the ones that are implied in the very design 
and implementation of the policy, but not always stated in its formal documentation
The first principle that seems to be fundamental for the development of the Alliance of 
Civilizations is the principle of interdependency: an increasingly globalizing world order 
can be regulated only through stable collaboration within an effective multilateral system, 
and the first task to establish this collaboration is the recognition of interconnectedness, 
which is precisely what extremist dramatically fail to do. Interdependence implies 
diversity of cultures, which is one of the most important driving forces for human 
progress. Within this multicultural context, interdependency is understood as both a top- 
down condition imposed by contemporary globalization conditions and as the 
empowerment of an empathic emotional state through the exercise of free dialogue and 
understanding. The Alliance is a communicative policy set to operate at the interface of 
both forms, connecting a modem, institutional analysis of the globalizing tendencies of 
our world with an empathy-assisted widespread rationalization of this process. However, 
despite this late modernity approach, it is also acknowledge that the moral-ethical 
principle of compassion that exists in all religions can also play a critical role in 
promoting an appreciation of other cultures.
The second principle is that the enactment of positive emotions can only be achieved if 
world’s major material inequalities are addressed. Poverty leads to despair, a sense of 
injustice, and alienation that, when combined with political grievances, can foster 
extremism that obscures by definition the rational recognition of the principle of 
interdependence. The only way of addressing such inequalities is to further advance the 
institutionalization of the multilateral decision-making system in the context of the United 
Nations system and the rule of Human Rights.
Third, the world major political actors must have a viable alternative to the ‘War on 
Terror’ policy and the ‘clash of civilizations’ theory. This is because, in absence of an
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alternative institutional and political discourse, the eventuality of new global events, 
especially terrorist attacks, will feed the support for this policies and theories. In this 
respect, there are in fact several similarities between these policies that are worth 
analyzing. One, both of them are in fact institutional infrastructures designed to scale in 
terms of power and significance every time that a global event occurs. This characteristic 
will be further addressed below. Two, the Alliance tacitly accepts the institutional 
analysis that highlights the current visibility of identity-based conflicts connected to 
contemporary patterns of globalization. However, it strongly denies the inevitability of 
these conflicts, and in fact attributes them, among other issues, to the ‘anxiety’ and 
‘confusion’ caused by the very ‘clash of civilizations’ theory. Therefore the Alliance 
policy aims at mobilizing similar analytical grounds than the ‘clash’ theory for totally 
different future oriented projections, which both require and stimulate radically different 
emotions. And third, both of them have democracy, and democratic governance, at their 
core. But the Alliance sustains that, in order to be successful, democratic systems must 
emerge organically from within each society’s culture. In principle, the Alliance is not 
based on a pacifist theory, but any ‘war’ that stimulates national and global sentiments of 
fear and injustice is radically rejected because it blocks the very possibility of democracy.
Fourth, identity-based conflicts are only the most visible part of a new, rising global order 
that is mostly based on cooperation and cultural understanding. These are expressed 
through, and encouraged by, multiple political projects that aligned with the core 
components of the Alliance policy. The Alliance does not aim at replacing any of these 
existing plans or political channels, but to facilitate their visibility through partnership 
operations among a variety of existing groups. It is, more than anything else, a 
communicative device with the emotional and epistemological ambition to unite and 
project these evidences (the sites of confluence and understanding) towards particular 
future outlooks. The power generated by 11-M gave the energy to articulate the Alliance 
of Civilizations as the communicative frame for other projects, a strategy that also 
requires a correct reading of the political tempo of the project (see below).
The fifth principle connects directly with the 11-M strategic mobilization described in the 
previous section. There’s a growing generational gap in societies around the world, and
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two key parameters of this gap are reflexive awareness of political identities and 
interconnection and the growing disapproval among the young generations of certain 
modes of political behaviour. In this context, the Alliance aims at encouraging the 
parameters of this transformation promoting certain educative measures. It also aims at 
expanding the opportunities for youth mobilization and their incorporation to relevant 
structural positions in societies around the world. However, the Alliance is also aware that 
the generational gap is to a great extend an elite-driven gap, and that elites are too 
intimately linked to pragmatism. More often than not, this discards them as significant 
agents of social change. That is why one of the primary concerns of the Alliance is to 
promote and to provide proper funding for extended-stayed exchanges between youths of 
different countries who are part of strata of society other than elite populations.
And sixth, the Internet is a crucial instrument to increase the level of socio-political 
autonomy of people and civil society in relation to the institutions of the nation-state and 
big corporations, including media corporations. The Internet is also a privileged tool for 
peoples around the world to initiate bottom-up, non-coercive processes of cultural 
communication and interchange, and to become media producers and disseminators. And 
at the same time, the Internet is also a privileged ground to disseminate complex, 
innovative and interesting audiovisual materials that can truly engaged a mentally 
concentrated audience in a reflexive debate about the consequences of cultural and 
political conflicts in interdependent settings. Nation-states and big media corporations 
tend to focus on the negative aspects of the Internet, and the Alliance aims at being the 
first policy to truly concentrate its efforts in giving visibility and use to the opportunities 
opened up by the widespread, autonomous utilization of information and communication 
technologies.
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The Alliance and the Global State
This strategy seems to have a strong internal coherency, at least if we measure this 
coherency against the key themes identified and researched by globalist theorists: there 
are no grounds for assessing the policy as irrational, nor for affirming with far-sighted 
rotundity that it is unfeasible. In other words, if globalization theory is correct, the 
Alliance of Civilization’s success is in fact more plausible than that of the ‘War on 
Terror’. However, it would be against the premises of this research to venture into 
predictions based on deterministic considerations of global society. Global event episodes 
contribute precisely to showing that history is not pre-determined, but lived and created 
by human agents equipped with proper sources of power. The characterization of global 
event episodes that we have proposed in previous pages does, however, require an 
assessment of the intended and unintended consequences of the key policies which 
emerge from this case -  an assessment that, if we take the globalist theory as a frame of 
reference, implies analyzing the impact of the policy on political globalization structures 
and on the emerging form of some sort of global state (see analytical framework, page 
60). We can further simplify this point in order to study the impact of the policy on the 
United Nations system of institutions.
As we have seen above, the implementation phase of the policy took place from the very 
beginning of its introduction, a fact that gives a measure of its complex nature. The 
Alliance contributed to calm the “cartoon crisis”48 in a moment when the conflict could 
have escalated very dangerously. The Alliance idea was also mobilize during different 
global events such as the World Cup in Germany, where no racist or identity-related 
incident was reported. Moreover, in May 2007, the Alliance released its implementation 
plan that proposed a series of more concrete measures that are currently under way. 
However, it is obvious that the Alliance is only in the very beginning of its 
implementation process and that, due to its ambitions aims and its complex nature, a 
proper assessment of its impact requires not only a significant laps of time, but also an 
innovative analytical effort that transcends the current limits of the policy evaluation 
models. In sum, in order to pursue the aims of this exploratory research, we do have to
48 For an academ ic analysis of the cartoon crisis s e e  Albrow and Anheier (2008: 9)
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venture in an analysis of the potential intended and unintended consequences of that the 
policy might have for the current structures of political globalization.
The observable trends of the policy suggest that there are four interconnected areas where 
it can have a significant impact: human security conception and implementation, 
legitimacy, organizational structure and legal transformation of the United Nations 
system. First of all, the Alliance can contribute to expand the conception of security. It’s 
important to bear in mind that, according to this investigation, the Alliance proposal 
emerges from the political power generated by 11-M, and that this invariably links it to 
the problems of global security as one of its key justifications. The Alliance conception 
gives priority to address the social and political causes of sympathy for terrorism -  this is 
too obvious to comment. It also gives priority to the application of international law 
enforcement measures over global terrorists, always under a scrutinized respect to human 
rights laws. However, there is a more dynamic and complex, issue that is worth 
mentioning, and that we can call ‘imperative shift’. In absence of a flexible, 
communicative policy ready to scale at the global level under the proper circumstances, 
and that transmits the perception of coordination and efficacy, the realization of security 
threats of global magnitude will tend to reinforce the advocates of narrow 
securitization49strategies, especially if they hold a relevant structural position within the 
power structures of particular nation-state. The security imperative could indeed condition 
the Alliance proposal and remove their new and different elements. But, as we have seen 
in the cartoon crisis, the Alliance proposal seems more likely to reverse this situation to 
condition the securitization imperative, nationally and globally, drawing on particular 
global events to reinforce its epistemic principles, and perhaps draining the legitimacy of 
postmodernist tactics. There could be, however, unintended consequences within the 
security sphere. For example, Barrenada (2006:103), reflecting on the risks of the 
Alliance, thinks that, by its very global nature, and its use of the concept of civilization, 
the policy could in fact ‘reinforce the confrontational perception [between West and Arab 
and Muslim countries] that the proposal universality seeks to address’.
Second, the Alliance policy could contribute to make arise a new type of political
49 See for example the investigations of the Copenhagen School o f International Relations: Buzan et al. (1998)
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legitimacy that can be used to reform the United Nations system. It would be based on 
three principles: the fresh and direct appeal that the policy can have to the world’s 
younger generation, the increasing role of the Internet as a tool for reinforcing 
institutional autonomy, knowledge and coordination of people and civil societies around 
the world, and a shared disposition for and value of communication between all cultures 
and peoples. All these principles have been discussed above separately, but it seems that 
they converge in what would probably be the key of this new legitimating process: the 
transformation of the rationalization process of global interdependency. Globalization 
brings interdependency among communities, as the globalist authors have contributed to 
clarify. However, the mobilization of the concept by the United Nation’s actors is usually 
attached to a particular rationalization process assisted by the emotion of fear -  the UN 
system reform is justified by means of the necessity to address the inherent risks of 
interdependency. The main problem with this approach is precisely that it plays in the 
very same emotional, utilitarian grounds where nation-states seem to justify their 
contemporary raison d ’etre. On the contrary, the Alliance advocates for an empathic-base 
rationalization of interdependency, stressing its opportunity site and exploring the positive 
effects that an increasing interdependent world can have over the emotional infrastructure 
of individuals. That is, it combines Kant with Spinoza. But while this can indeed 
contribute to create a new, and probably longer, legitimacy process for a world’s based 
public intervention, it can also have dramatic unintended consequences if the final forms 
of political actions conflict with the key premises of the process, especially the principle 
of individual autonomy.
Third, a crucial element of the Alliance proposal is its aim at combining and coordinating 
different actors and political projects. The proposal is to bring together governments50, 
actors from the civil society, multiple UN agencies (UNESCO and UNDP among others), 
as well as other international organizations and regional bodies, including the European 
Union, the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Council of Europe, 
the Organizational of the Islamic Conference, the League of Arab States, the Islamic 
Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization, United Cities and Local Governments 
and the World Tourism Organization. The Alliance current organizational conception
50 Mestres and Soler (2007)
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implies very little bureaucracy. And, if  properly articulated, the network of partners can 
indeed transform the proposal in one of the biggest networked policies at the global level 
ever designed, able to address a particular problem or global event from different 
positions, flexibly configuring and reconfiguring its structure in relation to its shared 
aims, and not to the individual interests of its partners. That the initial organizational 
conception of the Alliance tends to the network structure opens up the possibility that the 
policy could impact on the highly bureaucratic structure of the United Nations system, for 
example introducing a more networking culture among its employees. It could also 
happen, however, exactly the opposite: the Alliance can easily become a bureaucratic 
structure, especially if its leaders and members interpret it as an objective in itself, instead 
of a system of reconfigurable means. When and how Zapatero’s government and other 
crucial actors substitute their active guidance for a greater openness of the policy will 
probably be crucial to determine the final organizational structure of the Alliance.
And four, as a cumulative result of all other three impacts, and in fact as the more relevant 
political result of the overall 11-M episode, the Alliance of Civilizations can impact on 
the enforcement of international legal rules, and on the rethinking and creation of new 
types of rules at the global level that might help regulating those forms of power which 
compromise, disrupt or undermine fair and sustainable conditions for global cooperation 
and coordination.
CONCLUSION: THE 11-M EPISODE
Globaliza,ion * ----------------------------------  Mobilization
G lobal E v en t
The global event episode analyzed in this chapter is complex, and some of its 
consequences are still unfolding as I write these words. And yet, the exercise has been 
useful to explore the explanatory power of the episodic characterization approach to the 
political dynamics of the post 9/11 world. The general methodological lessons learned
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from the exercise will be discussed in the dissertation’s conclusion. It is important to bear 
in mind that, according to our framework, general theoretical statements cannot be 
derived from single episodic characterizations. But we can extract several analytical 
results for the specific development of the case. They relate directly to the cumulative 
parts of our framework.
The 11-M terrorist bombings were a global event first of all because globalization, 
understood as the exercise of intended and unintended power at transnational distance and 
within a highly interconnected political setting, was a plausible cause. And it was a 
plausible cause from different perspectives: from the perspective of the global terrorist 
group that perpetrated the attack, and from the perspective of the current configuration of 
global political institutions and policies that were unable to stop the realization of the 
event. On March 11, both Spanish and global societies were indeed deeply affected by the 
attack. The data suggests that a consensual period was triggered by the event, thus 
generating a substantial quantity of power within the political system: 11-M generated 
power to do things; transformative, non-zero sum power. The data presented also suggests 
that the emotional basis of the consensual period was mainly empathic, and this is 
important because it naturally predisposed both Spanish and global societies to accept 
certain policies that were perhaps impossible before the attack. A crucial observation is 
that this consensual period was obviously connected to the plausible causes of the event, 
that is, the operation of global terrorism on Spanish soil, but it also had a general political 
effect that was beyond this connection. This is why it is plausible to analyze the 
mobilization of energy following 11-M as a broad phenomenon, with general political 
ramifications, both national and global.
Treating global events as sources of transformative power help to disclose the 
characteristics of distinctive strategic conducts. This is perhaps the key value added of the 
episodic characterization methodology. In this chapter, Zapatero’s strategic conduct 
during the 11-M episode has been studied by means of the analysis of the ways in which 
he mobilized the specific power of the event. Since 11-M is the key source of power of 
this period, it offers a very bounded research object that reflects with particular clarity key 
characteristics of agent’s strategic conduct. We have been able to study Zapatero’s 
strategic principles, and their mobilization, as an ideal type strategy, and we have seen
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that they coincide with what we have characterized as empathic realism: a combination of 
a modem approach to the institutional analysis of the causes and consequences of the 
event, and a deliberate exploitation of the positive emotion of empathy in order to extend, 
within both time and space coordinates, the consensual phase that was generated in the 
social system after the event occurrence. We have also been able to study the strategic 
conduct of the People’s Party actors, and observed how postmodern Machiavellianism 
contrasts very substantially with Zapatero’s political conduct. It does so especially in the 
ways in which it subordinates the attainment of power to any type of truth seeking over 
the causes and consequences of the attack. At the same time, we have been able to prove 
that the major emotions exploited by this latter strategy are fear and anger -  two emotions 
that lied beneath a conspiratorial narrative widely diffused during the episode’s 
development.
The conspiratorial narrative of PP actors managed to drain the consensual phase at the 
national level. In our episodic characterization we have been able to prove the plausible 
link between this and the failure of the peace process with ETA, which was the key 
national objective towards which Zapatero’s government mobilized the power of the 
global event. However, the global sphere did not have the institutional and cultural 
characteristics to be impacted by the PP’s strategy. This helps to explain the relative 
success of the design and implementation process of the Alliance of Civilization policy, 
which is the key political outcome of the episode. The relevance of the Alliance can be 
assessed against the structural constraints imposed by globalization conditions. Measured 
within the terms of ‘traditional’ sources of power, Spain simply did not have a strong 
enough structural position in the global system to implement this policy. The mobilization 
following 11-M within the terms of Zapatero’s empathic realism, and the support of the 
Spanish and the world’s younger generation, explains the possibility of the Alliance of 
Civilizations, and its potential impact on the global system
It is tempting to conclude by comparing the potential effects of the Alliance of 
Civilizations with those of the ‘War on Terror’, but the comparison is unnecessary if one 
simply consults Sands’ (2005) powerful narration of the consequences that the 9/11 
episode had for the international legal system. Less evident is the comparison between the 
11-M and the 7/7 episodes, an exercise that we will briefly explore in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4
London 7 July 2005 and 11 March: 
Key Aspects and Comparison

The main aim of this chapter is to identify more clearly some of the key ideas contained 
in the preceding characterization, and compare these elements with those observable in 
the 7/7 global event episode. These ideas represent some of the aspects that a possible 
theory of the global event, and any of its episodic characterizations, must necessarily 
address. Short analytical ideas will clearly prevail over empirical description in this 
section. The 7/7 and 11-M episodes had substantially different political trajectories: if 11- 
M resulted in the development of a policy with the potential to enforce legal international 
rules, the 7 July bombings mainly resulted in mobilization to advance a law, the 
Terrorism Act 2006, which implies not only the recession of civil liberties in the UK, but 
also the reinforcement, at least within UK foreign policy, of the old realist understanding 
of international relations; whilst the Alliance could inaugurate a new period of 
innovations in international law, the Terrorism Act legislates against the European Human 
Rights Convention, thus weakening international law. The exploration of some of the 
obvious differences between the two episodes, always within the disciplinary boundaries 
of political sociology and within the terms of our analytical framework, might help to 
clarify some of the key aspects of global event episodes. Three elements will be briefly 
presented in the following pages: the importance of ‘emotions’ in the political analysis of 
global events, the strategic loop effect that risk theories of globalization might have had 
on the behaviour of certain actors, and the current nature of American power. We will 
dedicate more attention to this last, since it seems to be the key factor underling Tony 
Blair’s strategic conduct during the 7/7 episode. In the concluding part of the chapter we 
will put forward some ideas on the compatibility between the Alliance of Civilizations 
policy and the Terrorism Act 2006.
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GLOBAL EVENTS AND EMOTIONS
Interest in “the emotional” has burgeoned in the last years, not only in sociology51 and 
political sociology52 studies, but in psychology, philosophy, history, international 
relations53 and media studies54. A concern to understand the role of the emotional in 
personal, social and political life has developed in response to a number of factors, 
including the realization of global events and the strategic activities around them. The 
past overlook of emotions in orthodox social scientific approaches, especially those 
associated with objectivism and structuralism, responded to the view that they occupy a 
relegated place in political life, and hence is seen as relatively uninteresting and 
inaccessible to the methods of sociological analysis. What has come to be known as the 
‘politics of fear’ of the Bush Administration is undoubtedly among the key reasons that 
explain this renewed interest in emotions. Moreover, as we have seen in the previous 
chapter, during the peak moments of global events episodes, emotions clearly transcend 
the personal realm, providing a wealth of evidences to which the social analysts can draw 
upon. Interpretative approaches to social science have tended to monopolize the 
renaissance of the field55: society and particular social phenomena are seen to function as 
constructed situations in which emotions dominate one way or another. We have already 
discussed the limitations of this approach (see Chapter One), so we can here concentrate 
in outlining an alternative to this view, one that has been mobilized in the empirical 
analysis of the previous chapter:
Recent psychological and neurological experiments suggest that emotions are an intrinsic 
neuronal event operating in any cognitive process developed by normal individuals: love 
and hate and anguish, envy, fear and empathy are all part of the ‘rational’, and in fact part 
of the.body56. All social actors are knowledgeable agents: they possess a complex 
knowledge about the institutional circumstances to which they are part of. But such 
knowledge about social reality keeps a chronic, bidirectional relation with their emotional 
state, which is in turn alterable by both structural and strategic phenomena. However, this
51 Albrow (1997); Bendelow and Williams (eds.1998); Turner (2008)
52 Oates (2006);
53 Lebow (2006)
54 Cho et al. (2003)
55 See for example the collection of papers edited by Millennium Journal around the notion of sublime (2006:34).
56 Koenigs et al. (2007); Damasio (2007)
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tremendous discovery is hardly taken into account in most of the current social scientific 
approaches to the study of emotions, which tend to treat them as something preventable, 
sharply separated from reason. Moreover, after the recent advances in the neuroscience, 
we can be quite sure that the plethora of emotions that all human beings are in principle 
able to experience can in fact be divided between ‘negative’ and ‘positive’, and that they 
tend to exclude each other. However, a simplistic hypothesis connecting ‘good’ emotions 
with an intrinsically ‘truthful’ rationalization of reality must be avoided. We have also to 
be very cautious with the opposite hypothesis. Although we know that negative emotions 
such as fear are intimately connected with automatic survival mechanisms, and that this 
mechanisms tend to highlight certain premises of the cognitive processes involved in the 
rationalization of a particular event, we also know that fear or anger can indeed save lives, 
at least when actors are physically present in the realization of a violent global event. 
What the chronic connection of emotion and cognition seems to reveal is another, more 
complex situation: the generation of proper institutional circumstances for the exercise of 
transformative power must have an emotional basis. Social consensus demands getting 
things done, and power is the means of getting those things done. However, a significant 
section of the members of a society can achieve the very same rational conclusion about 
the need for action under radically different emotional states. This in principle has two 
political consequences. One, it inclines the final action towards certain political options. 
Two, it provides a key field for strategic behaviour. Global events ‘natural’ emotions, be 
they negative or positive, can be made to endure a significant span of time, and to 
transcend contextualities of co-presence, as means for certain political actions. But in 
principle positive or negative emotions emerging from the experience of an event can also 
be strategically confronted by its negative or positive natural counterpart.
London bombings provoked instant domestic and global political unity, a consensus that 
was even more visible, robust and free from strategic interferences than the one generated 
by the Madrid’s bombings (see section one of Chapter One). However, we can observe 
considerable differences in some of the indicators that we have used to assess the 
emotional basis of this consensus. Public response to the attacks, for example, was 
significantly different. Fred Halliday, reflecting about the differences between 7/7 and 11- 
M few days after the London attack, wrote in an Open Democracy article (2005): “Much
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is made, with reason, of the calm dignity and resilience of British people after 7 July. The 
remarkable contrast is by no means with a confused or excessively emotional Spain after 
11 March, but with the political response of its people, its parties, and its civil societies. 
[...] After the Madrid bombings, 12 million people demonstrated in the streets of Spain’s 
cities and towns, denouncing violence and upholding the values of democracy. [...] The 
contrast with London -  where the Trafalgar Square gathering on 14 July is so far the only 
sizable collective response -  is notable.” Rubin et al. (2005) conducted a cross sectional 
telephone survey to a representative sample of Londoners to assess the impact of the 
bombings on stress levels and travel intentions. The study showed the presence of 
substantial stress among Londoners, a 32% of whom reported an intention of travel less 
on tubes, trains and buses, or in central London, once the transport network had returned 
to normal. In a 7 months follow-up study published in 2007, Rubin and his colleagues 
found that substantial stress and reduction in travel because of the bombings persisted at a 
slightly reduced level, that 43% of Londoners perceived a terrorist threat to themselves 
and that a more negative world view connected with the attack was common. One has to 
be very prudent in comparing these evidences with the ones presented in the 
characterization of 11-M57. We would need a much more systematic and profound study 
to undertake a deeper comparison and to understand its underlying cultural and 
institutional causes58. Moreover, any Londoner knows that London is still a vibrant city, 
with multitudes gathering on the streets every time that the weather allows it. But the 
available data on the issue do seem to suggest that 7/7 triggered more fear than the 
terrorist attack in Spain, and that this emotion seems to persists. Again, we have to remind 
ourselves that fear could indeed provide positive, rational consequences for survival. But 
neither should we forget that fear is a negative emotion, that, when accompanied by the 
idea of an external cause, can provide assistance to broad political process of consensus 
generation, thus immediately biasing the future outcome of the process towards certain 
political options and to the successful application of certain political strategies.
57 For example, I haven’t been able to find serious studies about the psychological and behavioral impact o f 11-M.
58 It is interesting to note that while Madrid has only 24 public surveillance cameras, London has 42.000.
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STRATEGIC BEHAVIOUR, RISKS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
The analysis of Tony Blair’s strategic conduct in the post 9/11 world poses one of the 
greatest puzzles for political commentators and social scientist alike. Many have already 
met this intellectual challenge, and this is not the place, nor the person that can address 
this issue in all its complexity. So a simplified question, which connects specifically with 
our analytical framework, would be: did Tony Blair use postmodern tactics and the 
politics of fear in the 7/7 episode?. On 5 August 2005, Blair did a very significant press 
conference59 with the main purpose of outlining the political project that emerged from 
the July attacks. The introductory sentences are remarkable: “Of course, there is anxiety 
and worry, but the country knows the purpose of terrorism is to intimidate, an it’s not 
inclined to be intimidated. Of course too, there have been isolated and unacceptable acts 
of racial or religious hatred. But they have been isolated, by and large Britain knows it is a 
tolerant and good natured nation [...] However, I’m acutely aware that alongside these 
feelings is also a determination that this very tolerance and good nature should not be 
abused by a small but fanatical minority, and an anger that it has been.” The way that 
Blair mobilizes positive and negative emotions, evidences of social behaviour after the 
attack, national identity and assumed political demands of the citizens clearly contrasts 
with Zapatero’s speech acts that we have studied in the previous chapter. Most of the 
academics that have written about this particular speech have focused on the Blair’s stark 
warning of his plans: “Let no one be in doubt, the rules of the game are changing”. While 
it is true that the expression transmits only a slightly deeper sophistication that some of 
the Bush’s memorable sentences after 9/11, it’s interesting to notice that Blair used the 
notion of ‘game’ to refer in very vague terms to something that we have to assume has to 
be ‘society’. The formulation that Blair chose is interesting because it bears with it an 
emotional content that has traditionally been quite overlooked. Games are utilitarian, 
social systems that can be stated abstractly and studied mathematically, but that have a 
problematic relation with the actual conduct of social actors. It has always been quite 
plausible that the missing premise in game’s abstractions of society is the unavoidable 
emotional nature of human beings. But a new study has proved this scientifically: the 
utilitarian behaviour that is presumed in ‘games’ abstractions bears a strong negative
59 www.number-10.eov.uk/output/Page8041 .asp (last access: July 2007)
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correlation with the normal capacity of individuals to experience positive emotions60. 
Therefore, in the light of these new, solid evidences, treating society, or any social 
relation for that matter, as a ‘game’, contains a substantive but provably unintended 
structuration capacity, especially when the Prime Minister of a nation mobilizes the 
metaphor during a period when the social foundations for transformative power are being 
generated. Reflecting about the social and legal implications of Blair’s sentence, Walker 
writes (2007: 427): “One might deprecate the implication that solemn legal process 
determining vital individual rights and societal interests should be viewed as no more 
sacrosanct than a ‘game’. One might also comment on the agenda highlighted for reform 
-  in other words, the diminution of individual rights rather than possible intelligence and 
administration fallings. A subsequent refusal to allow any form of inquiry into the latter 
beyond the production of a ‘narrative’ confirms the official determination to manage the 
policy agenda.”
According to the available studies, the construction of postmodern narratives by Blair’s 
government seemed to be a constant element of the strategy after 9/11. Taylor and 
Archetti have studied speeches and press conferences given by the ex-Prime Minister, and 
the relation of these with media discourse, connected to four recent terrorism-related 
events (a Heathrow airport alert in 2003, Istanbul bombings directed to British targets in 
2003, several flight delays between 2003 and 2004 and Madrid’s March 11). The authors 
find that the government’s communication during the crisis saw a constant repetition of 
the same uninformative messages (for example that the public should be ‘alert but not 
alarmed’; that the threat of ‘international terrorism is ‘real’ and ‘serious’; etc.) and 
abundant inconsistencies between the course of action and the chosen narrative. Although 
the British government never used the expression ‘War on Terror’, the study finds that the 
terrorist threat was always described in very vague terms, employing expressions such as 
‘extremists and rogue states can strike at any time, across any national boundary and in 
pursuit of a cause with which there can be little or no rational negotiation’. Interestingly, 
one of the findings of this study is that, despite the general claim that media create hype, 
sensationalism and could encourage public panic, the actual routes followed by 
information on terrorism show that the great majority of alarmist statements reported by
60 Koenigs et al. (2007)
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the British media originally come from officials. For example, on 28 February 2005 the 
Primer Minister told the audience of BBC Radio 4’s Women’s Hour programme that 
“there are several hundred of them [terrorists] in the country who we believe are engaged 
in plotting or trying to commit terrorist acts”. However, I would be inclined to place the 
key element of the logic of alarmism more than on the vagueness or exaggeration of the 
message, on the constant demand for people’s implication in the government’s strategy 
against terrorism, a policy that I have not observed in the study of the Spanish episode, 
nor in the everyday life in the Spanish cities. The psychological costs of encountering a 
reminder of the existence of global terrorism and the necessity to be ‘alert but not 
alarmed’ every time that one enters into the public transport system are very likely to be 
significant.61
Although the focus of our inquiry is 7/7 aftermath, we do not have to forget that the major 
focus of media management during Blair’s second term was on the war on Iraq, where 
Blair misinformed the public in presenting the case of war. The only open question about 
this is if he did it knowingly or not. On a basis of a detail research of this particular 
episode, and on Blair’s government media management tactics (spin), Kuhn (2005: 111) 
concludes that: “some of the news management techniques employed by New Labour 
under Campbell pushed up against and sometimes transgressed the boundaries of 
reasonable behaviour the public expect of politicians and their close advisers”. This, 
accordingly to the author, lead to a breakdown of trust in the process of postmodern 
political communication, and by extension a crisis of popular trust in the current 
configuration of political system, a results which is very similar than the one we have 
observe in the 11-M case.
But it seems that New Labour wasn’t always like this. Many analysts seem to identify a 
shift in Blair’s substantial and communication strategy regarding security policies, 
international law and the fight against terrorism after 9/1162. Much has been made about 
Blair’s interpretation of the ‘special’ relation of the UK and the US as the main cause of
61 London’s climate of fear is also produced by what Les Back (2007: 124) calls “the soundtrack” o f the “War on 
Terror”, something which is also less present in Spain according to my observation. As this sociologist writes “part of 
the work that the sirens do in our time is to maintain the constant sense o f war and emergency and amplify fear. The 
phobocity is not created by the bombers alone, rather it is created by politicians and journalists who are concerned with 
the thought o f them and trade on people’s fears”
62 For example see Gearty (2007)
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this shift. I will address this in the following section in relation to the 11-M episode and 
the withdrawn of the Spanish troops from Iraq. But this apparently highly constraining 
‘relation’, which was in fact tacitly blamed by Tony Blair himself as the main cause of his 
erratic conduct, cannot be the only reason of his strategic behaviour during the 7/7 
episode: there must be other, more profound causes that allowed him to shift the strategy 
without entering into flagrant epistemological and ideological contradictions with the 
New Labour political program. A comparison between Blair’s version of the Third Way 
and Zapatero’s ‘New Way’ ideology (see Chapter One, section 2) provides the following 
two clues on this issue: First, global risks and their socio-psychological consequences 
play a much larger role in Blair’s understanding of globalization. While the New Way 
program lacks the powerful theoretical basis that derives from the study of the impacts of 
global risks, it is surely more aligned with a much simpler theory of social emotions. 
Given the analysis presented in the previous chapter, it is plausible to think that this 
theory provides an alternative theoretical scaffold for the design of political strategies 
within globally interconnected settings. By principle, these strategies avoid any Hegelian 
exploitation of negative emotions, but do not necessarily downplay or overlook the 
necessity to address certain risks. Second, civil liberties play a pivotal role in the New 
Way political program and in Zapatero’s stated political convictions. This has obvious 
effects regarding the election of certain domestic political options, but it can also have 
more interesting ramifications, for example a complex connection with a genuine 
intention to comply with international law, no matter what situation or what interests 
would be at the stake. Despite his obvious inconsistencies, it seems that Tony Blair had 
always been a strong proponent of international law and multilateralism, so it would be 
worth analyzing this contradiction in the light of his much less enthusiastic defence of 
civil liberties.
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TRAJECTORIES AND PERCEPTIONS OF THE GLOBAL AMERICAN POWER
Few analysts doubt that Tony Blair built much of his foreign relations strategy after 9/11 
upon the conviction that Britain needed to stay close to the US. This would explain, at 
least partially, not only his strategic shift and erratic conduct in security policies, 
especially Britain’s participation in the Iraq war, but also some of his domestic decisions. 
In fact, if this is correct, the 7/7 episode could be interpreted as a 9/11 sub-episode, 
revealing some of the complex mechanisms that connect foreign policies with national 
strategies under globalization conditions. 7/7 took place in a political context where Blair 
had already positioned himself as the key fundamental ally of the United State’s ‘War on 
Terror’ principles, and he could not simply turn to another set of principles, or pick and 
choose different strategies around similar global events, if he did not want to lose his 
government’s coherence (because postmodern tactics are also dependant on coherence). 
This perspective would reinforce the globalist idea that foreign and national polices are 
intrinsically connected, in highly interdependent contexts, where many issues are global, 
but democratic accountability mechanisms are exclusively local.
The key, unanswered question would be then what specific reasons lead Blair to became 
the key George W. Bush’s ally in the “‘War on Terror’” , the strategic principles of which 
were simply applied nationally, and reinforced globally, once the opportunity came by. 
Three sets of arguments have been mobilized in the literature to explain this situation. 
One, Tony Blair was convinced that Britain could act as the bridge between the US and 
Europe63, and that he could use this position to lead a consensual strategy in the Middle 
East and in other affairs. The new Republican administration policies had created tensions 
between Europe and the United States over several issues. The most prominent ones were 
the missile defence, the US intention to withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile 
Treaty, the denunciation of the Kyoto agreement on climate change and the US opposition 
to the proposed International Criminal Court. Blair, some observers argue, wanted to 
minimise these differences and act as a link between Europe and the United States; this 
strategy was simply reinforced after 9/11, specially when the revival of the Franco-
63 See for example Riddel (2005). Blair made this clear on a speech in January 2007, when he declared that British 
foreign policy ‘has as its foundation, two alliances, with America on the one hand and Europe on the other’.
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German alliance became clearer. Blair rejected as destabilising the vision of a multipolar 
world advocated by President Chirac and other European leaders in which a united 
Europe acts as a counterweight to the ‘hyper-power’ across the Atlantic. The British 
prime minister believed in a strong Europe acting in cooperation, not competition, with 
the US, and ‘deluded’ himself (an expression often used by the advocates of this 
argument) that he could provide this bridge, and exercise real influence in the White 
House’s policies.
Two, there is a historical, structural connection between Britain and the US, and Blair’s 
decision to ally with Washington was a mere reflection of this unconditional relation. 
Blair, some observers argue, simply behaved as a very traditional British prime minister, 
unwilling to jeopardize the structural Atlantic alliance, and all that implied in military, 
intelligence, cultural and economic structural links. After the Second World War, 
successive governments have made the relationship with the US a central focus of UK 
foreign policy, a commitment that has been even stronger in the last twenty-five years, as 
Tony Blair himself made clear in March 2001: "I’ve been as pro-America a Prime 
Minister as it is possible to have. There is not a single issue I can think of in which we 
haven’t stood foursquare with America”64
Three, the US is in the process of building a new global empire, and it is obviously better 
to be with them than against them. After 9/11, Blair became a de facto Bush’s 
ambassador, covering more than 40,000 miles in the eight weeks after the September 11 
attacks while having 54 meetings with other leaders. When the differences over Iraq war 
between the United States and Europe became irreconcilable, Blair became an advocate 
for the US side, thus exposing the contradictions of his foreign policy (and by extension 
the problems of the ‘bridge hypothesis’). Some versions of the specific content of the 
‘special relationship’ are in fact aligned with this argument. Winston Churchill, who was 
the first Prime Minister to structure the notion of a special relationship between the 
United Kingdom and the United States, linked this relation to the aspirations of the UK to 
keep his status as a great power. For him, the special relationship was one in which the 
US, because of its greater power sources, would now play the leading role, in shaping
64 Hill (2005: 388)
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world affairs, with the UK acting as a junior partner in this endeavour.65
Nevertheless, the three arguments are not necessarily connected, nor exclusive in their 
explanatory power. But they do underlie the very same prediction about the evolution of 
the new world order: the US, due to its overwhelming military and economic power, and 
the mobilization of 9/11 and further global events, is in the process of placing itself at the 
very centre of the international system.
Is this an erroneous perception or a real trajectory? For the moment, as many observers 
have detected, the development of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the current 
strength of global terrorism, have made it plain the existing limits of the Bush 
Administration project when confronted with the complexities of a global, multilayered 
system of power. Yet the post 9/11 world seems to be indeed a transitional world, full of 
power opportunities, and dominated by the selection of strategic options more than by its 
structural constrains. A new American administration could recommit to the ideal of 
multilateralism, and perhaps adhere to the ideas of the Alliance of Civilizations. But a 
new American administration could also refresh and modernize the ‘“War on Terror’” 
project, this time having learned from previous strategic mistakes. In terms of the relation 
with the United States power, it is clear that Tony Blair bet much of his international and 
domestic political capital on the second prediction, on the plausible continuation of the 
“‘War on Terror”’ by other means, and this seemed indeed to be a rather good utilitarian 
option when George W. Bush was elected for a second term.
Zapatero’s government, on the other hand, designed its 11-M episode tactics not only in 
terms of the former prediction, that is, the conviction that a new American administration 
would have a different political agenda, but also explicitly assuming that if the exercise of 
hard power had some sort of continuity, the decline of American overall power, which for 
some analysts was already taking place66, was going to be sharp and sustained. Zapatero’s 
decision to withdraw the Spanish troops from Iraq was the fundamental expression of this
65 The notion of special relationship was first elaborated in die Churchill’s famous Fulton Speech. Investigating the 
circumstances of this event, Callaghan (2007: 169) concludes that “more than 100 Labour MPs condemned the speech 
in a House of Commons motion. But more important, the Labour Government had arrived at the same conclusion as 
Churchill, who probably spoke with its silent support”.
66 For example see Wallerstein (2003)
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strategic vision. Immediately after his election, Zapatero had vowed that he would fulfill 
his electoral promise to withdraw the troops unless they came under UN command by 30 
June when their mandate expires. The final decision was announced on March 14, and 
was simultaneous to Zapatero’s promise to double the number of Spanish soldiers in 
Afghanistan, where there was a UN mandate. Spain had only about 1,300 troops stationed 
in southern central areas of Iraq, so Zapatero’s decision was largely symbolic: it was set 
to denounce the illegality of Iraq war and the ‘“War on Terror’” , and to reinforce his 
commitment with the Spanish people. Many analysts have considered the withdrawn of 
the Spanish troops as one of the most important setbacks of the “‘War on Terror’” policy, 
a perception that was very intense during the immediate days of the decision. The United 
States officially condemned the resolution to bring the troops to Spain, saying it was 
giving in to terrorism. A number of American conservative commentators further 
elaborated this narrative in media outlets such as the Washington Post (see previous 
chapter). President George Bush gave a chilly reception to Spain’s new leader, and the 
relations between governments were particularly cold for three years. Asked by the 
American press how he could ever hope to charm Mr. Bush, Zapatero replied, "Just by 
telling the truth." However, this situation seemed to change when officials from both 
countries, in the 2007 Condoleezza Rice’s official visit to Spain, declared that they hoped 
to put aside their differences on Iraq, emphasize strong cooperation on counterterrorism 
issues and try to find common ground in their strategies in Latin America.
The contrast between Zapatero and Blair’s strategic conduct in relation the United States 
reveals some clues about their distinctive conceptions of the world order. First, Zapatero’s 
position shows a more agency-based conception of international relations. His strategy 
presumes that a change in the US government could indeed mean a very significant 
change in the US foreign policy, even when the sub-episodes of the “‘War on Terror’” 
had already started generating structural effects. Zapatero’s electoral victory was parallel 
to the Socialist Party’s emphatic support to John Kerry’s candidature to the Presidency of 
the United States. This is an important fact because it uncovers a complex understanding 
of contemporary sovereignty mechanisms, one that would have been politically 
unacceptable under pre-globalization conditions. Some commentators observed that the 
development of 11-M episode and Zapatero’s endorsement to the Kerry’s candidature
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could indeed have had significant effects on the November 2004 elections.
And second, Zapatero’s strategy demonstrated a more sophisticated conception of the 
world order, one where the US is not simply at the head of the international system, able 
to punish any actor who doesn’t comply its unilateral interests. The US is indeed a 
powerful agent in Zapatero’s strategic vision, but it is embedded in complex ways into a 
web of state and non-state actors that have constantly changing and overlapping relations 
of autonomy and dependence. In fact, as some commentators have pointed out, the US 
can no longer hope to achieve even the kind of primacy in the international economic 
sphere: forecasts indicate that the Chinese, Indian and Brazilian economies will rival 
those of most western powers. And although the United States will continue to have an 
overwhelming power in the military sphere, the rise of global organized terrorist violence 
seriously questions the current efficiency and efficacy of military power to maintain 
national security.
Only the evolution of the key undergoing global event’s episodes, and the analytical 
characterization of the new ones, will reveal which understanding of the global system is 
better suited for the elaboration of global strategies. Undoubtedly, Blair carried the 
weight of the ‘special relationship’ arguments: he did, according the historical records67, 
nothing that most of his predecessors did not do. Zapatero’s choices came from a 
different historical legacy, and a different structural location in the power system. 
However, as we have tried to show in this chapter, the role that the United States had in 
both episodes underlie different conceptions of the global order, and different 
understandings of the ways that the ‘national interests’ are defended within this context. 
Moreover, it is also quite plausible to consider the idea that Blair himself honestly shared 
a great amount of the “‘War on Terror’” principles with its main sponsors: how could be 
otherwise?
The global anxiety instigated by Blair and the US policies allow the US-UK relationship 
and the future direction of UK policy to be rethought; at least this is what Gamble and 
Kearns (2007) and other political analysts envision. According to these authors, the UK
67 Gamble (2003: Chapter 5)
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government needs to develop and publish a new and genuine national security strategy 
that includes inputs from non-government as well as government experts. This should be 
used to provide a new basis for policy discussion between London and Washington, and 
establish the limits of cooperation and disagreement between both countries. The 
cooperation of the US must be constructed on the evidence that certain US 
administrations have in the past been committed to multilateral solutions, and have 
delivered positive results to the global system. And this cooperation must also be 
constructed in terms of the elaboration of a forward-looking and credible policy 
alternatives to Bush ‘“War on Terror”’. As we have seen in the previous chapter, 
Zapatero’s mobilization of the power of the global event was mainly aimed at generating 
one of these possible alternatives. However, as we will see in the following section, the 
evolution and the structural impact of 7/7 episode casts serious doubt about the short-term 
actual possibilities of this shift.
CONCLUSION: EPISODE’S OUTCOMES AND THEIR RELATION.
Arguably, the Terrorism Act 2006 concentrated most of the political energy generated by 
7/7: Tony Blair and the British Government used the power generated by the event to 
limiting the rights of suspects and extend the powers of the police force. However, the 
legal background suggests, as does the strategic evolution of the episode, that the 
aftermath of 7/7 is to a great extent a sub-episode of 9/11: Blair’s government was already 
empowered by a panoply of new authorities under the Terrorism Act 2000, the Anti­
terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 and the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. For 
instance, the figures released by the Home Ofice showed that, up to 30 September 2005, 
895 people had been arrested under the Terrorism Act 2000. Only twenty-three of those 
arrested were subsequently convicted of a terrorism offence. London’s transport police 
stopped 6,747 people between June and August 2005. The ethnic profiling of these stops 
reveals some of the political consequences of 7/7 episode: 2,390 of those stopped were 
Asian and 2,168 were white people.
But besides bringing the powers of detention significantly beyond, the Terrorism Act 
2006 penetrates in the realm of communication: it provides for new offences relating to 
speech which might be construed as encouraging terrorism, other broad offences
134
concerning preparatory measures and training’ wider grounds for the proscription of 
organisations, and the extension of detention without trial upon arrest from 14 days to 28 
days. It is in the realm of communication that the Terrorism Act seems to be at odds with 
the Alliance of Civilization policy. Walker (2007: 457) defines this apparent contradiction 
very clearly: “In view of the need to understand much more of this ‘new reality’, one 
wonders at the wisdom of measures which seek to regulate places of worship and 
religious leaders(an idea later dropped)or seek to stifle debate by criminalising political 
speech and political groups. The sacrifice of rights to expression and liberty in the 
Terrorism Act 2006,the official endorsement of the intolerance of offensive speech, and 
the devaluation of the humanity of outsiders may ultimately become part of the problem 
rather than the solution, for it is dialogue and honesty between individuals, communities 
and cultures which gives hope of an alternative to political violence.” The Blair 
government has also a ‘soft power’ strategy against terrorism, one that includes, among 
other specific policies, an explicit support to the Alliance of Civilisations . However, the 
Terrorism Act is largely dependant on physical, coercive measures, and aims at affecting 
the process of socialized communication in ways that clearly differ from the Alliance. The 
question of their compatibility is an open one, but it seems plausible to think that the 
encouragement of a free, global communication process as the key means for institutional 
change suffers enormously when certain parts of this communication are officially 
criminalised by the state, taken away from the realm of personal and social responsibility, 
and thus excluded from the socialization of empathy.
However, these two policies seem to collide in the medium more than in the message. The 
Internet has already been a key field of application of the Terrorism Act 2006, and will 
probably increase its importance in the future. This is simply because under contemporary 
conditions of communication, the policy is very likely to produce a mechanism of 
adaptation from physical encounters to virtual, anonymous realities. Every sentence
68 The UK is part o f the Alliance’s Group of Friends. Moreover, on the 27th July 2005 Tony Blair said at a joint news 
conference with Zapatero that "We discussed the proposal that the Spanish prime minister has made for what he called 
an alliance of civilizations, which is the idea that we join together, our countries with Muslim countries. Turkey is 
particularly involved in this - to form a coalition of civilised people from whatever race or religion to combat the 
barbarity of terrorism. I think this is a proposal with possibilities in it that we can develop over the month”.
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written in a political web log could become a source of prosecution, thus providing a new 
source of power for global terrorists, and for the politics of fear. Moreover, it is very 
likely that with the official prosecution of new cases, the Internet will constantly appear in 
the media not as an opportunity to develop global communication processes, but as a 
source of global terrorism. This effect could obviously be devastating for the 
rationalization of the multiple opportunities opened up by the Information Society, which 
is precisely the main area where the Alliance of Civilizations policy directs its 
implementation process.
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Conclusion
Towards an Analytical M odel for the 
Analysis of Global Events Episodes

This is the general conclusion of this Master’s dissertation, where we have explored the 
possibility and interest of a theory of the global event. We have framed the exploratory 
research within the disciplinary boundaries of political sociology, and the key themes and 
approaches of the globalist school, especially those recently developed in order to explain 
the politics of the post 9/11 world. We have argued that the political responses to 9/11 
revealed a mechanism of power that was mistreated in previous analyses of globalization. 
The 9/11 terrorist attacks were important because they created a sharp, unprecedentedly 
particular sense of crisis both nationally and globally, and there is a wide consensus among 
globalization authors that the Bush Administration mobilized around this situation in order 
to advance its political agenda. Yet the globalization literature does not offer a systematic 
analytical framework for studying the ways in which this process took place. After the 
analyses presented in the previous chapters, we are now in a position to set up a research 
agenda to fill this gap, and to argue that the development of the 9/11 episode is interwoven 
in fundamental ways with a broader mechanism of power and institutional transformation: 
a mechanism that, as we have seen, can indeed be detected and explored in cases other 
than the 9/11 episode.
Therefore, the primary concern of this conclusion is to put forward a coherent analytical 
framework for identifying and systematically studying the mechanism of power that 
operates throughout all global event episodes. We shall address this in three main sections. 
First we will address the primary epistemological and methodological concern of the 
theory of the global event: the duality of structure. In this section we will establish the 
general guidelines for individual characterizations of global event episodes. Second, we 
will put forward the definition and the key proposition of the theory of the global event, 
and outline an analytical framework to test its implications while respecting the guidelines 
of structuration theory. And third, we will outline a research program for the theory of the 
global event, and propose a number of case studies for further investigations.
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DUALITY OF STRUCTURE IN THE THEORY OF THE GLOBAL EVENT
As discussed in Chapter Two, it is of fundamental importance for our approach to maintain 
the key epistemological, ontological and methodological imperatives of structuration 
theory. Chief among these is the question of the duality of structure. The key idea behind 
the duality of structure is that the structural proprieties of social systems do not exist 
outside of action but are part of this very action. This idea is contained in the episodic 
characterization methodology that we have deployed during our research; a methodology 
which is useful for the aims of both individual and comparative characterization of global 
events.
But perhaps the best way to express the consequences of structuration theory for the theory 
of the global event is by separating the two types of methodological approach which are 
subsequently possible in the study of social change: a) the study of strategic conduct and b) 
the institutional analysis of societal transformations. Although these mainly involve a shift 
in emphasis, they have important implications in terms of the possible generalization of 
outcomes, and of methodological requirements in terms of the number of case studies that 
are necessary to produce knowledge. In other words, the analysis of strategic conduct 
delivers knowledge even if the analyst only deals with single cases, but the institutional 
analysis of global events requires a substantial number of case studies in order to increase 
our understanding of the phenomena. The theory of the global event requires the 
intersection of both approaches, because they deliver knowledge about particular aspects 
of global events episodes:
A) STRATEGIC CONDUCT
In the analysis of strategic conduct observed during global event episodes the focus is 
placed upon modes by which actors draw upon structural proprieties in the constitution of 
social relations. The characterization of the 11-M episode presented in Chapter Three has 
shown the promising results of an approach that treats global events as a structural 
proprieties one ihat is particularly important during the episode’s time-line. In the analysis 
of the strategic conduct of the key actors of our case, we have given primacy to discursive 
and practical consciousness, and to substantive and stylistic (emotional) strategies of 
control of the several structural disruptions produced by the realization of a violent event.
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Structuration theory has a contingent conception of social reality, so the study presented 
in the previous pages not only offers certain guidelines for orientation of the episodic 
characterization of global events. It also provides specific knowledge about the 
transformative consequences that 11-M had for the national and global social system. 
These exclusive analytical results have already been presented in the conclusion of 
Chapter Three, so we can now concentrate on outlining five general lessons that can be 
derived from our characterization.
(1) Global event episodes are essentially strategic in character. They do generate global 
and national structural disruptions, but these are less relevant than the different political 
tactics that are adopted in the immediate aftermath of global event realizations: no result, 
no theory, can be derived from global event episodes without taking into account the 
unpredictable outcome of specific dynamics of power. There is nothing inevitable in 
global event episodes, and the analyst must be extraordinary sensitive to this fact.
(2) Many actors attempt to draw power from global event realizations: it is not an 
exclusive source of power for members of a particular political apparatus. Episodic 
characterizations could in principle include sectional analyses of the discursive 
mobilization around particular events by different actors, who can be situated in different 
social systems, and thus instigate structural impacts in different contexts. Nevertheless, 
nation-state governments seem to be the most empowered agents during global event 
episodes, so any episodic characterization must include the specific analysis of their 
strategic conduct in relation to the event. Moreover, global event episodes seems to be 
periods of highly personalised policy-making, with presidents and prime ministers driving 
through their mobilization towards relevant policies. This simplifies very significantly the 
focus of analysis.
(3) Global events episodes are indeed emotion-intensive, but this must not be treated by 
the analyst as something that causes automatic havoc in the process of reasoning. Existing 
characterizations of global event episodes invariably start with something similar to this: 
“In the weeks after 9/11 ordinary rational calculations did not apply. Emotions were 
running high and there was a widely shared feeling of living through a cataclysmic 
event.” Traditional wisdom and scientific investigations of the normal reasoning process
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reveal the potentially harmful influence of certain emotional biases. But recent 
investigations have shown that the absence of emotion and feelings is no less damaging, 
no less capable of compromising the rationality of social systems. The real issue is not the 
counterpoising of emotion and reason, but the systematic study of those evidences that 
reveal the predominant emotion during an episode’s sequence.
(4) Actor’s strategic behaviour is performed at both the emotional and the rational level, 
and both are necessary to understanding the process of consensus generation during 
global event episodes. Emotions and reason are a duality, not a dualism, and that is why 
hybrid concepts are useful for characterizing certain strategic behaviours. Within this 
characterization methodology, the combinations of emotions and epistemological 
approaches with reason and reality are many, so the analyst must put a substantial effort 
into finding the concept that best describes the creative combination deployed by an actor 
during an episode.
(5) The analysis of empathy and fear is of fundamental importance to the characterization 
of both the strategic conduct of actors and the structural disruptions of social systems 
during violent global event episodes. However, there is nothing intrinsically new in this, 
apart from the global nature of global events, and therefore the global nature of the source 
of power employed. Machiavelli wrote over 400 years ago that a prince ought to inspire 
fear in such a way that, if he does not win love, he avoids hatred. And empathy is an 
emotion that has sometimes been exploited, manipulated and, most of all, bureaucratized 
by religious apparatuses all through history. These two emotions have serious 
compatibility problems, and from this we can derive the hypothesis that, under 
globalization conditions, strategic modes that employ empathy as the key emotional 
source are more likely to be ‘successful’ in the mid/long term, this success implying that 
the event episode generates a smaller and less dramatic number of unintended 
consequences and a longer consensual period. Under conditions of global media 
transparency and plurality, and with social transformations taking place more rapidly than 
in any other period, there seem to be serious costs in trying to expand consent through 
fear. There are costs for the strategic actor who deploys it, because people and democratic 
institutions tend to rise up against these tactics. And costs for the social system, because it 
tends to unleash and reinvigorate negative social attitudes such as racism, therefore
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spoiling the ground of truly multicultural encounter.
B) INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
In the analysis of strategic conduct, institutionalized disruptions of the national and global 
settings of interaction were assumed to be given. Therefore, the extensity and intensity of 
an episodic change appears to have an immediate connection with the activity of key agents. 
This implies the loss of some promising information which can only be obtained if the 
study of global events proceeds in a comparative fashion. This is because it is plausible that 
the level of impact of a particular global event can have a direct effect on the quantity of 
power generated in the social system. This quantity is then mobilized by agents in order to 
manufacture social change: but this social change will always be limited by the institutional 
power generated by the global event. Therefore, in the institutional analysis of global 
events structural disruptions are treated as comparable features of social systems, and the 
emphasis shifts towards the study of how the characteristics of these features impact on 
the quantity of social change. Since this is a difference of emphasis, there is no clear-cut 
line that can be drawn between these. This means that the development of the theory of the 
global event has to proceed in the intersection of both methodologies, combining them in a 
coherent and unique research program. In the next sections we outline how a plausible but 
untested theory of global events would look if we integrate both perspectives, and if we 
give systematic form to the lessons learned through this dissertation.
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THE THEORY OF THE GLOBAL EVENT
Both the strategic and the institutional analysis of global event’s episodes are necessary to 
fully confront the research questions that we have set up to explore at he beginning of the 
dissertation:
• What is a global event? How should it be conceptualized and studied?
• What is the relationship between the global event and power?
• Who are the key actors who play a significant role in the political process 
generated by the global event? What strategies do they utilize?
• Can global events be associated with patterns of domestic and international 
conditions? Can the identification of these conditions help to explain the different 
intensity and the different scope of the immediate political action borne out of 
global events?
The following non-tested, systematic proposition is informed by the research presented in 
this dissertation, and constitutes a plausible, integrated response to the previous inquires:
A) WORKING PROPOSITION
Global events are circumstances of radical and global disjuncture of an unpredictable 
kind, involving the fundamental participation of global, non-state actors and forces, with a 
logic of causality potentially connected to the globalization process, that affect a 
considerable number of people. They generate and legitimate a particular kind of political 
power that breaks through the circular stability of the otherwise relative zero-sum global 
power system. This power is mainly based on sudden changes in political and emotional 
reflexivity around globalization, and lasts only as long as the consensus lasts, ultimately 
achieving a variable level of institutionalization. This institutionalization mainly depends 
on the agency of certain national and global actors. Due to their structural location, these 
are potentially able to draw upon the specific political power of the global event in order
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to successfully overcome and sometimes even regulate specific structural determinants of 
national and global political action, the impact of the unintended consequences of such 
actions also being a direct function of the event. However, for a global event to be 
effectively translated into relevant global power opportunities, it is plausible to affirm that 
five necessary conditions must concur in the political process generated by the crisis, (a) 
The scale of the event in terms of objective information must prove to be medium or high, 
(b) There must be substantial global agreement around the globalization causality, (c) It 
must generate sustained global mass media attention, (d) a significant popular 
mobilization must take place after the event and the relevant national actors (especially 
national political parties) must have sustained, legitimate access to the institutions of the 
nation-state directly affected by the event. Given these conditions, it is plausible to argue 
that global events always generate significant opportunities for global action, a process 
which is independent of other variables such as the direct implication of the United States 
national power bloc, the type of global event or the potential effectiveness of risk 
elimination. The intensity and political direction of the resulting global and national 
action will ultimately depend on the agency of the relevant actors and the specific values 
that the mentioned variables might take. If the global event’s political process does not 
generate relevant values in at least two of the mentioned conditions, the opportunity for 
political action is restricted to the nation-state boundaries. If the event lacks at least four 
conditions, it has no relevance in terms of power.
B) ANALYTICAL MODEL
In this section we put forward all the elements of the proposed analytical model prior to 
interaction with data. This model should test the previous proposition. The presentation 
begins with the figure below. The figure shows the general intuition behind the theory of 
global events. It also specifies the key hypothetic relationships among its constructs. In 
the next section, we will address the key conceptual part of the model, the main aim of 
which is to establish the logical connections between the occurrence of global events and 
the generation of power within the global system. The institutional part of the theory 
requires the discussed abstract variables be tied to measurable phenomena. The 
description of these variables and its proposed measurement is outlined in Chapter One. 
However, it is necessary to stress that this Master thesis is only exploratory. Therefore,
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the model presented below is by no means definitive.
Let me reiterate the key epistemological logic of this research in relation to the presented 
model. The theory intends to respect the duality of structure, which requires both 
structural and ethnographic research. This breaks with the most conventional view of the 
social science methodology. It is especially interesting to point out that the duality of 
structure can be better represented in this model due to the particular dynamics of global 
events as power generators. Thus, this framework is intended to facilitate the formulation 
of theorems of structural causation that explain the determination of opportunities for 
social action in general, but not social action itself. For purposes of this study, quantitative 
analyses are intended to uncover these hypothetical “universal laws” of opportunity, but 
not how and to what ends these opportunities are mobilized, if they are mobilized at all. 
These questions are reserved to specific episodic characterizations. However, 
opportunities of power do not manifest themselves unless they are effectively exercised: 
this is why we can eventually hold in suspension the conscious agency of the relevant 
actors in order to systematize the evaluation of the model.
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(Definition) GLOBAL EVENT (N ature of the  Political P ow er G en e ra ted ) 
Rational Causality is Exogenous to the Model (But Not the Debate around It)
Independent Variables 
Scale: (S)
Global Causality Debate: (CD) 
Power Location Nation-State: (NS)
Intervening Variables 
Global Mass Media Attention: (MA) 
National Popular Mobilization: (NM) 
National Power BlocfsL (NP)
G lobal E v en t
E conom ic, Violent, Environm ental
(1) Triggers “Consensual Period”
Expression  of S u ccessfu l Mobilization
G enera tion  of Political P ow er 
(Invariable)
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(5)
Empathic Realism (Cosmopolitan-Left)/ Postm odern  Machiavellianism (Transnational-Right) 
Particular Configuration o f Temporary Coalitions, Interests and Values are Exogenous to the Mpdel
(a) Circumstances of radical and global disjuncture of an unpredictable kind
(b) Affecting a considerable number of people
(c) Involving global, non-state actors or processes
(d) With a logic of causality potentially connected to globalization process 
(f) Which generates global political reflexivity and global media attention.
(a) Breaks through the circular stability of a zero-sum power system (something ne^5s to 
be done)
(b) Reinforces risk-based autonomous source of global political legitimation for 
domination (FEAR)
(c) Triggers perception of globalization and “overlapping community of fate” (EMPATHY) 
(f) Conflictual Periods / Consensual Periods: Political power lasts only as long as the 
political reflexivity connected to the global event lasts
In relation to this figure:
1. The model cannot support alternative interpretations that do not accept the basic 
findings and premises of the globalist framework. It can, however, be used to 
accept or reject alternative hypotheses.
2. The proposed functions (x, y and z) define the necessary and sufficient conditions 
for a global event to be translated into power opportunities. A research program 
on Global Events would necessarily involve a coherent definition and exploration 
in relation to the theory of globalization.
3. (1) requires both an empirical analysis of the strength of the consensus and its 
emotional basis. The analysis of strategic conduct focuses on the study of the blue 
and red lines. The institutional analysis of global events explores the plausibility 
of the relations (2), (3), (4) and (5).
4. The “impacts” of the dependent variables do not directly coincide with the actor’s 
agencies: they are the sum of intended plus unintended consequences of these 
actions. However, the intensity of both elements must have a direct connection 
with the correspondent structural function.
5. The four levels of political action must be precisely identified in relation to the 
theory of globalization.
6. Global events’ causality and the determination of interests and values of the 
relevant actors are part of the episodic characterization of particular events.
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C) THEORETICAL SPECULATION
In the following table we condense the variables of the model, provide a list of global 
events that are susceptible of being studied through the proposed interpretative 
framework and present the observed values of three cases, two of which have been 
explored in this research. This exercise is only useful because it provides some 
systematically organized material that can contribute to both clarify the elements of the 
analytical model and speculate about its specific hypotheses. Accordingly, we have 
named “structural functions” three specific conjunctions of variables: events that generate 
an structural shift opportunity (9/11), an institutional reform opportunity (11/3) and a 
national empowerment opportunity (7/7). We propose the following indicators to fully 
assess the model’s dependent variable:
Effects on the Nation-State:
• Changes in the Scope and Depth of the Nation-State Enmeshment in the Global 
System (indicators: Global Transformations)
• Changes in the National Political System: (qualitative assessment)
• Changes in the National Values System: (e.g. security vs. freedom -  Opinion 
Polls)
Effects on the Global System:
• Changes in Networked Global Processes: transformation of the extensity and 
intensity of global processes: (e.g. economic openness, terrorist activity, etc. -  all 
of them have specific measures in the relevant literature).
• Changes in the Geopolitical and International Law System: (traditional measures; 
for example number of new regulations connected to the event or increase in 
conflicts between state actors)
• Changes in the Soft Power System: (classic soft-power studies, measured through 
global opinion polls)
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Table 5.1: Summary of the Model Variables and Expected Relations (see below for list of events)
Political Action Effects Over Social Structure
Structural Dimensions Global Events Intervening
(Operators)
Variables Control Variables Type
Political
Action
Nation-State Global System
Generation 
of Political 
Power
Scale Global
Causality
Debate
Power
Location
Nation-
S tate
National
Popular
Mobilization
National
Power
Bloc(s)
Global
M ass-
Media
Attention
Type of 
Global 
Event
NS=
United
S tates
Poss.
Risk
Mitigation
Descriptive
Variable
State 
Enm eshm ent 
in the Global 
System
National
Political
System
Values
System
Networked Geopol.
Global and 
P ro cesses Law 
System
Soft
Power
System
Event S CD NS NM NP MA T US RM PA LS VS R NP GS SP
US9/11 High Disagr. Hyper. Nationalist Trans-R High Violent Y ? W ar on 
Terror
H H H H H H
Mad11/3 Med. Disagr. Middle Cosmopol. Cosm-L Med. Violent N ? A.Civil / 
Iraq /ETA
H L L L L L
Lond7/7 Med. Disagr. Great None. ? Low Violent N ? Terrorism
Act
N L N N L (E.U.) N
Ist03 Violent
C as03 Violent
EgyOS Violent
Oil Price 
S h o c k (73)
Market
Energy 
Crisis (80)
Market
A. Fina 
Crisis (97)
Finance
Stock 
Mark (02)
Finance
Chern (86) Environ
Mitch (98) Environ
Exx (89) Environ
Prest. (02) Environ
Tsuna (04) Environ
KasErt (5) Environ
Katri (06) Environ
Structural Function X /Y  (US9/11 and M ad 11/3)
For a global event to be effectively translated into relevant global power opportunities, it 
is plausible to affirm that at least six necessary conditions must concur in the political 
process generated by the crisis, (a) The scale of the event in terms of objective 
information must prove to be medium or high, (b) There must be a substantial global 
agreement or at least a consensual uncertainty around the globalization causality, (c) It 
must generate a sustained global mass media attention, (d) The nation-state directly 
affected by the event must rank high in the global power hierarchy, (e) The relevant 
national actors (especially national political parties) must have a sustained and legitimate 
access to the institutions of this nation-state. And (f) a significant popular mobilization 
showing the same ideological inclination (CL or TR) that the national actors holding state 
power must take place immediately after the event. Given these conditions, it is plausible 
to affirm that global events always generate significant opportunities for global action, a 
process which is independent from other variables such as the direct implication of the 
United States national power bloc, the type of global event or the potential effectiveness 
of risk elimination. The intensity of the resulting global and national action will 
ultimately depend on the specific values that the mentioned variables might take. The 
political tone of this action will result from the type of national power bloc affected by 
the event, which behaves as an active (non-neutral) power transmission belt towards the 
structurally and ideologically related global power bloc.
Structural Function Z  (Lond7/7)
If the global event’s political process does not generate relevant values in at least two of 
the mentioned conditions, the opportunity for political action is restricted to the nation­
state boundaries. This situation was for example the one that presumably occurred in the 
Lond7/7 case. On the one hand, the chronological position of the event in relation to then- 
proper list (third relevant Islamic extremist terrorist attack in Western countries) makes 
the event to rank relatively low in the “scale” variable. But even beyond this variable, 
Lond7/7 took place when the national and international debate around the causality of the
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Islamic extremist acts was in a very conflictive point, which was in fact exacerbated by 
the event itself. This in turn had restrictive effects in terms of power generation not only 
at the level of international organizations but also at the level of global public opinion. 
Furthermore, no popular mobilization that would have potentially reinforced or even 
released the political action at the global level was observed after the event occurrence. 
Although we still have not explored any cases of this sort, it is plausible to affirm that if 
the event lacks at least 4 conditions, it has no relevance in terms of its generative power.
RESEARCH PROGRAM
These are very demanding propositions, which can only be explored through the 
comparative analysis of a significant number of cases. If the propositions were true, all 
the listed events would have to show logically coherent values according to what we have 
characterized as the “structural functions” of the model. If the particular combination of 
independent variables constitutes a “Structural Function X”, the expected values of the 
dependent variable would have to correspond to what we have characterized as “Global 
and National Political Action with High Structural Impacts”. And the same should be true 
for the other logically possible functions and for any possible new global event that might 
take place in the future.
However, given the epistemological position that we have already outlined, the predictive 
capacities of the model are by definition restricted. In short, the model is not 
deterministic, since the relevant agencies can reflexively decide about and mobilize 
towards particular ends the power of the global events. This has a methodological 
expression in the episodic characterization of global events. However, we have already 
argued why we can hold in suspension the agency part of the model for the structural 
analysis. How should we then connect the two parts if we observe significant variation in 
the expected values of the dependent variables? This fundamental question has a clear 
answer from the institutional point of view: Any significant variation in the expected 
values will have to be clearly explained through the specific analysis of the accounts that 
the relevant agencies offer in order to justify why they have reflexively decided not to use
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the power of the global event. If such accounts do not exist, the model would have to be 
modified or simply discarded.
Therefore, the theory of the global event has a necessarily cultural, or anthropological 
aspect. Some sort of individual episodic characterization, and analysis of strategic conduct, 
will always be necessary for each case, although if the focus is placed in the institutional 
analysis, the analysis of the strategic conduct can indeed be very bounded. A 
comprehensive set of global events must necessarily be analyzed and compared. To this 
end, a more specific taxonomy of events can be elaborated adapting the classification of 
“global sites of power” and the distinctive periods of globalization suggested by Held et 
al. (1999). Accordingly, only those events that fit into the previous definition, and that 
occurred in the period since 1945, should be taken into account. This is because 1945 is 
considered by these authors as the starting point of the contemporary period of 
globalization. Therefore, the following events could be part of a systematic research 
program of a possible theory of the global event:
Organized Violence
• 9/11 US
• 2003 Istanbul
• 2003 Casablanca
• 11-M Madrid
• 7/7 London
• 23/7/05 Egypt
Global Trade, Global Markets
• Oil Prices Shock (1973-1974)
• Energy Crisis (1979-1980) Global Finance
• 1997 Asia Financial Crisis
• 2002 Stock Market
Environmental
• Chernobyl Disaster (1986)
• Hurricane Mitch (Central 
America 1998)
• Exxon Valdez (1989)
• Prestige Oil Spill (2002)
• Tsunami (Asia - 2004)
• Kashmir Earthquake (2005)
• Hurricane Katrina (US 2006)
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Methodological Appendix

List of Documents: Spanish Case
Main Website Resources
http://www.elnais.com/comunes/2004/ll-M/portada.html contains a lot of audiovisual 
and journalistic data on 11-M. The material has been complied by GrupoPrisa Group, a 
media corporaton close to the Socialist Party.
http://www.elmundo.es/documentos/2004/03/espana/atentados 11 -M/ (last visit July 
2007) contains also a lot of information on 11-M. El Mundo is a general newspaper close 
to the Popular Party.
http://uk.voutube.com/user/3daisdemarzo (July 2007) is a very good source of original 
audiovisual material of the 11-M case.
http://www.voutube.com/user/znerven (June 2007) Contents audiovisula interviews the 
the Alliance of Civilizations experts.
List of Principal Documents
Alliance of Civilizations: International Security and Cosmopolitan Democracy. 
Conclusions of the seminar organized by the InstitutoComplutense de 
Estudioslntemacionales (ICEI)
ReportoftheHigh-level Group ofthe Alliance ofCivlizations (2006)
Alliance of Civilizations Implementation Plan (2007-2009)
First and Second Meeting of High-level Group of the Alliance of Civlizations working 
papers (2006)
Comissioned Reports Alliance of Civilizations: Civilizations: Truth or Tool (Bulliet) / 
Western Historiography and the Problem of “Western” History (Pocock)
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Speech Acts
Sources:www.moncloa.es. w w w .lavanguardia.es.w w w .elpais.es.w w w .pose.es. 
www.pp.es.
Zapatero (Complet List):
Z l: 18 April 2004: “Declaration in relation to the withdrawn o f  Spanish troop from  
Iraq ”
Z2: 27 April 2004: "Press conference at the end o f President’s official visit to Morocco ”.
Z3: 27 April 2007: “President’s intervention before the Congress to inform about the 
withdrawn o f Spanish troops from Iraq ”
Z4: 28 April 2004: “Joint press conference o f  the President o f Spain and the Germany’s 
Canceller”.
Z5: 29 April 2005: “Joint press conference o f  the President o f  Spain and the President o f  
the French Republic
Z6: 24 of April 2004: “Press conference o f  Zapatero at the end o f  the official visit to 
Morocco ”.
Z7: 19 of May 2004: “Press conference o f  the President o f Government and the Prime 
Minister o f  the Palestinian Authority”.
Z7bis: 3 of June 2004: “Zapatero’s Press Conference with Tony Blair”.
Z8: 14 of July 2004: “Press conference o f the President o f Government after his official 
visit to Argelia ”.
Z8bis: 19 of July 2004: “Speech at ‘Circulo de BellasArtes’ with Philip Pettit”
Z9: 28 of September 2004: Speech on the presentation of the book ‘Ciudadano Zapatero’ 
( ‘Citizens Zapatero) by Luis RodriguezAizpeolea.
Z10: 11 of November 2004: Discourse of the President before the General Assembly of
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the European Youth Forum.
Z11: 13 of December 2004: “Discurso del Presidente del Gobierno ante la Comision de 
InvestigacionParlamentaria de los atentados del 11 de marzo de 2004”.
Z12: 22 of March 2005: “Zapatero’s Discourse at the Arab League Meeting”
Z13: 9 of March 2005: “Joint Press Conference with the United Nations Secretary- 
General”
Z 14: 7 of July 2005: “Zapatero’s declaration after London’s terrorist Attacks”
Z15: 27 of July 2005: “Press Conference with Tony Blair”
Z16: 15 of September 2005: “Press Conference after the meeting o f the United Nations 
General Assembly”
Z17: 27 of November: “Joint Press Conference with the Turkish Prime Minister after the 
first meeting o f  the Alliance o f Civilizations”
Z 18: 6 of July 2007. “Press Conference with United Nations Secretary-General, Ban Ki- 
Moon ”
Z19: 17 of July 2007: “Press Conference after the presentation o f  the High-Level Group 
Report o f  the Alliance o f Civilizations”.
Peoples Party’s Members’ Main Speech acts:
PP1: 29 of November 2004: “Intervention de D. Jose Maria Aznar ante la Comision de 
Investigacionsobre el 11-M”.
PP2: 28 of July 2004: “Comparecencia del Sr. Ex Ministro del Interior AcebesPaniagua 
ante la Comision de Investigacionsobre el 11-M”.
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Table 3.2
The values in Table 3.2 have been calculated with a simple content analysis 
methodology. The selection of the global political leaders was based on a reading of 
mainstream newspapers and magazines in the aftermath of the 11-M terrorist attack: BBC 
News, El Pais, La Vanguardia and El Mundo. Once the global leader was identified, we 
searched for the condemnation’s full text online. We found most of them in official web 
pages. Declarations were considered to be action-based when the biggest amount of 
manifest content of the speech refer to action or to need for action against terrorism. Key 
quotes:
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